**Abstracts for Wednesday**

**9:25 – Room A**   
Leora Sung - *Maximising Rationality and Saving the Greater Number*

It is typically assumed that the rationale behind a general obligation to save the greater number (SGN) is that there is a *pro tanto* obligation to make things go best. Some philosophers reject SGN because they do not buy into this rationale and because they reject the notion of *goodness simpliciter*. In this paper, I argue that we can defend SGN without appealing to such a notion, by instead appealing to the concept of maximising rationality: given a desire or goal to save everyone, *ceteris paribus*, we are rationally required to choose the option which best satisfies this desire or goal—i.e., to choose the outcome in which the many are saved over the few. I suggest that this approach not only avoids concerns raised about *goodness simpliciter*but also answers the question of whether we can allow many smaller harms to outweigh a larger harm. Finally, it also allows us to take a novel position in the debate about Effective Altruism.

**9:25 – Room B**   
Matthew Kinakin - *Can We Introspect Moral Properties?*

Ethical Intuitionism is the view that at least some of our first-order ethical beliefs are non-inferentially justified. For instance, my belief that *torture is wrong* seems to be non-inferentially justified in the sense that it is not dependent on any prior moral belief. A promising naturalistic explication of Ethical Intuitionism is Perceptual Intuitionism (Cullison 2010; McBrayer 2010; Vayrynen 2008), the view that our first-order ethical beliefs are non-inferentially justified by having ethical perceptual experiences. The truth of Perceptual Intuitionism is dependent on the truth of Ethical Perception, the view that ethical properties can be parts of the contents of perceptual experiences. One of the attractions of this view is that perceptual experiences are excellent naturalistic candidates for providing non-inferential justification. But there is another excellent, almost entirely neglected naturalistic candidate for non-inferential justification: introspection. Surprisingly little has been said about the prospects of *introspective* states providing the non-inferential justificatory grounds for our first-order ethical beliefs. This paper aims to give an account of how introspection could provide such grounds, leading to a novel a posteriori intuitionism: Introspective Intuitionism.

In this paper, I present an alternative account of Ethical Intuitionism, namely, Introspective Intuitionism. Introspective Intuitionism relies on the plausibility of what I call Normative Introspection. Here, I canvass a few accounts of introspection and test their plausibility in accounting for the introspection of ethical properties. I tentatively argue for an account of Normative Introspection which states, roughly, that the nature of our introspective access to the ethical properties of our mental states involves what is sometimes called ‘direct acquaintance’ with those properties. This view is superior to two rival views of introspection, namely, quasi-perceptual views and transparency views. I end by defending my claims against objections and drawing out some further implications.

**10:05 – Room A *(ONLINE)***  
Anda Zahiu - *Meaningful work as a response-dependent concept. Implications for distributive pleas*

Many authors contend that meaningful work ought to be included on the list of distributive  goods that liberal institutions and arrangements allocate. Those distributive pleas rely on common intuitions about the centrality of work to human existence. I argue that, although there is a wide  range of competing theories about what constitutes meaningful work, none of them is efficient in addressing the subjectivist objection. If we accept this claim, any attempt to make meaningful work the object of just distribution is doomed to failure because meaningful work is conceptually indistinct. However, I propose an alternative account for meaningful work that retains its analytical value despite committing to the position that argues for content-subjectivity: the concept of meaningful work as a response-dependent concept.

I propose an alternative to the traditional accounts of how distributive claims are to be understood. Instead of looking at the object of fair distribution (in this case, meaningful work), we  can enable individuals to privately ascribe value and publicly select what constitutes meaningful  work for them. When the object of distribution is conceptually indistinct, the attention must be  shifted towards the mechanism of distribution.

I build a philosophical case for providing the real conditions of freedom that would lead  to a fair distribution of meaningful work amongst individuals.

**10:05 – Room B**   
Urja Lakhani - *Why is Beauty Activity Problematic from a Feminist Perspective?*

Throughout the feminist project, there has been a history of describing and critiquing the hold that beauty has over women. There are several key themes occupying the literature on this topic, including but not limited to: the opportunity cost of pursuing beauty, problems with objectification, the role that beauty plays in dividing women, and the harmful impact of beauty activity on psychological well-being. Though the feminist literature on this topic is broad and insightful, in my view it lacks a clear classification of beauty activity; it fails to map out which specific practices are problematic and fails to provide clear reasoning for why they are problematic. In this talk, I will assess these aforementioned criticisms and add some nuance to the conversation; I intend to narrow the scope of problematic beauty practices, and analyse why such practices are problematic.

I will start this talk by creating a classification of beauty activity. I will create three categories of beauty activity – pleasantly instrumental, purely instrumental, and harmful. In the second part of the talk, I will look into the opportunity cost argument against beauty and show that this critique can only be applied to a handful of beauty activities; mainly in the ‘harmful’ category. In the third part, I will assess the objectification argument and separate out the two accounts that explain why sexual objectification is problematic: the instrumentalisation account and the imposition account. I will then clarify that there are two main facets of sexual objectification which make it problematic: the denial of autonomy and the imposition of social meaning. In relation to beauty activity, this assessment helps clarify that beauty activity is problematic only to the extent that it is sexual objectification, and therefore helps narrow the scope of problematic beauty activity. In the fourth part of the talk, I will look into the argument about dividing women and use the conception of status games to show that competition amongst people in a group is inevitable, and that beauty just happens to be a dimension across which women compete. In the last part, I will look into the argument pertaining to psychological well-being. I will show that there are two elements to this problem; the first pertaining to the self-surveillance that comes with beauty work, and the second pertaining to the unattainability of the beauty ideal. Assessing these arguments will help to clarify that beauty activities which lead to psychological stress and sexual objectification are the real culprits, and will consequently show that not all beauty practices are problematic.

**11:15 – Room A**   
Luca Stroppa - *A dilemma for value pluralists about wellbeing*

What makes our lives go best? According to Value Pluralists about wellbeing, a life should flourish in different dimensions: meaningful relationships, fulfilling projects, pleasure, and much more. Value Pluralists hold that there are limitations on the ways in which values can be traded-off against one another. Chiefly, they think that lives that are excellent across many dimensions are always better than lives that are average across any dimensions. I call this principle Balanced Pluralism. However, Value Pluralists do allow some trade-offs between values. They accept that, whatever one’s life is like, very small quantities of one value cannot outweigh great quantities of another value. I will refer to this intuition as Value Trade-off. I show that no theory can respect both Balance Pluralism and Value Trade-off: these two principles are incompatible. I conclude that Balanced Pluralism is the intuition that we should reject between the two. The argument for the incompatibility between Value Trade-off and Balanced Pluralism works as follows. Starting with an average life, there is a series of changes that, according to Value Trade-off, would each produce a worse life, but according to Balance Pluralism eventually produces a better life. Assuming transitivity of “better than”, a series of changes for the worse results in an endpoint that is worse than the beginning. Hence, according to Value Trade-off, the excellent balanced life at the end of the sequence is worse than the initial average life. However, according to Balance pluralism the excellent balanced life must be better than the average life. Therefore, Value Trade-off and Balance Pluralism are in contradiction. I argue that, despite the many influential arguments in favour of Balance Pluralism, we can’t deny Value Trade-offs: it is certainly true that no slight increase with respect to any value can justify a night of agony.

**11:15 – Room B (ONLINE)**Zixuan Liu - *Doxastic, Axiological, and Teleological Characters Are Aspects, Rather Than Layers*

Husserl cast doubt on his classical view that the doxastic character has priority over the axiological and teleological one. He reexamined the arguments that he himself had offered, turning on the privileged invariance of cognition and its one-sided separableness. His attempt to generalize the will also contradicts his usual cognitivist position. In line with this, I argue that these three characters are inseparable aspects of every concrete instance of intentionality. This contrasts with the view on which they are layers in a hierarchical structure. Each character addresses different aspects of the noematic content. The apparent hierarchy is on the one hand due to a confusion between attention and separation, and on the other hand due to the restricted notions of feeling and the will. The apparent hierarchy, and the apparent objectivity of cognition, have deeper origins: there are three types of relations to the subject, and they manifest themselves to a different degree in these three characters.

With respect to axiological character, there is a temptation toreduce it to the doxastic one. The latter is at work, but cannot exhaust the axiological character. ‘I feel the ontological proof of the God to be unpersuasive’ is not exhausted by ‘I want to verify its badness’. What is different is how the badness *actually* *concerns me*. ‘Actually’ is to highlight that what matters for *me then* is insignificant for *me now*. This is the distinctive dimension of axiological character that renders it irreducible to cognition and the will. It addresses how an intentional correlate *actually* matters for the participant in the correlative experience rather than how an intentional correlate *should be*.

There is a rationale behind the word ‘feeling’, as etymologically more strongly related to the tactile than to the visual sense. Whilst the latter can perceive things at a distance, the former can only work coming into actual contact with its object. Similarly, ‘demand’ implies a distance from what meets the demand, while feeling is an immediate contact of what concerns the subject at that given moment. The German word for ‘concern’ (*Anliegen*) is inspiring on this point: something concerns me literally means that it lies immediately on my heart with a certain weight (*ἄχιος* is originally related to ‘weight’). Abnormalities of this immediateness can be found in depersonalized patients, who report that their painful experiences cannot “reach the soul” and the pinched skin is “three kilometres away”.

A textual support for this view can be found in Husserl’s distinction between objective value and subjective value. An objective value can be felt by everyone, whilst a subjective value is *not* another type of value, but ‘the same objective value as an individual, subjective love-value’. A beloved object has ‘a new value character arising from the ego which is concerned (*betroffen*)’. Here, subjective value means that this thing is of value so long as it is felt as such here and now by me, so long as it concerns me now, *regardless of* how it would be felt under other circumstances.

**Keywords**: taxonomy of consciousness, cognition, emotion, will, Husserl

**11:55 - Room A**   
Álvaro Rodríguez-González Barredo - *Value scepticism and the experience of other animals: Korsgaard on teleology*

At the end of *The Sources of Normativity*, Christine Korsgaard throws a direct challenge against Mackie’s error theory. Contrary to his famed analysis, Korsgaard claims that there do exist entities that can tell us what to do and make us do it: “people, and the other animals”. Analysing what is special about animals, both human and non-human, such that they can ground value  judgments is a core element of Korsgaard’s meta-ethics, and one she continued to explore in  her more recent books.

In this paper, I aim to explore the role of teleological judgment in Korsgaard’s meta ethics, and argue that, even though her account suffers from some insufficiencies, a slightly revised version can overcome them and, furthermore, draw promising bridges between meta ethics and the philosophy of biology. I begin by analysing her account of animals. Through

elucidation of the challenges to normativity Korsgaard needs to face, I assess the peculiar features such beings need to have in order to ground value judgments. Animals must have a  form, in the Aristotelian sense, directed towards self-preservation, and an experience of the  world such that they can perceive phenomena as being good or bad for them according to said  form. Next, I go on to examine the ‘perspective-dependent’ status she ascribes to these  teleological judgments. According to Korsgaard, teleological judgments do not have bearing on  the ‘Scientific World View’, they are features of our practical outlook into the world. I argue that  this strategy faces several problems: it is epistemologically inviable, it poses threats of incoherency and it is easily defeasible by error theorists.

To conclude, I propose an alternative to Korsgaard’s view regarding the status of teleological judgment. Instead of committing to a two-standpoints view, subscribing to a non reductionistic philosophy of biology can still account for the required features for animals while tackling those three issues. Our meta-ethical commitments and our theoretical worldview, then, should not be artificially divided; by presenting them in a bundle, they can support one another,  and a stronger case for the morally special status of animals can be put forward.

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**11:55 – Room B**   
Zak Stinchcombe - *‘These discourses are not overlapping or interchangeable.’ Value-making structures in Lamarque and Olsen’s Truth, Fiction and Literature*

In Lamarque and Olsen’s *Truth, Fiction and Literature*, there emerges an account of literature as one among many social practices. In their treatment, the practice is defined and governed by a network of conventions and concepts that structure how a work is identified as literary by a community of readers and authors. As a consequence, it is only in virtue of how those concepts and conventions are understood by the practice that a work can be said to possess, or else lack, literary value. They argue that literary value is conferred upon a work only so long as it itself interprets, or is interpretable through the application of, perennial thematic concepts that are of enduring human interest. In their analysis, they acknowledge that otherdistinct social practices, such as religion and philosophy, are also centrally focused on perennial thematic concepts. To this extent, these three practices share a “special connection”. However, Lamarque and Olsen go on to insist that, in addition to being distinct and in spite of their special connection, “[t]hese discourses are not overlapping or interchangeable.” In this paper, I will argue that, on the contrary, certain works of literature are valuable *precisely because* they explore how value-making structures might overlap in these three specially connected practices.

In order to accomplish this, I will subject their position to close analysis, paying attention to those conventions used by literary practice that are especially important to its evaluative activity – namely, its creative-imaginative and mimetic aspects. This being done, I shall argue that, whilst their model of literature as one among many social practices is useful, their account falls short in several important respects. As a result, because their account fails to capture how literature is actually practiced, the explanation they provide for how we might understand literary value is flawed. In its place, I offer an alternative account of literature as a social practice that is capable of overlapping with other social practices. This will have implications for the way in which we understand how literary value is conferred upon a work. To draw out these implications, I will turn to an unusually rich literary example, Thomas Mann’s *Joseph and his Brothers.* By subjecting an extended sequence from this novel to close interpretation, we will see that quite apart from being nonoverlapping, some works of literature are valuable precisely because they explore how different social practices and different value-making structures are importantly and intimately related.

**13:35 – Room A**  
Rory T. Wilson - *Testimonial and Discursive Injustices in Transgender Medicine*

Presently in the United Kingdom a diagnosis of gender dysphoria is needed to receive any medical care related to gender affirmation. Gender dysphoria is discomfort due to a conflict between one’s assigned gender at birth and one’s gender identity. However, asserting one has gender dysphoria in this context presents an unsavory commitment: that gender dysphoria is significant to transgender experience, contrary to the testimony of many trans people. Transgender people seeking gender affirming medicine are posed with one of two options: not receive the care they need or use this concept and perpetuate this commitment. I argue that in the clinical setting transgender people are facing a particular silence-based testimonial injustice which has implications for the perceived intrinsic harm of testimonial injustice.

According to Fricker, a person may not have their testimony solicited due to prejudice or a person’s testimony may not even be considered testimony by the hearer. The case of gender dysphoria diagnosis does not immediately fit these models. However, it does limit the testimony of trans people in interesting and unfortunate ways.

Trans people cannot outright assert that they have gender dysphoria, rather, they can only offer narratives that imply they experience it (Pearce, 2018, pp. 64-67). Past the diagnosis stage, trans people then have to consistently reference their diagnosis of gender dysphoria and its specific commitments in order to access further care. To articulate these cases, I suggest an adaptation of Kukla’s discursive injustice to cases of epistemic injustice. Rather than a speaker being unable to perform certain speech acts due to prejudice, a speaker is unable to offer an intended variety of testimony due to prejudice. In this case, trans people cannot assert their own self-knowledge when they say they have gender dysphoria, just reference an evaluation by a physician.

Across these cases Fricker considers the intrinsic harm of epistemic injustice to be an epistemic objectification. It turns people from “informants to sources of information”. The limits on the speech acts that trans people can make due to the process and commitments of gender dysphoria diagnosis may fit this bill. However, we might think that sources of information are not intended to report their own experiences which these cases want trans people to do. Instead, trans people seem to face an imposed strained relationship with their knowledge of themselves. They must be simultaneously certain and uncertain of their gender identity to fit the standards of gender dysphoria diagnosis. Rather than object, they may be forced to be a dual subject.

The diagnosis of gender dysphoria presents a new relationship between testimonial injustice, silence, and epistemic objectification. This relationship requires discursive injustice and reconsideration of epistemic objectification to fully understand.

**13:35 – Room B (ONLINE)**  
Dominik Boll - *Responsibility Expansionism: On Taking Responsibility and ‘False Positive’ Moral Emotions*

Suppose I borrow your favourite book and lose it due to sloppy organisation. Arguably, I am blameworthy. Contrast the case where I lose the book faultlessly, having taken all expected and additional precautions. You might blame me; indeed, it has been suggested that it is right to *take responsibility*. I might feel guilty, but it is questionable whether this is the same kind of blame. What are the differences regarding emotional engagement (if any) between being responsible and taking  responsibility? This is the main question of this paper. I ultimately argue that taking responsibility calls for different responses, but that agents can genuinely change their responsibility.

The debate on moral responsibility has demonstrated enormous interest in cases of atypical agency like moral luck or glitches. They often lead to ‘false positive’ moral emotions (Anderson et al. 2021), for instance guilt without fault. Many philosophers hold that appropriate moral emotions dovetail with responsibility. But such agents are often treated as if responsible by being blamed or feeling guilty (Aguiar, Hannikainen, and Aguilar 2022). What to make of this mismatch? I first examine three cases of (1) being responsible, (2) taking responsibility, and (3) neither being responsible nor taking responsibility respectively. Simple accounts make no difference between (1)  and (2) after the fact of responsibility-taking. To map the debate, I introduce *Responsibility Expansionism* (RE) as the group of positions which accept the possibility of

*Responsibility Expansion*: Making yourself (differently) responsible for X by Y, where you  were not so responsible for X prior to (the initiation of) Y.

I show how different accounts (Enoch 2012; Mason 2019; Sliwa Forthcoming) diverge on  objects, means, and the kind of responsibility one can take, while demonstrating the grouping under  RE is still viable. I contend, however, that there are important distinctions between the cases regarding who has standing to blame (Bell 2012), the flavour and intensity of appropriate emotions,  and the moral status of taking responsibility, which motivate worries about these accounts. Thus, it follows that equating responsibility in (1) and (2) should be rejected. Any account of RE should make room for and explain these differences.

The second part homes in on taking responsibility. I show that responsibility-takers also differ regarding the categories above. For example, taking responsibility for biases manifesting in a single action calls for different reactions than taking responsibility for consequences of formative  life decisions (Heuer 2022). However, taking responsibility appears conceptually unified due to the structure of and positive reactions to these cases. Thus, I defend a version of *Responsibility Expansion*.  I argue for a plurality of means—for example apologies or remedial action—while the object must have a non-trivial personal connection to the agent. I offer an account thereof and suggest that taking responsibility functions as a responsibility-modifier (Sliwa 2019) depending on the means. The upshot is that there are crucial differences between being responsible and taking responsibility the current discussion has not paid sufficient attention to. Therefore, this paper takes preliminary steps to fill this lacuna.

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**14:20 – Room A**   
Kangyu Wang - *What makes life meaningful? A novel subjectivist theory*

What makes life meaningful? Objectivists believe that meaning hinges on objective values. Intuitively, meaning must be about something *beyond oneself*. Subjectivists suggest that meaning does not depend on objective values. Intuitively, the meaning of one’s life must be *up to oneself*. Hybridists, e.g., Susan Wolf, aim to accommodate both intuitions.

I propose a novel subjectivist answer, *meaning-in-deed:*

Meaning arises from deeds that are motivated by indirect passions.

Hume distinguishes direct passions and indirect passions. Indirect passions are passions that involve *ideas*, such as love and hatred. For instance: an artist paints paintings, which is motivated by the love of art, which is an indirect passion. Hence, this life is meaningful.

I explain what indirect passions have to do with meaning, how my theory accommodates both the “beyond self” intuition and the “up to self” intuition, and why doing things matter.

Meaning-in-deed is superior to its major competitor developed by Wolf, which proposes that:

Meaning arises from loving objectively loveworthy objects and positively engaging with them.

The artist loves art, the value of art is objective, and the artist positively engages with art. Hence, this life is meaningful.

I argue that Wolf’s theory, very influential and a strong representative of the non-subjectivist camps, faces five challenges:

1. *The optimist problem*:Hamlet kills his uncle because of hatred, which is meaningful.
2. *The exclusivist problem*: football is meaningful, Wolf thinks, but Sudoku is not.
3. *The wrong mind problem*: Tristan and Isolde love each other. As their romance can be deadly dangerous, love keeps them distanced. Some magic potion drives them together. This erotic activity seems meaningless.
4. *The first kiss problem*: the first kiss with a partner is more meaningful than the following routine ones, even if the love has not faded away.
5. *The last wish problem*: the Allies’ victory in 1945 makes a Dunkirk martyr’s life more meaningful. But in 1945, the martyr could not love or engage with anything.

Meaning-in-deed avoids the first and the second problems, and explains the other three.

Besides, other subjectivist theories face some more general problems:

1. *The Sisyphus fulfilled problem*: assume boulder-rolling makes Sisyphus very happy and satisfied. Wolf claims that his life is still meaningless.
2. *The Epiphany problem*: if one converts from one religion to another, one may feel one’s earlier life meaningless, though the psychologies before and after are similar.

Meaning-in-deed can handle the former. The latter is misconceived.

**14:20 – Room B**   
Pablo Rivas-Robledo - *How we model competence and expertise changes the way we determine which is the appropriate voting rule*

In this talk, I will discuss how different conceptions of competence and expertise affect the models we use to decide which is the best voting rule in democratic contexts.  There are several criteria for evaluating the appropriateness of a decision or voting rule:  We can say that a rule R is the best voting rule for a decision problem on practical, axiomatic, or epistemic grounds (Hartmann  & Rafiee Rad, 2018, p. 1274; Pacuit, 2019,  sec. 2.4). Practical approaches compare voting rules in terms of how easy they are to use; axiomatic approaches contrast voting  rules in terms of principles of rational  decision making; epistemic approaches  contrast voting rules in terms of how well  they can lead the group to a reliable decision  that is consistent with the facts of the case.  Since Arrow (1950), much of the work in voting theory has focused on showing the shortcomings of majority rule on axiomatic grounds. However, this procedure is not effective in determining the most appropriate rule for a given problem, since multiple voting rules may satisfy the same axiomatic constraints. On the other hand, work in epistemic democracy has shown that when using an epistemic approach, there is no specific voting rule that performs better (List & Goodin, 2001, p. 294). Even if majority rule is axiomatically a bad rule, it is good enough  for epistemic reasons. A tension arises:  majority rule is axiomatically undesirable but epistemically appropriate. This would force us to neglect one of the two criteria in favour of the other, but this is not desirable. I will argue that the dissonance that currently exists between axiomatic and epistemic criteria is due to the fact that epistemic approaches use static and oversimplified  notions of competence and expertise. When a more empirically plausible conception of both concepts is used, the tension disappears as majority rule underperforms  on almost every decision problem. In this talk, I will argue that a context-dependent understanding of competence and expertise  not only is closer to reality, but also provides  a better backbone for epistemic democracy.  To this end, I will first elaborate on the current tension in social choice theory and social epistemology between axiomatic and  epistemological justifications for the most  appropriate voting rule. Second, I will discuss the static model of competence and expertise used to argue that there is no  specific voting rule that performs better.  Then, I will present a model of context dependent competence and expertise based on the problem-relative conception of  competence (Dietrich & Spiekermann, 2013)  and the cognitive systems approach to  expertise (Watson, 2021, Chapter 7). I will compare both models of competence and  expertise and argue that the context dependent one is superior because it avoids  two undesirable consequences of the static  model, namely small group infallibility and a  simplistic characterization of decision  problems. Finally, I will outline how the  context-dependent model of competence and  expertise can be transformed into a model  that more accurately compares voting and  determines which rule is appropriate for  which decision problem.

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**15:35 – Room A**   
Ben Clarke - *Trust, Accountability, and Social Norms*

Interpersonal trust – that is, the attitude expressed by the three-place relation, “A trusts B to do X”, where “A” and “B” denote different agents and “X” denotes an action – has been subject to extensive philosophical analysis over the last few decades. As a result, there are now numerous extant philosophical theories of the nature of trust, and it can be a challenge to discern which, if any, of these theories we should prefer. This is a problem for philosophers because however they decide to define interpersonal trust will have a significant impact on how they answer other important questions about the attitude, including questions about its value, the reasons that make it rational, and its moral implications.

In my paper, I aim not only to motivate a novel theory of the nature of interpersonal trust, but to show how it is preferable to some of the more popular extant theories in the literature. More precisely, I aim to show how an adapted version of Amy Mullin’s social norm theory of trust is preferable to what are arguably the three most popular extant philosophical theories of trust: namely, the dependence-responsive theory (Faukner 2011), the obligation theory (Nickel 2007), and the commitment theory (Hawley 2014).

According to my version of the social norm theory of trust, a necessary condition for it to be the case that A trusts B to do X is that A believes that there is a social norm specifying that B has a responsibility to A (and not just anyone) to do X. That is, under this theory, trust is understood to be responsive to, and to involve the ascription of, a directed social responsibility to the trustee such that the trustee is believed to have a social responsibility to the trustor to do as they are trusted to do. It is only under this theory, I contend, that we can adequately account for the apparent appropriateness of a trustor holding a trustee personally accountable through the accountability-seeking practices that are often taken to be characteristic in cases of misplaced trust: namely, resentment and demands for personal apology (Holton 1994, Walker 2006, Hawley 2014). Moreover, by appealing to social responsibilities, the theory has the advantage of refraining from over-moralising trust (Mullin 2005). Accordingly, I argue that a directed-responsibility theory of interpersonal trust is the kind of theory that we should prefer.

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**15:35 – Room B (ONLINE)**Kellan D. L. Head - *Internalist Perspectives on Moral Encroachment*

*Moral encroachment* maintains that moral considerations regarding a belief (racist or sexist beliefs are morally bad) affect the belief’s epistemic justificatory status in addition to evidence for the belief being true.  It holds that the moral badness of beliefs will raise the threshold of evidence needed in order for the belief to count as justified, making morally bad beliefs (at least often) epistemically unjustified.

Suppose person P sees a black person outside a fine dining establishment, and on the basis of them being black, forms the belief b: they are an employee rather than a patron.  Suppose that P recognizes that *all or most* of the employees are black, and all of the patrons are white.  It seems that P possesses evidence in support of b’s truth.  But moral encroachment states that the moral badness of the belief prevents b from being epistemically justified, despite its evidential support.

Moral encroachment is an *externalist* theory of epistemic justification, claiming that the moral features of a belief are dependent upon facts external to and independent of the agent’s evidential circumstance, and that these moral features affect whether the belief is justified.  Here, I develop *internalist* moral encroachment (IME) which I will argue is superior to standard externalist versions (EME).

While EME states that the moral factors relevant to a belief’s justificatory status obtain irrespective of the agent’s (moral) evidential context, IME is different:

**IME**: moral factors relevant to the belief’s justificatory status are *relativized to and determined by the agent’s evidence about the moral status of the belief*.

Suppose agent A has *just enough* evidential support of belief p’s truth to make believing p justified in normal, non-moral contexts, and A believes p.  If p has a moral status, EME has us look at the *objective* moral features of the belief.  Instead, IME has us look at *what the agent’s evidence suggests are the moral features* of a belief in p.  If A’s evidence supports that believing p is morally bad, then A’s belief in p is epistemically unjustified.  If A’s evidence *fails* to support believing in p being morally bad, then A’s belief is not prevented from being epistemically justified in this way.

I provide cases that motivate IME over EME.  Importantly, IME yields the same intuitive results as EME does in standard moral encroachment cases: each of the agents *are in a position to know that the belief they form is morally wrong,* and so their belief ends up being epistemically unjustified.  I conclude by discussing additional advantages of accepting IME over EME: a) IME does not rely on beliefs actually possessing moral properties, and b) IME aligns better with the sentiment that people should be sensitive to moral considerations, and that the notion of epistemic justification should reflect this.

**16:15 – Room A**  
Alexander (Sasha) Arridge -*Towards a Fitting-Object Analysis of Goodness*

This paper introduces the *Fitting-Object Analysis of Goodness*: Goodness is the higher-order property of possessing lower-order properties that (together) constitute the *source* of a reason to hold some positive evaluative attitude towards these lower-order properties.   
This paper argues that this view is distinct from its closest rivals (Buck-Passing and Fitting-Attitude analyses) and avoids a host of problems facing each, including the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem, the Intrinsicality Problem, and the Too Much Goodness Problem. As such, the *Fitting-Object Analysis of Goodness* is a unique and compelling meta-ethical theory of goodness that deserves further consideration.

**16:15 – Room B**   
Rory Aird - *The Legitimacy Dilemma: (how) should we engage with controversial false assertions?*

In this paper, I argue that when responding to controversial assertions we know are false, we are faced with a dilemma. I call this the legitimacy dilemma. This dilemma occurs when both actions an agent or agents can take (i.e., engaging or not engaging) in response to a controversial false assertion (e.g., denial of anthropogenic climate change) lead to negative epistemic consequences. This is because, I contend, either action confers *legitimacy* upon the false assertion; in other words, either engaging or not engaging with the assertion both have the same result of an (unwarranted) increase in its credibility.

I begin with a brief survey of some extant literature on engaging with false assertions from Mill (1859/2003), Cassam (2019), Fantl’s (2018), Lackey (2018) and Goldberg (unpublished). I note that there is disagreement in the details, but a general agreement that engagement with controversial false assertions is (epistemically) good. In fact, the main reasons pointed towards for why an agent shouldn’t (or doesn’t have to) engage are invariably *non-epistemic* ones. So, I draw a broad thesis from this literature; *Optimistic Thesis*: in the face of controversial false assertions, there is *always* an epistemically good action one can take.

I argue, however, that this thesis is wrong. First, I formalise the dilemma: when a speaker, *S*, asserts a controversial false assertion to multiple hearers, a hearer *H*’sengaging or not engaging with *S*’s assertion will result in negative epistemic consequences for the epistemic community. Second, I flesh out the details, taxonomizing engaging/not engaging, explaining exactly what I mean by “negative epistemic consequences”, and why I think the legitimacy dilemma is strictly *social*, and has negative epistemic consequences for the epistemic community.

I then turn to the mechanics of the dilemma, and how exactly I think these negative epistemic consequences come about. I first deploy Goldberg’s *defeasible entitlement to assume hearer’s silence indicates assent* (DEASIA) norm to explain the negative consequences of non-engagement. For engagement, I look first at Gerken’s (2022) *discursive deception*, which I alter to *social discursive deception*: When *H* is unable to respond to a challenge, members of the epistemic community may feel the position (e.g., climate change) is epistemically deficient and “overreact” by retracting claims to warrant or knowledge. I also discuss a descriptive claim I call *Engagement*: engagement on a topic (defeasibly) legitimates the discussion and signals dissension on the topic for any hearers.

Clearly, this is a concerning conclusion to draw as controversial false assertions are currently widespread in our epistemic environment and how to effectively combat these claims is a pertinent area of research. If true, the legitimacy dilemma suggests that there simply may be no good answer. Nevertheless, I conclude by discussing what might be our best option when faced with this dilemma and tentatively propose that some epistemically paternalistic practices (such as no-platforming and censorship) could assuage the problems of the legitimacy dilemma.