

Book of Abstracts

Understanding Value VIII

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Towards a Phenomenological Account of Emotional Experiences: On the Justificatory Force of Moral Emotions

Philipp Berghofer

University of Graz

Concerning sources of immediate justification, there are three types of experiences that are often considered the only plausible candidates of justification-conferring experiences: *Perceptual experiences* justify beliefs about physical states of affairs, *rational intuitions* justify beliefs about a priori truths, and *introspective experiences* justify beliefs about one's own mental states. In my contribution, I shall defend the view that *emotional experiences* can immediately justify beliefs about the *evaluative* status of certain states of affairs.

By an emotion or emotional experience, I understand an intentional mental state that presents its object in an evaluative way. This means that emotions exhibit a distinctive phenomenal character, which qualifies them as a distinctive type of experience. When you are having a walk and suddenly a grizzly bear approaches you, the emotion of fear presents this object (the approaching grizzly bear) as dangerous. My focus will be *moral* emotions. Prime examples of moral emotions are guilt and indignation. When you selfishly refuse to help a friend in need, the emotion of guilt may present your (lack of) action in a distinctive way as morally condemnable. Reading in the newspapers how corrupt politicians do not care about the people who voted for them may evoke the emotion of indignation. The question I address is whether such emotions can immediately justify your beliefs that the respective actions are morally wrong.

Only very recently have researchers in the analytic tradition begun to investigate the relationship between emotion and value (cf. Roeser & Todd 2014). Those few works that explicitly defend the claim that moral emotions are a source of immediate justification typically stress the similarities to perceptual experiences (cf. Pelsler 2014). However, so far the question what it is that makes emotional experiences a source of immediate justification is rarely addressed. What gives them their justificatory force? With respect to perceptual experiences, the most common *externalist* answer is reliability: Perceptual experiences gain their justificatory force by virtue of their reliability. I will defend an *internalist* approach. More precisely, I shall argue that emotional experiences (like perceptual experiences) gain their justificatory force by virtue of their *distinctive phenomenal character*. With respect to perceptual experiences and rational intuitions, such a phenomenological conception of experiential justification has recently been defended, e.g., by Chudnoff 2013 and Church 2013. In my contribution, I aim at broadening this approach such that it also includes emotional experiences. Doing so allows me to identify a rich potential of fruitfully engaging approaches typically considered to be incompatible, namely analytic meta-ethics and Husserlian phenomenology (cf. Drummond & Rinofner-Kreidl 2018). Furthermore, I will draw on the expanding literature on moral perceptions and argue that moral perceptions can be identified as moral emotions.

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Moral generalizations are genuinely explanatory

Alexios Brehier-Stamatiadis

University of Leeds

I defend the claim that moral generalizations (both hedged and un-hedged) are genuinely explanatory given plausible assumptions about the normative constraints that govern explanations. What constitutes a genuine explanation? In the context of this presentation I will assume that a fact is genuinely explanatory insofar as its omission would contribute towards the dissatisfaction of that explanation's success conditions. Why would someone want to defend the genuine explanatory role of moral generalizations? There are at least three reasons. The first is historical. There is a consensus in first-order normative ethics that moral principles are explanatorily important. Explanations of particular moral facts somehow involve an appeal to some general moral fact: a particular act is either good or bad partially because a specific moral principle is true (for example, the principle of utility). Second, scientific laws can also be used to explain particular scientific facts. Many theories of scientific explanation take this to be uncontroversial (for example, Woodward and Hitchcock 2003). Insofar as the analogy between scientific and moral laws is warranted we should expect moral principles to behave in a similar way. Finally, the explanatory role of moral generalizations is particularly important for those who wish to advance a broadly neo-Humean view of moral principles. Neo-Humeans take moral law-statements to refer to non-governing moral regularities. If their project is to be made plausible then it should be demonstrated how such entities can have a genuine explanatory role.

The claim that moral generalizations can be genuinely explanatory has been recently contested by Skow (2016) and Berker (2018). Berker claims that moral generalizations are explanatorily redundant. Given independently plausible assumptions about the hyperintensionality of moral principles, it seems to follow that a particular moral fact can be fully explained by another particular fact without appealing to a moral principle. Skow similarly claims that moral generalizations cannot explain particular moral facts, not in virtue of their putative redundancy, but, instead, because they are not appropriate answers. Instead, they are appropriate as answers to the following higher-level question: why is this particular

moral fact explained by such-and-such particular fact? Finally, even if one somehow provides a satisfactory response to these challenges the threat of circularity arises (Rosen 2017). If we grant that moral generalizations can genuinely explain particular moral facts, and if we assume the independently plausible view that generalizations are explained by their instances, it seems to follow that moral generalizations explain themselves. I argue that all three challenges can be simultaneously tacked if one assumes a powerful and plausible, moderately pluralistic, view of explanation. Such a view builds on the idea that the success condition of a given explanation largely depends on the aims of the explanatory project in which such an explanation figures.

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What role can cultural values plausibly play in justifying political institutions?

William Wai Chuen Chan
University of Warwick

Certain philosophers and politicians support particular political institutions, for the reason that those institutions exhibit or promote the cultural values widely shared by the citizens of their political community. For instance, the just institutions Rawls (2005) defends express what he considers the public political culture of modern constitutional democracy;¹ Lee Kuan Yew defends the paternalistic institutions in Singapore against Western-style liberal democracies, on the basis of Asian cultural values (Kwang, Fernandez and Tan, 1998); and so on.

I examine this kind of reasoning. For present purposes, cultural values are broadly conceived as values *actually* shared by some social groups. Political institutions are understood as institutions which create and enforce laws. The *mere* fact that a political institution exhibits or promotes certain cultural values, I shall argue, cannot justify that institution in any substantial way. Rather, the following view best characterizes the justificatory force of cultural values on political institutions:

Cultural value *C* can *pro tanto* justify political institution *P*, if and only if by having *P* to exhibit or promote *C*, a culturally independent goal *G* (such as social justice) is met, where *G* is morally worth pursuing for its own sake; the value of *G* does not depend on whether *G*'s value is actually recognized by anybody.

It follows from this view that in justifying political institutions, we are to look solely at the instrumentality of cultural values. There is no self-contained force of cultural values on justifying political institutions.

I propose three grounds for this view. First, there is indeterminacy as to the proper moral basis for some cultural values, instead of others, to be selected to be exhibited or promoted by political institutions. We cannot make sense of a particular selection of cultural values, without appeal to the larger ends they serve. Second, some cultural values are clearly problematic from the moral perspective, such as values supposing that some sexes are naturally inferior to another, that slavery is correct, that cannibalism is unproblematic and so on. It would be highly counter-intuitive to say that there would be a reason for political institutions to display or promote such obviously questionable values, even if that reason were just *pro tanto*.

¹ Rawls's conception of justice does not wholly rest on cultural considerations, though.

Third, no attempts to defend the intrinsicity of cultural values with respect to political morality have been successful so far. One notable example is Cohen's (2011: 207-208) account of cultural conservation. He argues that we have an interest in *cultural continuity*: we want to connect ourselves to the past, to the living, dead and future people. We thus have an interest in having institutions that secure our interest in cultural continuity; that is why political institutions should pro tanto exhibit or promote cultural values. But this kind of reasoning is unsuccessful, since it is awkwardly self-regarding—it cannot justify institutions exhibiting or promoting cultural values that are *not* spiritually connected to us.

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Trans Epistemology: Normativity, Injustice, and Incomprehension

Matthew Cull

University of Sheffield

This paper will attempt to carve out a specifically trans epistemology, arguing that (a) there are debates over epistemology that are distinctive to the trans experience, (b) that there are effects of epistemic injustices that are specific to trans people, and (c) that the perspectives of trans people can make us rethink central concepts in social epistemology. I will argue for these conclusions using three case studies: (i) the debate over the nature of justification provided by self-identification, (ii) testimonial injustice, and (iii) hermeneutical injustice. Should there be time, I will also develop a fourth case, (iv) dismissive incomprehension.

The first case, (i) the debate over the nature of normativity provided by self-identification provides a case of (a) - an epistemic debate that is specific to the trans experience. Here, Talia Mae Bettcher has argued that a person asserting, say, "I am a woman" does not provide other agents with an *epistemic* justification for believing or asserting that the initial speaker is a woman. Instead, she suggests, other agents are offered an *ethical* justification. I will develop reasons to suggest that Bettcher is too quick in her arguments against epistemic justification. However, as I shall conclude, the broader conclusion that we should draw is that there is a debate in epistemology that is distinctive to trans identities.

The second case, (ii) testimonial injustice, nicely provides us with ways in which epistemic injustices have effects on trans people that are specific to trans people, i.e. (b). I will look at the ways in which insufficient credence is afforded to trans people when they offer self-identifications and how this constitutes a particularly acute wrong, wronging trans people as knowers and as epistemic agents in specific ways. Here I will draw on the work of Rachel McKinnon and the 2013 #transdocfail campaign.

Our third case, (iii) hermeneutical injustice gives us a case of trans experiences of a phenomenon pushing back against traditional epistemology's understanding of that phenomenon. Drawing on the work of Trystan Goetze and Patricia Hill Collins I will show the ways in which Fricker's notion of hermeneutical injustice is insufficient, and needs revision in the light of trans experiences. This should lead us to think that (c) there are central concepts in social epistemology that need thinking in the light of trans experiences.

Finally, should there be time, I will develop (iv) the notion of *dismissive incomprehension* - a speech act that allows some speaker to undermine some other agent in the eyes of an audience by performing ignorance of the meaning of whatever that other agent says. Whilst this speech act is widespread, I will suggest that there are ways that it is used to undermine trans people that are especially pernicious. I take it that this investigation into dismissive incomprehension is simply another case study in *trans epistemology*.

Intuitions About Moral Relevance—Good News For Moral Intuitionism!

Hossein Dabbagh and Alex Wiegmann

Doha Institute for Graduate Studies and Institute for Cognitive Science Studies, University of Göttingen

Moral intuitionism is the view that there are certain *prima facie* or *pro tanto* moral principles (self-evident propositions) that our moral intuitions can give us non-inferential justification for believing. Some critiques such as Sinnott-Armstrong contend that “some recent research in psychology and brain science undermines moral intuitionism” (2006, 340). The research Sinnott-Armstrong is referring to has found that our moral intuitions can be influenced by morally irrelevant factors, i.e. framing effects, such as the order in which moral dilemmas are presented to participants. Most of these empirical psychology findings are concerned with moral intuitions about the permissibility of a particular action, e.g. whether it is right to kill one person in order to save five persons. However, some influential forms of moral intuitionism (e.g. Ross, 1930, Audi, 2004 and Stratton-Lake, 2002) do not require that our *moral intuitions about the permissibility of actions* are immune to the influence of morally irrelevant factors but emphasize the self-evidence of *prima facie* or *pro tanto* duties. Hence, in order to empirically challenge these forms of moral intuitionism it needs to be shown that moral intuitions about what counts in favour of or against performing certain *prima facie* duties, e.g. “promise-keeping, *ceteris paribus*, is morally right” (henceforth: moral intuitions about moral relevance) are not reliable. If there are such reliable intuitions, then this would be good news for the epistemology of moral intuitionism.

Recently, Andow (2017) conducted several experiments to investigate whether people’s intuitions about the moral relevance of certain properties of cases might be relatively resistant to framing effects. For instance, he tested whether agreement ratings to statements such as “The fact that pushing the bystander will lead to the death of one innocent bystander who would otherwise have survived counts against you pushing the bystander” are prone to order effects or exhibit an actor versus observer bias. Overall, he found that people’s intuitions about moral relevance were not affected by framing effects. However, the findings were not fully satisfying news for moral intuitionism since in some experiments about one third of participants disagreed with the purportedly self-evident moral relevance statements.

We speculated that the relatively low agreement rate for the purportedly self-evident moral relevance statements might be due to experimental pragmatics. For example, some participants might have interpreted the statements as being about the overall moral status of the corresponding action (e.g., whether the action is permissible or ought to be performed). To test this hypothesis, we rerun two experiments by Andow in their original form and also added conditions in which we applied some measures to block such unintended re-interpretations of the moral relevance statements. While we replicated Andow’s findings in the original conditions, the agreement rates in the new, extended conditions were

significantly higher (~90%) and at the same level as the proportion of correct answers to a simple transitivity task. Hence, the findings of our experiments provide good news for the aforementioned versions of moral intuitionism.

Faultless disagreement and moral relativism

Patrick Denning

University of Edinburgh

Two important developments have recently been made in the philosophical literature on relativism. First, sophisticated semantic frameworks have been advanced by MacFarlane and others (MacFarlane, 2014). These sophisticated forms of relativism avoid many of the objections that face traditional, e.g. indexical, views. Second, the long standing notion that disagreement is evidence for relativism has been precisified in terms of the notion of “faultless disagreement” (Kolbel, 2004). Max Kolbel has argued persuasively that relativism is the best account of topics on which we can disagree without fault. Together, these developments have led to a renewed interest in relativist accounts of paradigmatically subjective domains of inquiry, such as taste.

Meta-ethicists, though, have paid relatively little attention to these developments. In particular, moral relativists have yet to put forward an argument from faultless moral disagreement for a MacFarlane style moral relativism. In this paper, I defend a key premise in such an argument, namely:

Implication Claim: If faultless moral disagreement is possible, then moral relativism is true.

For reasons of space, I focus only on the *implications* of faultless moral disagreement, and not on the question of whether moral disagreement can be faultless. Nevertheless, the thesis of this paper constitutes an important move towards moral relativism. This, partly, is because many moral realists concede that faultless moral disagreement is possible². These philosophers must reject the Implication Claim in order to resist relativism. So although the paper doesn’t argue that relativism is *true*, it contains plenty for relativists and anti-relativists to fight over.

The plan of the paper is as follows. I begin (§2) with a clarificatory preamble, in which I explain how I understand moral relativism, and faultless moral disagreement. I argue that the standard definition of faultless disagreement is dialectically ineffective in the context of meta-ethics. Instead, I present and defend a novel *epistemic* definition. I then (§3) give an argument for the Implication Claim. The argument turns on the premise that in relevant contexts, an epistemically faultless thinker believes a given proposition only if the relevant proposition is true. I show, by *reductio*, that this claim implies that the Implication Claim is true.

Finally, (§4) I defend the Implication Claim against an overgeneralising objection. The objection argues that *philosophical* disagreement can be faultless, and therefore that anyone who endorses entailment must also endorse relativism about philosophy.³ I am not inclined to endorse philosophical relativism, but fortunately – I don’t think that philosophical disagreement can be faultless. Unfortunately, an in depth defence of this view would be beyond the scope of this paper. This is because the question of whether

² (Hills, 2013) (Huemer, 2005, pp. 142-144) (McGrath, 2010) (Shafer-Landau, 2003, pp. 224-225)

³ Cf. (McGrath, 2010) (Sampson, Forthcoming) (Shafer-Landau, 2003, p. 225)

philosophical disagreement can be faultless is at least as expansive as the question of whether moral disagreement can be faultless. Both questions require that we think deeply and carefully about the epistemology of the respective domains. And if we attempt to answer them without doing so, we run the risk that our answers will merely reflect our antecedent biases in favour of or against relativism. In this paper, however, I argue that *at the outset of inquiry*, the evidence for faultless moral disagreement is *significantly better* than the evidence for faultless philosophical disagreement. Thus, at the outset of inquiry, the view that moral disagreement *can* be faultless and that philosophical disagreement *cannot* be faultless is both coherent and promising. So the overgeneralising objection fails to undermine the Implication Claim, at least at first pass.

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Literature, evaluations and truth

Margarita R. Díaz Pérez

University of the Basque Country

In this paper I argue that statements expressing evaluation of literary works can have—and indeed have, on most relevant cases—objective truth-conditions, focusing on what would or could count as truth-makers in literary evaluations. I discuss one particular case: the work of different critics discussing the novel *The Well of Loneliness*, by Marguerite Radcliffe Hall. I pay special attention to how critics give reasons to support their evaluations and thus to ascribe “literary value” —or lack of it—to this novel.

The recognition of literary value is a complex process that requires the appreciation of different facts about the evaluated work. I claim that the usual distinction between the so-called “purely descriptive” statements and the so-called “evaluative” statements, usually drawn under the assumption that only the former have objective truth values, is vague and misguided (Lamarque 2009: 280-281). I borrow a classic distinction by Beardsley (1958) and present a typology of the different types of statements contained in literary criticism texts: analytical statements (like, “The main character dies”), interpretative statements (like, “It is an exploration of oppression”) and verdict statements (like, “It is magnificent”). I argue that all three types of statements have truth-conditions and thus can be either true or false.

The choice of this case of study is motivated by two reasons. Firstly, it provides a good set of examples of literary criticism in different epochs and using different methods, and so it allows me to illustrate the variety of factors that might and usually play a role in the process of literary evaluation.

Secondly, the case of study is particularly illuminating for the problems at hand. *The Well of Loneliness*, published in 1928, tells the story of a woman that suffers from being rejected by society because of her—in its author’s words—“sexual inversion.” It is the first novel published in English on this topic, and it has been largely known as “The lesbian novel.” Not surprisingly, a big controversy surrounded the novel after its publication. Opinions vary from those who defend the literary value of the novel to those who “would rather give a healthy boy or a healthy girl a phial of prussic acid than this novel” (Douglas, 1928/2001). The existence of seemingly irresolvable disagreements among critics is normally taken as an evidence of the subjectivity of evaluation in art. Nonetheless, I argue, they can be accommodated into a realistic approach that take into account the relation of the overall evaluation and the reasons given to support it.

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Does the genealogy of moral belief entail that our moral beliefs are probably false?

Benjamin Dugher
Durham University

In this paper I consider the claim that the genealogy of our moral beliefs entails that, if moral realism is true, our moral beliefs are probably false. This claim locates itself in popular variations of debunking arguments against moral realism (see Street 2006). For the purposes of this paper moral realism should be understood to be the view that there are mind-independent moral truths. The genealogy of moral belief in question is that which nowhere in the explanation of how we come to possess our moral beliefs presupposes that these beliefs are true (Joyce 2008).

From this understanding of moral realism and the genealogy of moral belief I take it as given that we can establish what I refer to as the no relation thesis. The no relation thesis states that the probability that we believe moral proposition P, given that P obtains, is the same as the probability that we believe P, given that P does not obtain (see Brosnan 2011). I argue that the no relation thesis entails that our moral beliefs are probably false.

I first look at an argument against the probably false entailment given by Brosnan (2011). This argument amounts to the claim that whilst the no relation thesis provides the type of evidence used to adjust a prior probability, it is unable to produce a probability where none exists. I broadly agree with Brosnan's point, however, contrary to Brosnan I argue that we can produce a prior probability and thus establish that our moral beliefs are probably false. I set out to provide this prior probability in the remainder of the paper.

I argue that we can assign an equal probability to all possible outcomes in cases of indifference. Cases of indifference are cases where the possible outcomes are exhaustive of possibilities, mutually exclusive and where we have no reason to suppose any outcome is more likely than another. I argue that although the case of which moral propositions obtain is not a case of indifference, the case of which set of moral propositions obtain is, and thus each set of moral propositions are equally likely to obtain. I then argue that the quantity of possible sets of moral propositions which are incompatible with our moral beliefs is greater than the quantity which are compatible, and thus that our moral beliefs are probably false.

I finally consider three objections. One relating to the necessity of moral truth (see Clarke-Doane 2016), one relating to counter-intuitive entailments from my argument, and a third which asks what role is left for the genealogy of moral belief and no relation thesis to play in this argument.

Truth, Belief and Ethics: Wittgenstein's Moral Non-Cognitivism in his Later Work

Jordi Fairhurst

Universidad de las Islas Baleares

It is a widespread view (see e.g. Harman 2000; Lovibond 1983; McDowell 1998; Loobuyck 2005; Brandhorst 2015; 2017; De Mesel 2017) that Wittgenstein, in his later work, is committed to moral cognitivism, i.e. he claims that moral sentences express beliefs and are apt for truth and falsity. My aim in this paper is to argue against this view, and demonstrate that Wittgenstein is committed to the two theses that constitute moral non-cognitivism: semantic non-factualism (i.e. that moral sentences do not represent facts, express propositions or are truth-apt) and moral non-cognitivism (i.e. that moral utterances do not express beliefs).

On the one hand, when dealing with different ethical systems, Wittgenstein suggests that we have a tendency to believe that one particular ethical system will be true (Rhees 1965: 24; Wittgenstein 1979: §31, §34; Wittgenstein, Rhees and Citron 2015: 29). However, he affirms that attempting to establish which is the true or right ethical system is a meaningless task. Saying that an ethical system is 'the right one' simple means that I am adopting said ethical system (Wittgenstein, Rhees and Citron 2015: 29). Notwithstanding, the following may be countered: "there is still the difference between truth and falsity. Any ethical judgment in whatever system may be true or false" (Rhees 1965: 24). However, Wittgenstein's remarks on ethics negate the possibility of stating that certain claims or judgments are true or false within a specific ethical system. First, Wittgenstein explicitly states: "it would have no meaning to say that each was right from his own standpoint" (Rhees 1965: 24). Second, this entails resorting to a normative and context-dependent notion of truth that is not available in Wittgenstein work —insofar he does not explicitly speak about it. From the above it follows that Wittgenstein is committed to semantic non-factualism.

On the other hand, Wittgenstein, despite rejecting traditional accounts of belief, ties the notion of belief to the notions of 'truth', 'falsity' and 'proposition' (see Churchill 1984; Coliva 2010). The non-existence of truth, falsity and propositions in ethics, as I have argued above, suggest that beliefs cannot be expressed in ethics. Moreover, the non-existence of proof in ethics (Wittgenstein, Rhees and Citron 2015: 28) indicates that beliefs cannot be established as either true or false. The lack of correlation between the world and ethics negates determining if a belief is satisfied or unsatisfied. This is accentuated if we take into account that, for Wittgenstein, our ethical and moral sentences express certain attitudes towards life and its meaning, and prescribe certain conducts. The attitudes expressed are evaluative responses (specifically, evaluative responses that stem from natural reactions of approval and disapproval and that generally entail the view of a certain community) that approve or disapprove certain actions, conducts, behaviors and so on. In consequence, and in accordance with moral non-cognitivism and psychological non-cognitivism, ethics is concerned with attitudes and not beliefs. It provides evaluative responses of approval and disapproval with some way the world is, it is not a cognition of how the world is.

On the Relevance of Counterfactuals in Moral Worth

Laura Fearnley

University of Glasgow

It is commonly agreed that theories of moral worth ought to serve two plausible intuitions: morally worthy actions are non-accidentally right. Call this the non-accidentally constraint (NAC). And only the motives which actually lead an agent to act are relevant to moral worth ascriptions. Considerations regarding how an agent might have been motivated in counterfactual circumstances are irrelevant in determining the moral worth of her actual conduct. Call this the non-counterfactual constraint (NCC).

NAC and NCC are widely accepted desiderata, and yet, the constraints appear to be in tension with one and other insofar as non-accidentally presupposes counterfactual robustness. Given this tension, commentators like Julia Markovits (2010), Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder (2013), Paulina Sliwa (2016) and Jessica Isserow (2018) have claimed that theories of moral worth face a serious challenge in the form of a dilemma: either they uphold NAC by incorporating a counterfactual framework, therefore violating NCC, or they respect NCC at the risk of praising right actions which are only accidentally right, thereby violating NAC.

In this paper, I argue that there is no such dilemma, because NCC should not be a desideratum for moral worth. Counterfactual considerations can not only successfully preclude accidentally right actions from praise, but also illuminate moral evaluations in way that is intuitive and theoretically non-problematic.

To demonstrate this, I proceed as follows.

In §1, I introduce the supposed dilemma.

In §2, I begin to dissolve the dilemma by arguing against the appeal of NCC. To do this I respond to what I take to be the two main arguments given in favour of the constraint: 1) considering counterfactuals generates counterintuitive moral appraisals, and 2) invoking counterfactuals is too morally demanding since it entails that an agent not only be motivated to act well in this world but also across a range of possible worlds. In regards to 1), I suggest that the examples critics employ to support this claim only succeed in virtue of invoking *irrelevant* counterfactuals. By borrowing David Lewis's (1973) similarity ranking of possible worlds, I will show in what sense they are irrelevant. In contrast, when we determine moral worth by selecting *relevant* counterfactuals the resultant moral appraisal appropriately tracks our intuitions. The case of Oskar Schindler will be presented to illustrate this thought.

In regards to 2) I will argue that by specifying that counterfactuals track *the degree* to which an action has moral worth, not moral worth simpliciter, advocates of a counterfactual dependence can avoid the moral demandingness objection.

In §3, I provide a positive argument in favour of a counterfactual framework in metaethics by drawing an analogy with epistemology. In both normative domains, counterfactuals function as an instrument to eliminate luck/accident. If a counterfactual dependency is legitimate in assessing knowledge, it gives us a strong reason to believe this philosophical method is also appropriate in assessing moral worth. Ultimately, I hope to shed some incredulity on the widely accepted claim that counterfactuals serve as an inappropriate framework from which moral worth can be determined.

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The Epistemic Injustice of Disrespectful Trust

Danny Forman

Rutgers University

Epistemic injustices are a distinctively epistemic form of injustice which harms an epistemic agent as such. Miranda Fricker defines the primary harm of testimonial injustice, the central form of epistemic injustice, exclusively in terms of limiting a speaker's capacity to transmit knowledge via testimony. One consequence of this definition is that only prejudicially-based *deficits* in evaluations of credibility can bring about testimonial injustices; this follows from the fact that one can only be unjustly harmed (limited) in their capacity to transmit knowledge via testimony if they are accorded less than due credibility and are thereby unjustly distrusted.

We might wonder why wrongs against other epistemic capacities besides knowledge transmission (or conceptualization, in cases of hermeneutical injustice) or do not suffice to underwrite instances of epistemic (if not testimonial) injustice. Critically, if there are injustices which wrong an individual as an epistemic agent (or specifically as a knower) without diminishing her capacity to transmit knowledge, they needn't be the product of credibility deficits.

Consider *SEXIST SAMIR*, a professor, tenured decades ago, during a time when it was hardly notable that he had no female colleagues. He maintains the view that the academic accomplishments of women in his field are generally the result of stealing ideas from male colleagues and pawing them off as their own. He often trusts his female colleagues when they speak about their work exactly to the degree that his available evidence supports, but always under the assumption that they've picked up their information from male colleagues. It seems that Samir commits an epistemic (if not testimonial) injustice against his female colleague when he trusts her word on this basis, insulting her as an epistemic agent, despite testimonial uptake.

The wrong of epistemic injustice is typically understood to be grounded in the unjust (partial) incapacitation or demotion in standing of an epistemic agent as such. Even those who offer purported non-deficient credibility cases (which Fricker labels as "non-core" or "derivative") seem to advocate epistemic incapacitation or demotion as a necessary condition for epistemic injustice. In line with the burgeoning literature on doxastic wrongs, I suggest that we might locate epistemic wrongs which ground epistemic injustice in the very basis for the credibility evaluation itself, tainting otherwise harmless epistemic exchanges which neither incapacitate nor demote.

Sometimes testimony is taken up for wrongful reasons - for prejudicial, problematically objectifying, insulting and demeaning reasons; herein lies a wrong, even absent an immediate negative epistemic effect rendered upon its subject. Where superficially respectful treatment is the product of prejudicial disrespect, the treatment may constitute a wrong which is *harmless* in isolation (save for the subjectively unexperienced potential frustration of the desire to be accorded due respect in the minds of others). This paper analyzes a number of cases, like *SEXIST SAMIR*, wherein insulting prejudicial beliefs may

underwrite certain forms of epistemic (if not testimonial) injustice which involve (1) neutral or inflated credibility evaluations, (2) insult epistemic capacities other than one's standing as a knower or transmitter of knowledge, and (3) wrong independently of any harmful consequences.

An education based on the nature of knowledge itself

Jane Gatley

University of Birmingham

Hirst sees his conception of education dating back to 'the Greeks' who 'attained the concept of an education that was 'liberal' not simply because it was the education of free men rather than slaves but also because they saw it as freeing the mind to function according to its true nature, freeing reason from error and illusion and freeing man's conduct from wrong' (Hirst, 1974, p.89). Liberal education has come to be associated with a 'broad and balanced curriculum' (Roberts, 2018, p.5). In England, this must cover English, maths, sciences, history, geography, art and design, physical education, music, languages, computing, design and technology, and citizenship at secondary level according to the National Curriculum (p.7). The idea that students should study a broad and balanced curriculum based on a curated sample of disciplinary content is the basis behind most secondary education systems worldwide; this is a liberal education.

In this paper, I will outline reasons for thinking that Hirst's account of a liberal education is the most promising in terms of being able to explain why the sort of 'broad and balanced' curriculum specified by the National Curriculum might be a justifiable use of students' time. I will then outline key difficulties with Hirst's account of liberal education. Hirst claims that a liberal education is one which inducts students into all of the 'forms of knowledge'. The forms of knowledge are 'the complex ways of understanding experience which man has achieved, which are publicly specifiable and which are gained through learning' (Hirst, 1974, p.38). According to Hirst, becoming acquainted with these forms of knowledge contributes to the development of a rational mind. My primary issues with Hirst's account are the difficulties that he has defining the forms of knowledge, and difficulties with how they contribute to the development of a rational mind.

In response, I will develop an account of liberal education which rests on the simpler claim that 'knowledge is clearly valuable in the sense of being conducive to successful practical action' (Olsson, 2011, p.874). I will argue that, in a minimal way, providing students with a broad and balanced selection of knowledge contributes to their autonomy. This is in accord with the association between knowledge and autonomy at the centre of liberal education, which frees 'man's conduct from wrong' (Hirst, 1974, p.89). From my revised account, I will derive two clear guidelines about the sort of content which should be included on the school curriculum. First, that content should be taken from disciplinary sciences, which capture the best available to humankind; and second, that the content selected should at least answer prominent and pressing questions that people are likely to face (Hand, 2018, p.7). Finally, I will outline how this new account helps to solve key problems in philosophy of education, such as the nature of rationality.

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The Second Revolution of Moral Fictionalism

Eline Gerritsen

University of St Andrews and University of Stirling

Assume that Moral Error Theory (MET) is correct. Nothing is morally right, wrong, required, permissible, or impermissible. This is clearly a radical view, if only because it rejects some of our most deeply held beliefs. The question that remains is whether it has radical practical consequences too. Wouldn't abandoning moral judgements undermine the building blocks of society? If this is what follows from MET, the cost of accepting this theory is extremely high.

Some prominent moral error theorists, like Richard Joyce, try to avoid this result. Joyce denies that accepting MET should lead us to abandon our moral beliefs. Instead, he advocates preserving morality as a useful fiction. This entails that we will pretend to make moral claims and act as if we still believe that certain things are morally right or wrong. Nonetheless, in critical contexts, we will admit that our moral thinking is mere make-belief. Joyce calls this theory on how we should respond to an absence of moral facts *Revolutionary Moral Fictionalism* (RMF). It is based on these (simplified) claims: (1) one ought to ϕ iff ϕ -ing is in one's best interest; (2) acting on moral considerations is in one's best interest.

An important aspect of RMF that has not received any substantial discussion is how adopting morality as a useful fiction affects the content of that fiction. Joyce assumes that the same moral claims we once genuinely believed will be preserved in the moral fiction. I argue that this conservative account of RMF is inconsistent: Joyce's own argument for a revolution in our attitude towards moral judgements also calls for a second revolution, one regarding the content of those judgements. If we should engage with morality merely for the instrumental value of doing so, this implies that the specific moral fiction an agent should adopt is the set of moral considerations it is most instrumentally valuable for her to engage with.

With this criterion in mind, I will sketch the moral fiction RMF must recommend by using insights from David Gauthier's contractarianism. A serious objection to Gauthier's advantage-based account of morality is that he cannot justify moral obligations towards people who cannot benefit us in return, such as vulnerable members of society, people outside our own society and future generations. I argue that the moral fiction RMF must support lacks such obligations as well, for the same reason. In addition, I argue that the fiction will contain more obligations to oneself than we normally recognise. Overall, while all content of the fiction stays within the boundaries of what can be seen as a moral matter, it will depart in significant ways from people's ordinary views of morality. This result is important, because it means that RMF is much more revolutionary than Joyce shows it to be: while it does preserve some parts of morality, it also calls for abandoning many other-regarding moral thoughts, and consequently significantly limiting our altruistic behaviour. Therefore, combining MET with RMF does not free it of radical practical consequences.

Epistemic Injustice as an Effect of a Psychiatric Diagnosis

Richard Hassall

University of Sheffield

Receiving a psychiatric diagnosis can have a range of effects on the person who receives it. Some welcome it, seeing it as an explanation for their distress in ways which relieve them of confusion about their state of mind. Others, however, perceive it as an unwelcome medicalized label that impacts on their sense of themselves as rational agents. The aim of the presentation is to offer an account of how such a diagnosis can impact on the latter group and on the self-narratives they create. I argue that receiving a diagnosis can render the recipient vulnerable to experiences of epistemic injustice, as described by Miranda Fricker. This includes hermeneutical injustice, where individuals may be denied the ability to understand their difficulties or distress in ways that make sense to them. This can be understood in terms of the narratives that individuals construct for themselves. I refer to two accounts of narrativity – Jerome Bruner’s psychological account and Alasdair MacIntyre’s philosophical account, both of which emphasise how individuals gain meaning in their lives through their self-narratives.

The codification of psychiatric diagnoses in disease nosologies, such as DSM-5, is liable to convey the implication that these represent disease entities of some sort. As such, the diagnosis assigned may be understood by the recipient as a medical explanation of their difficulties, despite most such diagnoses having no explanatory value. I argue that one effect of this is to put pressure on the patient to adopt a medicalized narrative about their life and their difficulties. I illustrate this by reference to quotations from the accounts of former service users. The medicalization implicit in psychiatric diagnoses conveys a distinct kind of narrative based on a disease model of psychological distress, which may conflict with or diminish the recipients’ previous self-narratives. This is reinforced by the epistemic authority accorded to medical practitioners in healthcare systems. This kind of narrative may often be constructed around the statement that the patient’s suffering can be understood as “a disease like any other”. In this respect, it may be construed by the patient to mean that their difficulties are caused by some kind of disease process over which they have little control. I suggest that this may result in experiences of epistemic injustice, in that such diagnoses may reduce the recipient’s sense of agency and induce feelings of hopelessness about recovery.

Justification and Practical Considerations: Contextualism About Justification

Jack Herbert

University of Sheffield

The traditional view about knowledge, or *purism*, holds that knowledge depends purely on truth-directed, epistemic matters (Fantl and McGrath, 2007: 558). This view has been challenged by pragmatic encroachment theorists and epistemic contextualists, who argue that knowledge can also be affected by non-truth conducive, practical considerations. For example, two agents, A and B, may have the same evidence for some proposition p , but may differ with respect to knowing that p , due to p being more important for A rather than B. This increasingly popular position has become known as *impurism*. In my paper, I seek to widen the current debate between purism and impurism and demonstrate that practical matters can affect ascriptions of *justification*.

The question I aim to answer is whether justification is *pure* or *impure*. In answering this, I work within a broadly *evidentialist* framework. This is the view that a subject, S , is justified in believing some proposition, p , at some time, t , if and only if S 's evidence at t on balance supports p (Conee and Feldman, 2008: 43). I challenge this.

I first introduce a case in which two agents have the same evidence, but not the same justificatory status – due to non-truth conducive matters. Take two agents: A and B. Both agents have taken the 11am train to York every Monday for the past month and wish to get the next 11am Monday train to York. However, A wishes to have a relaxing day out in York, whilst B has an important job interview there. Both agents appreciate that train schedules sometimes change. Nevertheless, A and B both believe, on the basis of their evidence, that next Monday at 11am, the train will leave for York. But it appears that A is justified in believing this, whilst B is *not* justified. It seems that, instead of believing that the train will leave at 11am, B should suspend belief and gather further evidence. The only striking difference, however, is that B has an important job interview. This is a non-truth directed, practical consideration.

It is my objective to then provide some account of why these agents have differing justificatory statuses. In doing so, I look at the pragmatic encroachment theory advocated by Hawthorne and Stanley (2008) and apply this to the concept of justification. This account requires there to be a symmetrical connection between justification and practical rationality, such that when S is justified in believing p it is appropriate for S to treat p as a reason for acting (and vice versa). I then deal with two objections from Reed (2012) (2014), who attacks the symmetry between knowledge and practical rationality. I apply this to justification and show that these attacks fail to impact the proposed account if we include an 'all things

considered' clause, and also recognise that some of our beliefs concern *possibilities* (e.g. it *might* rain today).

In this paper, I apply the purism / impurism debate to justification and propose the novel view that ascriptions of justification can be affected by practical considerations.

Skill, Habit, and Reasons of Familiarity

Will Hornett

University of Sheffield

Habits and habitual actions pervade our lives. Yet we lack adequate philosophical understanding of them, partly because of widespread acceptance that habits are 'blind' and 'dumb'; items whose philosophical interest lies in contrasting them with more interesting things like skills. Ryle (1949) is one of few philosophers who actually defends this view of habit. In this paper, I argue that all Ryle's main claims about habit are false. Seeing why this is allows us to view of habitual actions as manifesting intelligence and a distinctive kind of responsiveness to reasons.

§1

When articulating a conception of intelligent capacities, Ryle argues that habits and skills are both behavioural dispositions, committing himself to (A):

- A) Habits and skills explain actions in fundamentally the same way;

Ryle then contrasts habits with skills to rule out habits as intelligent dispositions. His two most important contrasts are:

- B) Since habitual actions are automatic, they do not involve self-conscious attention to the standards of the activity which characterises skilful action;
- C) Habits are less internally complex than skills because they are characterised by one conditional whereas skills are characterised by many.

§2

Firstly, (B) is false because, as Brett (1981) points out, the fact that habitual actions are usually *initiated* with little thought does not entail that they are *thoughtless*. The habit of looking at my watch to see the time *is* a habit of attending; the habit of *washing with care is* a habit of being careful. We cannot give the description under which these acts are habitual independently of describing the intelligence they manifest. So (B) is false.

(C) is false because many habitual activities are constituted by activities of different kinds. A *smoking* habit usually involves habitually *rolling* and *lighting* cigarettes, activities which are different from, yet constitutive of, *smoking*. To characterise a smoking habit with a conditional that refers to smoking (e.g. 'If the circumstances were I appropriate, I would smoke') one must also characterise that habit by using more conditionals which refer to the activities constitutive of smoking (e.g. 'If the circumstances were appropriate, I would roll my cigarette'). So habits are internally complex – (C) is false.

§3

With (B) and (C) gone, one might be tempted to assimilate habits and skills on the basis of (A). But (A) is false because habits explain *why* agents act, and skills explain *how it is possible* that agents act. In this respect, habits are more like desires than like skills. I argue that, like desires, habits explain actions by rationalising them, and that, if habits rationalise, then they are distinctive because they must do so by providing a reason for action which an agent who lacks that habit cannot have. I argue that what rationalises habitual actions is that they *feel familiar to do*, where that feeling of familiarity also constitutes the grasp of the reason. Showing that Ryle is wrong, then, puts me in a position to give a preliminary sketch of the rationality of habit-explanations.

Oppressive Political Gaslighting: Collective Manipulation and Silencing of Dissenting Voices

Emma Jaura

University of Nottingham

Following the fictional case that first introduced the term 'gaslighting', the concept has evolved. Gaslighting systematically undermines a victim's perceptions and judgements, to the point that she questions them. Through prolonged construction of situations designed to reinforce doubt, the gaslighter is able to isolate the victim from her capacity for autonomy, by convincing her that she is an incapable interlocutor. Features of cases commonly now called 'gaslighting' that depart from the original case include the gaslighter's behaviour not necessarily involving conscious calculation, nor the need for there to be a clear goal in sight of the gaslighter. My project is to expand the term from its original use further still, to be able to make sense of cases where there is more than just one individual targeted. I argue that same techniques with parallel motives are often used by people in positions of power in order to undermine large collective groups of people and maintain oppressive social structures.

In this talk I will characterise *oppressive political gaslighting*, and propose a method for identifying it, to avoid over-inflation of the term, and distinguish it from cases of 'positive' political gaslighting. This methodology will emphasise the importance of context, and adapt ideas from Marilyn Frye's (1983) account of how to recognise oppression, through identifying a network of related structures and forces that together restrict and immobilize a marginalized group. To be considered a form of oppression, the gaslighter must be in a position of greater power, and the gaslightees in a position of subordination.

I will explore two concrete examples, one historical and one contemporary, through the lens of political gaslighting in order to reveal potential concerns or complications that might affect the analysis. The first is drawn from the work of Franz Fanon, in his (1963) study of the mental disorders experienced by the colonized people of Algeria. I argue that gaslighting played a part in the development of the 'permanent insecurity' experienced by the colonized people, that forced them to question 'who am I in reality?'. This case study raises questions about the severity of political gaslighting, as well as how the manipulation can function to bring about indirect results. My second case involves the widespread shaping of public consciousness regarding law enforcement. In this discussion, I respond to worries about a lack of a clear gaslighter, and the size of the group of gaslightees.

Finally, I argue that oppressive political gaslighting captures a phenomenon distinct from Fricker's (2007) testimonial injustice, and Young's (1990) cultural imperialism. I use the two concrete cases to separate these forms of oppression, and highlight how analysis in terms of gaslighting offers alternative insight. It draws together the way that dominant groups mark marginalized perspectives as 'other', and shape what is universal and neutral to be what

only they experience. By forcing a subordinate group into a position where they question and doubt their reality, dissenting voices are silenced and the dominant norm is reinforced.

Epistemic Justice as Epistemic Fairness: a Founding Principle of Democracy

Junyeol Kim

University of Connecticut

Fricker (2007) points to the idea that epistemic justice buttresses the authority of democracy. This paper is an attempt to develop Fricker's insight further. Specifically, epistemic justice is a founding principle of democracy, and epistemic justice as such confers legitimacy on the authority of democracy. We can see this by paying a close attention to epistemic proceduralism of democratic authority and the role of voting in democracy.

Epistemic proceduralism claims that democratic authority is epistemic authority, i.e., that the legitimacy of democratic authority consists in the epistemic value of the democratic procedure (Anderson 2008). Arguing for this, epistemic proceduralism denies that the fairness of the democratic procedure is sufficient for the epistemic authority of democracy (Estlund 2008). This denial is mistaken because the fairness of the democratic procedure is epistemic justice as epistemic fairness. We can formulate the notion of epistemic justice, i.e., that of epistemic justice as epistemic fairness, from Fricker's conception of testimonial injustice. Roughly, one enjoys testimonial justice in an institution *S* if and only if

(TJ) In *S*, one is given an amount of credibility sufficient for [i] not being wronged in one's capacity as a knower and [ii] not being nullified by the amount of credibility given to other people of social identities one does not have.

The testimonial justice defined as (TJ) requires that credibility be distributed fairly across people of different social identities in the democratic institution. In this sense, (TJ) gives us the notion of epistemic justice as epistemic (credibility) fairness.

The central thesis of this paper is that the institution of voting, an essential component of democracy, takes epistemic justice *qua* epistemic fairness to be its founding principle. In a reasonable conception of voting, a vote is a voter's answer to the question as to which option among the given is the best for the public interests (Estlund 1990). Thus, the institution of voting asks a question of a voter and takes the voter's testimony as evidence for which option is in the public interests. In this way, the institution of voting respects each voter's capacity as a knower. Given this interpretation of voting, a voter's influence on the public decision made by voting is evidential influence; each vote counts as evidence. The fact that each voter must have an equal amount of influence now means that each voter's testimony must be given an equal amount of credibility. Thus, the institution of voting requires epistemic justice as epistemic fairness to be realized by itself. In this sense, epistemic justice is the founding principle of the institution of voting. Because the institution of voting is an essential component of democracy, epistemic justice is a founding principle of democracy. This is why the democracy has an epistemic authority. The fact that democracy takes epistemic justice as its founding principle does not mean that democracies are epistemically just by default. It

rather means that democracies must strive to get rid of epistemic injustice in themselves because democracy with epistemic injustice is not only self-eroding, but also even paradoxical.

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Threats, Protests and the Possibility of Inarticulate Forgiveness

Kirstine la Cour

University College London

Consider the following familiar sequence of phenomena from moral life: 1) Someone wrongs me; 2) I blame them; 3) They apologise; 4) I forgive. In “Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness” (2001), Hieronymi proposes that we conceive of these phenomena and the relations between them as an interplay between threat and protest. In short, by wronging me, you make a threatening claim against me, and by blaming you, I protest and reject that claim. By apologising, you diffuse your threat, thereby removing my need to continue protesting, rendering me instead ready to forgive.

Hieronymi’s proposal is interesting for several reasons. While all the phenomena mentioned above have received considerable philosophical consideration, less attention has been paid to articulating the relationships between them. By offering an account of the whole chain, the threat-and-protest proposal enables us to attend to and explain a number of significant features of our accountability practices, which, I hold, remain underexplored or insufficiently well-understood in the philosophical literature. Amongst these, I focus on the following two: the distinctively interpersonal, other-directed character of these practices, and their temporal duration.⁴ Both features appear productively illuminated by likening the string of phenomena to the moves in a conversational exchange. The account seems both to explain how blame can be a form of “moral address”⁵, itself inviting a response from its target, and to make sense of the possibility and propriety of continued blame and its eventual cessation.⁶

My objective in this paper is to argue that this appearance is misleading, and that the proposal in fact accounts satisfactorily for neither of these. Specifically, I show that if, as Hieronymi proposes, blame is understood as a protest against and repudiation of a wrongdoer’s threatening claim, apology cannot have the function of diffusing the threat, thereby paving the way for forgiveness, for what the protest signifies is precisely that the threat cannot be sustained. Unless the victim’s protest is somehow undermined or otherwise unsuccessful – something I argue we should not accept - Hieronymi’s own construal of these terms should not allow for the possibility of the coexistence of threat and protest. The upshot of this is that the account fails to explain both the continuation of blame and its cessation. Moreover, while the account instructively captures certain important aspects of the communicative, other-

⁴ For further advantages of a protest view of blame, see Talbert (2012) and Smith (2013).

⁵ This description of blame was influentially offered by Gary Watson (1987), and has subsequently been taken up by a number of philosophers writing on blame, including Darwall (2006), McGeer (2013) and McKenna (2013).

⁶ This latter point is especially important for Hieronymi who proposes the account with a view to characterising how it is possible for resentment to become rationally undermined without having always been inappropriate, or, in her terms, how forgiveness can be both “articulate” and “uncompromising” (2001)

directed character of our practices, it is insufficiently discriminating about who gets to do the talking and how. I end by suggesting some routes for amelioration.

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How epistemic injustice can deepen disagreement

Thirza Lagewaard

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

In this paper, I want to contribute to a better understanding of what has been called deep disagreement by arguing that sometimes, disagreements are deepened due to epistemic injustice. Firstly, I argue that deep disagreement can be defined as disagreement about relatively fundamental epistemic principles which involves disagreement about what counts as evidence and/or justified belief regarding a certain domain.

Racism

Then, I will introduce and explore a case study of real-life deep disagreement: the debate in the Netherlands about racism. A majority in the Netherlands holds the view that racism is not an significant issue in the Netherlands. I illustrate this disagreement about racism with the hotly debated black-face tradition of Black Pete. I argue that this dispute on racism should be understood as a deeper kind of disagreement, mbecause there is disagreement about what counts as evidence. There is disagreement about what counts as a good epistemic reason in the racism-debate. Drawing on Fricker, Dotson and Medina I argue that both testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice can lead to the deepening of a disagreement.

Testimonial Injustice

People who have first-personal experiences of racism are arguably epistemic experts on the racism question, as they have knowledge other people cannot (so easily) have. As the majority in the Netherlands cannot access this knowledge directly, their main source of evidence about racism is expert testimony.

However, only part of the people who do not experience racism take expert testimony on firstpersonal experience of people of color to be an important reason for the claim that racism is a problem in the Netherlands. Due to testimonial injustice based on racial prejudices, testimony of people who are arguably experts in this domain, is not taken as important source of evidence in this domain. In such a case there is disagreement about what counts as a good reason for the claim that racism is a significant issue, and this deepening is partly due to testimonial injustice. The disagreement becomes harder to resolve.

Hermeneutical Injustice

Something similar happens with hermeneutical injustice. Dotson expands the notion of hermeneutical injustice: it's not just that people might lack epistemic resources for interpreting and communicating their experiences. In fact, they might have very rich and powerful resources for doing so. Even so, however, testimony using these resources might fail to communicate adequately to the dominant knowers.

Although things are changing in recent years, racism is barely addressed in the Netherlands. Because racism supposedly is not an issue, there is not a lot of debate about it.

This is an instance of hermeneutical injustice because the group that is subject of racism has no way to discuss racism in the Netherlands in a constructive way.

Conclusion

When the non-dominant group's testimony is given insufficient credibility and their proposed epistemic resources are dismissed or misunderstood, the disagreement becomes deep. It has become deep because there is disagreement about what counts as evidence.

This can happen in other disagreements, involving recipients of epistemic injustices, as well. Understanding such injustice-based deep disagreements seems to me to be a project not only of theoretical interest, but also of great practical social relevance.

Blameworthiness, Voluntary Victimhood, and the Case of the Women Anti-Suffragists

Lee Wilson

University of Edinburgh

It is usually wrong to blame victims, assigning blame to individuals who suffer harm and who have done nothing to contribute to it. But what if victims *do* contribute in some way? This question has *individual* and *structural* versions: 'Can one be blamed, at least partially, for acting in ways that contribute to an individual harm one suffers?' and 'Can one be blamed, at least partially, for acting in ways that contribute to one's oppressed position within a given structure of oppression?'. Agents in the latter, located at structural nodes, are systematically conferred with ranges of unjust constraints on their autonomy, according to which they participate in everyday practices either in institutional or communal forms. Additionally, blaming might go wrong in different ways (e.g. the blamed lacking blameworthiness or the blamer lacking standing to blame). The general question of whether a victim can be legitimately blamed for contributing to their own harm essentially consists of such subquestions.

This paper aims at a clearer understanding of the wrongness of blaming victims by focusing on the *structural version of the blameworthiness subquestion*. My point of departure will be the question of blameworthiness in paradigmatic cases of structural victimhood: individuals not only systematically constrained in the range of actions available to them, due to their structural position, but also in their reasons for such actions. I will consider the case of women anti-suffragists in 19th century Britain: specifically, those hundred and four women who undersigned the anti-suffragist manifesto "An Appeal Against Female Suffrage" (1889), who may be regarded as instances of victims contributing to their own oppression.

Some philosophers would explain their actions as arising out of 'false consciousness', wherein "attitudes and desires of the oppressed are manipulated by the conditions of their oppression so that they appear voluntarily to accept their own oppression," such that these signatories "believe in the naturalness of the inferiority and consequent subordination of women to men" (Cudd 2006). The signatories may thus be seen as instances of the paradigmatic kind of structural victims in suffering false consciousness. And this is commonly held to exempt one from blameworthiness. This is because one suffering false consciousness would presumably be unable to satisfy two key conditions for blameworthiness that are usually independently or jointly necessary: (a) the *rationality condition*, that the agent had the general capacity to appreciate and act on moral reasons and (b) the *epistemic condition*, that she had relevant awareness of her action.

Nevertheless, an intuition lingers that a signatory is still somehow blameworthy as a co-contributor. I will attempt to vindicate this and argue that false consciousness is insufficient to exculpate, that she may still satisfy those two conditions for blameworthiness. I will argue

that, on a minimal understanding of false consciousness, (a) its restricting or masking a signatory's responsiveness to reasons is neither clearcut nor extraordinary and (b) her lack of awareness cannot be similarly exculpatory due to the peril of exculpating oppressors, if not due to moral-epistemic vice.

Four Cases of Desire-Based Reasons

Olof Leffler

University of Leeds

Desire-based theories about practical reasons say that a fact is a reason for agent *A* (usually if and) only if it is suitably related to *A*'s desires, e.g. by being what *A* would desire when rationally and epistemically idealized (Williams, 1981). Such theories face an intuitive extensional problem (Schroeder, 2007). We sometimes get *too few reasons* because we lack desires for what we, intuitively, have reason to do. And sometimes we get *too many reasons* because we desire things that we do not seem to have reason to do.

Previous solutions are unhelpful. For example, Schroeder (2007) claims that we have (too) many reasons, but we rarely talk about our weaker reasons due to pragmatic linguistic norms. And Street (2009) thinks that an ideally coherent Caligula has awkward reasons based on awkward desires. But these solutions leave us with reason sets that have the wrong extensions, deep down. Inspired by Derk Pereboom's (2001) Four Cases argument against compatibilism about free will, in this talk, I take a new stab at the problem. I aim to use a set of cases to undercut the intuitions that indicate that our reason sets have the wrong extensions.

How? Assume that *A* has ordinary desires – for watching and playing sports, having the odd drink, improving the world, etc. This desire set gets *A*'s reason set roughly intuitively right. Call this *Case 1*. Then we get to *Case 2*. Assume that *A* gets too drunk, realizes this, and loses her desire for alcohol. *A*, intuitively, also loses her corresponding reason because of this unremarkable desire shift.

This process can be iterated. Over time, more of *A*'s desire shift with life events – e.g. maybe *A* loses her ability to do well in sports as she ages, and hence her desire to participate in them. *A*'s reasons shift accordingly. We arrive at *Case 3*: The only intrinsic desire *A* has left is to watch her local sports team. *A* now seems to have *too few* desires and reasons. But *A* has too few reasons because of the same type of unremarkable desire shifts as the one between Cases 1 and 2. It seems unproblematic that her desire – and reason – set is limited.

This solution generalizes to the *too many reasons* problem. We often develop desires for curious things by undergoing unproblematic life events. Hence *Case 4*: *A* develops a desire for agony because *A* runs the marathon often, gets used to agony, and begins desiring that sensation. But if desire shifts can explain how *Case 3* is unproblematic, they generalize to *Case 4*. As *A* just has undergone a desire shift, she does not have too many reasons.

I conclude with responses to objections. First, my starting point is not an intuitively implausible case that is generalized to get counterintuitive results (*contra* McKenna, 2008), since *Case 1* seems to get *A*'s reasons extensionally right. Second, *A*'s desires are not problematically adaptive, since we have assumed that she already is idealized.

The explanatory power of trait attribution in folk psychology

James Lloyd

University of Manchester

Character traits play a significant role in virtue ethics for their moral valence. In the psychology of social interactions, though, character trait attributions are valued for their power to predict or explain behaviour. This talk discusses the *explanatory* power of traits. I critique one account, then offer a positive suggestion.

(Andrews 2012), argues that folk-psychological explanation, as opposed to scientific explanation, need not refer to causal mechanisms to be explanatory; humans look only for explanatory coherence. This draws on (Malle 2004)'s empirical research, which categorised folk explanations as offering 'reasons' (e.g. beliefs/desires), 'general causal stories', and 'enabling factors'. Andrews therefore understands a trait attribution to "offer explanations of behavior, even though it does not constitute a description of the reasons or the goal motivating the actor's behavior" (Andrews 2008), p.22). Potentially absent of information, traits *point* to information that functions as explanators: "Other times it is clear that we do not want any more in the way of an explanation—for example, when one explains a hated politician's speech by saying 'He's either an idiot, or evil, or both'" (ibid). Here, the idiot/evil attribution is explanatory as although it does not *constitute* reason-giving explanations, it *points* to them, about how idiots/evil people generally act. Therefore, this account treats trait attributions, at their minimum, as explanatory insofar as they function to point to explanators.

However, some may claim that to attribute a trait *is* to provide an explanation, not a *direction* to explanation. So, what provides explanatory power? I suppose that either (a), contra Andrews, trait explanations do not point to explanatory information but are constituted by it, or, (b) traits have explanatory power in virtue of having causal power - that traits can physically cause behaviour is explanatory enough. I argue for (a) elsewhere, so here I try to reject (b).

Firstly, there is an objection to thinking of traits as having causal power, because traits are generally conceived of as dispositions and there is an objection to dispositions having causal power. I will explain this 'dormitive virtue' objection, suggesting that (Mumford 2003)'s response is relevant here. Mumford argues that the objection is not an argument against causal power, but an argument against causal *explanation*. As such, I note that the objection demonstrates good reason for thinking that traits are not explanatory in virtue of their power to physically cause. This leaves space to focus on (a): questioning whether Andrews is right to claim that trait explanations merely point to explanators. Positively, though, rejecting (b) corroborates Andrews' folk psychological explanatory approach - traits need not refer to physical causal mechanisms to be explanatory, so work on (a) should accommodate this.

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Rousseau in Twilight: A Botany of the Soul

Dian D. Meakin
Columbia University

Writing in the twilight years of his life, Jean-Jacques Rousseau offers a phenomenological philosophy of emotion and knowing in *Reveries of a Solitary Walker* (1782). Part poetic articulation and part evidentiary examination, his treatise waxes and wanes in a similar fashion to the fluctuation of his lived experience as the embraced citizen he longed to be and the man he had become of such longing. Rousseau speaks of this work as an informal record of the conversations of his soul; its quest for nature, rid of pretense, alive in wonder. It is tempting to interpret the little book – just 155 pages in length – as a melancholy and delusional man’s autobiographical diatribe; a tormented last ditch lasso tossed towards the bourgeois society that had exiled him. However, to do so would be a great injustice to the existential lessons he shares. Despite the sad sentimentality that cloaks many of his reveries, Rousseau skillfully employs life’s most inherent powers to confront the disunity of his soul. Thus, I situate two specific and purposeful characteristics of the *Reveries*: 1) Rousseau’s practice of botany 2) the psychic interrogation of his consciousness as the essential elements that facilitate Rousseau’s late-life philosophy. By conceptualizing these two features as a whole, we can grasp the articulation of his emotional and epistemological positions. I suggest that the solitary consciousness displayed in Rousseau’s *Reveries* hint at the same pinnacle of greatness as the “philosopher-genius” Nietzsche envisions in *Schopenhauer as Educator* (1874). To map out these claims, I begin with a broad-strokes discussion of the composition of the *Reveries* and then move to an analysis of Rousseau’s eighth walk. To frame the pinnacle of Rousseau’s enlightenment and to further illustrate his engagement with botany as the essential component of his reveries, I borrow Simone Weil’s conception of reading the world (in which whatever comes to us does so by virtue of being “read” (1946). Here, I will assert that while Rousseau carefully contemplates and notates the plant life around him, he is simultaneously botanizing the parameters of his soul. It is by this influence of sensations on his inward feelings that Rousseau satisfies his need to asses and then harness the cruel contradictions of his life. Finally, after establishing Rousseau’s achieved unity between botany, memory, and consciousness, the paper concludes with a metaphor that situates him upon Nietzsche’s lonely mantle of genius.

A Blame Centred Account of Epistemic Vice

Daniella Meehan
University of Glasgow

Despite the long prehistory of the concept of epistemic vices and increasing literature on virtue epistemology, philosophical literature has largely neglected the study of vice epistemology. In light of this, recent attempts have been made by epistemologists in the last decade to revive the field of vice epistemology, with great success. Epistemologists' such as Quassim Cassam (2016, 2019), Heather Battaly (2014, 2016), Ian Kidd (2016, 2018) and Alessandra Tanesini (2016, 2018), have all made headway in the field by creating multiple accounts of epistemic vices, identifying their key features and nature.

However, despite the now expanding literature on vice epistemology, little has been said on the notion of epistemic responsibility with regards to epistemic vices, despite the intuitive relevance that the two domains have. When we speak of the multiple vices that can be attributed to epistemic agents, such as close-mindedness, arrogance, dogmatism and so forth, we recognize these as bad character traits, which prevent us from attaining an epistemic good of some sorts. Quite naturally then, it seems attributions of responsibility (of the epistemic sort) can be made, in that we can understand epistemic vices as reprehensible. Despite this intuition, the literature on the relationship between epistemic vices and blame has been sparse, with only one account recently referencing blame with regards to the actual definition of epistemic vices (Cassam 2019).

In response to this significant gap in the literature, I present a novel account of epistemic vice which has blame and an integral and constitute feature. I argue that for a character trait or attitude to be defined as an epistemic vice, it must contain the notion of blameworthiness within its definition. I also argue that this notion of blameworthiness we speak of with regards to epistemic vices, is distinctively epistemic, despite the literature which attempts to reduce epistemic blame to a subform of moral blame (Meehan, *forthcoming*). I will demonstrate why my account of vice is to be preferred over the existing accounts of epistemic vice which either do not mention a responsibility condition on epistemic vices (Kidd 2018, Tanesini 2018) or understand the blameworthiness of epistemic vice to be in the character of the person possessing the vice, as opposed to the vice itself (Cassam 2019). I will offer some theoretical advantages that my new account of epistemic vice possesses over these accounts, such as the ability to distinguish between genuine vices and mere accidental disposition to break norms or cognitive defects such as forgetfulness.

The Second Tongue: Michel Serres on Taste and Knowledge

Dave Monroe

Staffordshire University

The third chapter of Michel Serres' *The Five Senses*, "Tables," opens with a fond remembrance of sharing a bottle of 1947 Chateau D'Yquem Sauternes. Serres intimates that the occasion was not only pleasurable, but one of renaissance for his sense of taste, recalling "with gratitude the moment when a great wine gave me a new mouth—the day of my second communion...the second mouth was born here". The "second mouth," or, "second tongue," as he sometimes puts it, is distinct from our "first tongue"—the one of language (speech). What follows is a philosophical celebration of the sense of taste and its relation to language, culture, and material world from which cultures emerge. Serres' account is complex, nuanced, and layered, much like flavor notes of a superb wine or delectable recipe. Not only does Serres engage with traditional epistemological and aesthetic issues related to taste, but also tantalizes his readers with hints of how these problems intersect with important matters in disciplines like education, artificial intelligence, and ethics.

Despite the lushness of Serres' work on taste, there is little elaboration by Anglophone scholars of his corpus, and, surprisingly, scant attention from contemporary philosophers of taste and gustatory aesthetics. Thus, the aim of this paper is twofold. The principal, explicit goal is an exploration of Serres' account of taste and its relation to knowledge. The second goal is to stimulate further discussion of Serres' work on taste by suggesting linkages to related philosophical issues transcending the scope of this paper.

The Five Senses is Serres' attempt to conceive of a new empiricism, one capable of escaping, at least to some extent, the confines of language and culture, thus making possible a renewed understanding of humanity's relation to nature. There are good reasons for approaching the overall project through taste. First, Serres' work on taste both exposes and works against a prevalent--and powerful--western philosophical prejudice: the so-called "hierarchy of the senses." Second, one's examining taste leads naturally to discussing food and drink, taste's most frequent objects, which are already rich in cultural significance. Eating and drinking involve shared practices, traditions, languages, and so on. If Serres can mount a convincing defense of the *lowliest* senses, as the hierarchy would have it, and show that taste provides contact with the world *despite* its being shot through with culture, then he will have advanced his cause along its most problematic front.

This paper begins by sketching a basic understanding of the "second tongue" in *The Five Senses*, contrasting Serres' conception of taste's role as a sensory modality with that traditionally assumed through the history of western thought. From there, the paper outlines the problem of the seeming relativity, either subjectively or culturally, of judgments associated with taste—framing them as challenges Serres seeks to surmount. The

remainder of the paper focuses on Serres' account of how taste makes contact with reality and is able to provide knowledge, before concluding by gesturing at connections between taste and other philosophical problems.

The concept of systematicity in the intervention of discursive injustice

Alba Moreno Zurita

University of Granada

The main thesis of this paper is that the measures we can adopt to solve situations of discursive injustice must be systematic. This means that the resolution of this type of situation is necessarily related to the systematic correction by the audience of implicit biases, implicit attitudes and structural changes that are maintained over time. According to Fricker, the cases of epistemic injustice that are relevant are those cases where the speakers, besides being the object of this type of injustice, are also the other types of social injustice. This is what she calls cases of systematic and persistent injustice. Our aim in this paper is to apply the notion of systematicity proposed by Fricker in the detection of cases of epistemic injustice to the intervention measures of cases of discursive injustice in order to make these measures effective.

One of the particular theses that derive from the main idea is that interpretative injustice works in a different way from discursive injustice and this may be a problem for the notion of interpretative injustice. We consider that the main thesis we defend has the following theoretical consequences. On the one hand, the fact that the notion of systematicity operates at the moment of the intervention of these cases is an orthogonal question to the structuralism and individualism debate and, on the other hand, we would be enriching the notion of systematicity, of its original formulation, by applying it in the context of the intervention.

The main reason we argue that intervention is related to the systematic correction of implicit attitudes and structural changes is due to the systematic nature of discursive injustice. This type of systematic intervention has two main functions. Firstly, the resolution of conflicts raised by discursive injustice, as well as testimonial injustice and hermeneutic injustice. Secondly, this approach to intervention helps to examine the way in which certain types of injustice, such as interpretative injustice, are characterized. The fact that systematic intervention is not necessary to resolve the type of conflict generated in the example of interpretative injustice shows that the notion of interpretative injustice does not account for relevant cases of injustice. This does not necessarily imply that the notion of interpretative injustice is not valuable, since it makes sense to think that prejudices play a role in the interpretation of utterances of speakers. However, the example presented to us as a representative example of this notion is problematic due to its intervention, so it may be necessary to develop this notion in other types of contexts.

On the Procedural Fairness of Institutional Selection Practices

Pascal Mowla

LSE

Institutional accounts of procedural fairness often require us to consider how justly positions of special advantage have come about through a given institutional process. On T.M Scanlon's view, this calls for us to assess whether institutional decisions which are the outcomes of selection practices, are made 'on grounds that are "rationally related" to the justification for these positions'.⁷ Whilst I generally accept the tenets of Scanlon's account and his principle of procedural fairness, it is my contention that a more complete account of procedural fairness must give way to an additional principle of procedural transparency. The reasons for this are twofold; firstly because institutional selection practices which lack transparency such as hiring or academic selection, may be more likely to be influenced by non-rationally related reasons as a consequence of the arbitrary epistemic asymmetries that opaque procedures tend to manifest and secondly, because we might think that under a contractualist principle of fairness, individuals are owed reasons or justification for the outcome of the selection practices which they are subject to. In response to these practical and philosophical challenges, I suggest that a principle of procedural transparency might be required in working towards a more complete and less imperfect institutional account of procedural fairness, and utilise selection practices within academia as a case study in order to highlight the procedural concerns that I believe to arise within opaque selection practices.

⁷ Scanlon, T.M. *Why Does Inequality Matter?*. Oxford University Press (2018). pp. 42

Communicative Autonomy and the Cumulativity of Moral Damage

Susan E. Notess
Durham University

Our political climate increasingly compels us to consider the moral importance of communicative action. As we grapple with the dangers of hateful and radicalising speech, there is also increasing awareness of the harm that can occur when a person is *not* listened to—as when, for example, survivors of sexual assault seek to testify about their experiences. I contend that a vital step in addressing these questions is to develop an account of the morality of listening to someone: an account which addresses how autonomous communicative action is supported and structured by the (active) role of listeners, and the harm that can result when listening is withheld. In framing such an account, we can draw conclusions both about the effects that listening and non-listening behaviour have on interlocutors, and about the relationship between the incidental and the systemic scales of communicative action.

My account borrows concepts from literature on moral luck to assess the limits of the autonomous aspect of agency in communicative action, which is partly held up and formed by the responsive involvement of the listener. When listening is purposefully withheld, to put it in Austinian terms, the speaker's speech acts may be forced to fail through denial of uptake: this qualifies as silencing, according to Hornsby and Langton. Such deliberate undermining of the speaker's discursive agency constitutes a form of what Lisa Tessman calls moral damage, in that the speaker is harmed in her capacity to function as a discursive agent and to make claims in moral discourse.

When a person is silenced, she is blocked from acting as a discourse participant in at least one of two congenitally related ways: incidentally, in which silencing occurs with an event-like structure and blocks certain kinds of speech acts from being made at certain times, and constitutively, in which systemic silencing produces changes to a person's overall capacity for communicative action (especially in severe cases of gaslighting, as highlighted by Kate Abramson). The debates around communication ethics require us to be able to differentiate between small scale and large-scale harms without losing sight of the moral importance of the incidental.

I address the tension between the two scales by arguing for the cumulativity of moral damage. If incidental silencing adds to whatever moral damage the speaker has already sustained, of which the silencer may or may not be aware, then it would be disingenuous to evaluate the moral damage caused by incidents of refusal to listen (or other silencing behaviours) as if such incidents were isolated. This non-isolability argument requires us to

further say that we cannot justify incidental behaviours which undermine someone else's autonomy as a discursive agent. What results is a motivating argument for avoiding conversational refusal to listen to people, particularly those in positions vulnerable to moral damage.

Nietzsche's Radical, Moral Particularism: Rank Order and the Value of Suffering

Yuma Oto

University of Southampton and Keio University

In analytical ethics, moral particularism, as opposed to moral generalism, has sparked a fundamental discussion about moral principles, and the debate thrives. However, it seems useful to explore views of historical figures sympathetic to particularism to get illuminating insights. Although Aristotle is often seen as a forefather of particularism, Nietzsche has attracted far less attention from contemporary particularists.

In the presentation, I ultimately aim to offer a Nietzschean version of moral particularism, which would pose a more radical challenge to moral generalism than another version does. First, I outline the distinction between particularism and generalism regarding moral principles, also examining some of the later Nietzsche's remarks that it is a mistake to universalise a certain moral judgement about action across all contexts (GS 335, 347).

Then, I further illustrate Nietzsche's particularist position by focusing on Nietzsche's positive attitude towards suffering. As Janaway (2017) observes, Nietzsche seems close to Jonathan Dancy, a paradigm defender of particularism, claiming that suffering in itself is neither normatively good nor bad. And Nietzsche, unlike generalists like utilitarians, holds that the value of suffering is not invariable across contexts, but variable depending on whether a sufferer can give a meaning to her suffering as a part of the whole process of her (psychological) growth. For instance, one's suffering from bipolar disorder can be retrospectively reinterpreted as positively valuable, insofar as she can grow by feeling herself to be more profound or mentally stronger, thanks to that phenomenologically negative experience.

I argue, however, that, despite the similarity between Nietzsche and Dancy concerning the importance of context for our valuing something, Nietzsche is different from Dancy in an interesting way. For Nietzsche goes so far as to claim that "the requirement that there be a single morality for everyone is harmful precisely to the higher men; in short, [...] there is an *order of rank* between people, and between moralities as well" (BGE 228). On Nietzsche's view, thus, the rank order between nobles and slaves or the higher and the lower is significant for judging morality. I maintain that the point of Nietzsche's denial of universalizability of moral judgement and principles here is that Nietzsche's particularism would regard "contexts of action" as wider than Dancy's to include a particular agent who performs an action as well as particular circumstances in which the action is performed. For Nietzsche, therefore, who the particular agent is, makes crucial differences to the value of an action. This can also explain why some can grow through suffering by interpreting it valuable but others cannot.

Finally, I suggest that this more radical, Nietzschean version of moral particularism can be a new, strong threat to proponents of moral generalism. For they will have to explain not only why certain moral principle(s), if any, are to be universally applied to any action across every

situation, but also why certain moral principle(s) are applicable to all individuals, irrespective of their unique, particular differences, e.g. in the ability to give some meaning or value to something like suffering.

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Seeing Moral Action Through Theoria in Aristotle's Account of Happiness: 'The Philosophical Review' and 'Classical Philology'

Janset Özün Çetinkaya
University of Nottingham

There is a famous problem that Aristotle, in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (NE), presents two conceptions of the good life that seem incompatible; one is the life of intellectual contemplation, focused on *theoria*, and another is the life of practical activity, focused on practical wisdom (*phronesis*). The broadest interpretative question here is whether Aristotle is inconsistent in giving two accounts of happiness given that a certain set of conceptual criteria of happiness he develops in the first book of NE cannot be applied to both forms of happiness. In this paper I do not aim to solve this intractable problem but I propose a new reading regarding the concept of *theoria* with regard to the two conceptions of the good life. My proposal is that *theoria* functions differently within intellectual and practical pursuits, in a way that might promise a resolution of the *seeming* tension between the life of intellectual contemplation and practical activity.

I will first distinguish the two main interpretations of this puzzle (the inclusivist and exclusivist) both of which trace the problem to the concept of virtue on which the best and most complete (*aristen kai teleiotaten*) form of happiness is based. Granting that each approach is unsatisfying in explaining the relation between intellectually and morally virtuous activity in a happy life, I will explain this relation through the process of *theoria* and the faculty of intuitive intellect (*nous*). The structure of my approach is as follows:

My main argument centres around the claim that the process of *theoria* in the intellectual and morally virtuous activity differs in kind. Drawing on the etymological meaning of *theoria* and an important passage in Book 2.1 of the *De Anima*, *theoria* will be broadly defined as a deliberative process by which an agent theorises not only necessary and eternal facts but also contingent state of affairs. The supposition that morally virtuous activity involves *theoria* will be supported by the passages 1139a6-9, 1140a24-25, 1140b6-8 and 1143a35-b5 of NE in which Aristotle defines practical wisdom in relation to the process of *theoria* performed by intuitive intellect. Applying the process of *theoria* to practical syllogism, the process will be explained as follows: a moral agent first actualises particular common knowledge regarding the major premise and then associates the minor term with the major premise by identifying the *genus* and *differentia* of the minor term. Based on the verb 'to see' which is one of the translations of the term '*theoria*', this process will be called 'theorising contingency'. Morally virtuous activity will be redefined as an activity that is primarily (but not exclusively) based on the activation of the first principles (*arche*) of the particular moral action directed to an end (*telos*). This conclusion will be reinforced by Irwin's interpretation of practical reason and Roochnik's exposition of the relation between the function of intuitive intellect and its relation to the contingent state of affairs.

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A Defense of Christine Korsgaard's Account of Extrinsic Final Value

Karel Pajus

University of Tartu

It is commonplace in ethics to distinguish between instrumental and intrinsic value. Objects, activities, and states of affairs have instrumental value if their goodness depends on the value of some further valuable thing. They have intrinsic or final value when the entities in question are valuable in itself or for their own sakes and not as means or instruments to something else valuable. This allegedly exhaustive distinction between instrumental and intrinsic value is challenged by Christine Korsgaard (1983). According to her, we must distinguish between two pairs of value instead of one. Instrumental and final value relate to how persons value things, either as means or for their own sake. Extrinsic and intrinsic value relate to the ontological origin or "source" of value. An object's intrinsic value supervenes on its intrinsic or nonrelational properties; extrinsic value supervenes on the object's extrinsic or relational properties. The distinction between intrinsic and final value enables us to claim that things valued for their own sakes can be non-intrinsically valuable, i.e. the value source of finally valuable things can be extrinsic. Korsgaard thinks that the external value source of almost all valuable things lies in the agent's act of valuing those things. For example, a beautiful painting can be valued for its own sake and not because it is an instrument to gain pleasure. If the painting is, however, locked in a closet and no one could ever be delighted by it, the painting would not be valuable. Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (1999) oppose Korsgaard's particular explanation of extrinsic final value. According to them, the agent's act of valuing an object is not a relational property in the supervenience base of final value. It belongs rather to the "constitutive ground" of value. As such, the act of valuing an object does not make the object necessarily extrinsically valuable. Even if the finally valuable painting is externally constituted by the agent's act of valuing, it could still be intrinsically valuable as long as the paintings value supervenes on its intrinsic properties of having, say, certain colours, contours and proportions. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen provide a promising argument in defence of the view that the agent's act of valuing does not belong to the supervenience base of value. According to their argument from motivational foreground, the elements in the supervenience base have to figure as reasons in the foreground of the agent's motivational set, while the agents acts of valuing cannot figure as a reason in the foreground. Therefore, the agent's act of valuing cannot figure in the object's supervenience base. I argue that the argument from motivational foreground fails because the agent's acts of valuing can figure as reasons in the motivational foreground. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen's argument from motivational foreground fails to establish their critical conclusion, according to which Korsgaard's particular explanation of extrinsic final value is false.

The Primacy of Pleasure

Daniel Pallies

University of Southern California

It seems obvious that pleasure is good for us. When I savor a bite of pasta—for example—it seems to me undeniable that my having this experience amounts to an improvement in how things are going for me.⁸ And pleasure seems to be unique in this respect. Neither knowledge, nor achievement, nor health is *obviously* good in the way that pleasure is obviously good. What explains this difference in *obviousness*?

In my discussion, I offer an explanation. Central to my explanation is a platitude about well-being:

RESONANCE:⁹ If state *S* is among the constituents of well-being, and a subject is epistemically well-situated with respect to *S*, then that subject will tend to desire *S*.¹⁰

Pleasure satisfies RESONANCE, and the fact that pleasure satisfies RESONANCE should make us more confident that it's good for us. Furthermore, pleasure is the only *prima facie* good which satisfies RESONANCE in this way.

Pleasures are psychological states; they play certain roles in our overall psychology. In particular, they tend to cause us to desire them. Perhaps we're sometimes *unaware* of our pleasures, and in those cases we're not inclined to desire them.¹¹ But insofar as we're aware of them—and thus, epistemically well-situated with respect to them—they tend to cause us to desire them. Indeed, if a certain sort of *minimal functionalism* is true, then pleasures *essentially* bear this causal connection to desire. So it's clear that pleasure satisfies RESONANCE.

In contrast, consider achievement. Suppose that trekking the White Mountains would be an achievement for me. And suppose that although I know the White Mountains down to the last pebble, I nevertheless have no desire to make the trek. This is surely possible—treks, unlike pleasures, do not bear any especially close relationship to desires. So if we insist that the trek would be good for me, we'll have to say that I'm not *epistemically well-situated* with respect to the trek. But if I know the White Mountains down to the last pebble, in what respect am I not "epistemically well-situated"? Here we could explain that I'm not fully rational, or

⁸ Irwin Goldstein argues that even philosophers who flatly deny that pleasure is good tend to implicitly assume that it is indeed good. He considers two examples—J.L.Mackie and J.P.Sartre—and argues that both philosophers recognize pleasure's goodness, despite their explicit claims to the contrary. See Goldstein 1989, pp. 1-2.

⁹ I'm following Railton in using "resonance" to name the relevant platitude. Railton tells us "...what is intrinsically valuable for a person must have a connection with what he would find in some degree compelling or attractive, at least if he were rational and aware. It would be an intolerably alienated conception of someone's good to imagine that it might fail in any such way to engage him." (Railton 2003, p. 47)

¹⁰ Many philosophers have explored this sort of constraint on theories of well-being. See Kagan 1992 for a particularly thorough discussion.

¹¹ See Bramble 2016, pp. 204-206, and Bramble forthcoming.

not fully sensitive to my own well-being. But these claims will seem plausible *only insofar* as we believe that achievement is good for us. So if we have to appeal to these claims to explain why achievement satisfies RESONANCE, our explanation can't make us any more confident that achievement is good for us. This, I think, is the key epistemological difference between pleasure and achievement: even before we appeal to the idea that pleasure is good for us, it's clear that pleasure satisfies RESONANCE. The same cannot be said of achievement.

Importantly, if I'm the sort of person who *takes pleasure in* long hikes, then the hike through the White Mountains will tend to resonate with me. This is suggestive of a kind of hedonism. Whereas pleasure is *fundamentally* good, in virtue of its essentially resonating with us, other *prima facie* goods are *derivatively* good, insofar as they tend to cause pleasure. I very briefly canvass this quasi-hedonist view, and make the case that it merits further discussion.

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Communal Epistemic Vice

Henry Roe

University of Sheffield

This paper argues that the epistemic vices of groups are, at least sometimes, better understood as communal and not collective epistemic vices in the sense defended by Miranda Fricker (2010). I examine the phenomena for which London's Metropolitan Police Service was labelled institutionally racist following its investigation into the racist murder of Stephen Lawrence in 1993 and argue that this case offers a salient reference point for theorising the epistemic vices of groups. While Fricker hopes to explain the phenomena in question with reference to her account of collective vice, premised on group-level joint commitments, I argue that this account fails on the grounds that there are few reasons to think that any relevant joint commitment exists in this case. Instead, I propose an account of (what I call) *communal epistemic vice*, which locates the source of groups' vices within situated individual agents whose behaviour is shaped by prevalent group norms and social pressures that are embedded in their organisational or institutional contexts. In these situations, individuals are encouraged to manifest epistemic vices that they would not, or may even disavow, in different group or non-group contexts. I conclude by reflecting on strategies to ameliorate communal epistemic vice.

Explaining Moral Obligation: In Defence of the Second-Personal Account

Janis David Schaab

University of St Andrews

Stephen Darwall argues that moral obligations implicate a distinct class of practical reasons, “second-personal reasons”, whose “validity depends on presupposed authority and accountability relations between persons and, therefore, on the possibility of the reason’s being addressed person-to-person” (2006: 8). His argument rests on the observation that there is a conceptual link between obligation and accountability: we are obligated to ϕ if and only if we can legitimately be held accountable for failing to ϕ .

Darwall contends that any account that attempts to explain obligations in non-secondpersonal terms is doomed to face a *wrong-kind-of-reasons problem* (2006: 14-17). That is, if we characterise an agent’s reasons to ϕ as grounded in something other than the agent’s irreducibly second-personal accountability for failing to ϕ , we will fail to capture the sense in which ϕ -ing is obligatory for the agent.

Some critics object that Darwall’s second-personal account avoids the wrong-kind-of-reasons problem only at the cost of facing another problem, the *problem of antecedence* (Wallace 2007, 2019, Zylberman 2017). That is, by grounding obligations in relations of authority and accountability, the second-personal approach implausibly claims that we have an obligation to ϕ only if someone (implicitly or explicitly) demands that we ϕ . They argue that an alternative account of obligation, the relational account, avoids both the wrong-kind-of-reasons problem and the problem of antecedence. I defend the second-personal account against this criticism by arguing (i) the second-personal account avoids the problem of antecedence and (ii) the relational account falls prey to the wrong-kind-of-reasons problem.

I argue that the claim that the second-personal account falls prey to the problem of antecedence rests on an overly voluntarist interpretation of the second-personal account. According to this interpretation, the existence of a moral obligation to ϕ depends on someone’s actually demanding that we ϕ . However, Darwall argues that “second-personal address”, the attempt to give someone second-personal reasons by making demands on them, has certain “normative felicity conditions” (2006: 5). From these conditions it follows that some demands are “in force”, irrespective of whether someone actually addresses them, “if no one could reasonably reject principles that would warrant them” (Darwall 2007: 65). Conversely, demands fail to create second-personal reasons if they are incompatible with this basic contractualist requirement, even if they are addressed by concrete individuals.

The relational account purports to avoid the wrong-kind-of-reasons problem by maintaining that obligations are not “intelligible independently of our practical relations to others” (Zylberman 2017: 926). At the same time, it purports to avoid the problem of antecedence by abandoning the notion that obligations are grounded in an authority to address. However, I

argue that once we abandon this notion, we cannot sustain the idea that obligations intelligible independently of our practical relations to others. In the picture that emerges, persons no longer play the essential role of originator of claims who stand to be *wronged*. Instead, they are degraded to the status of mere loci of norm-violations. Therefore, the relational account falls prey to the wrong-kinds-of-reasons problem.

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On Hermeneutical Gaps and Willful Ignorance: Towards a Feminist Conception of Moral Progress

Katharina Anna Sodoma

University of Vienna

While feminists have begun to address metaethical questions, there is still a range of issues in metaethics that have not yet been directly explored from a feminist perspective (Superson 2017). In this paper, I develop a conception of moral progress that is feminist in the sense that it allows us to theorize about the mechanisms and effects of unequal social power relations as well as strategies for overcoming them. This conception of moral progress is based on J. David Velleman's version of metaethical constitutivism, which takes intelligibility – making sense of what one is doing – to be the constitutive aim of agency. What makes Velleman's version of constitutivism suitable to feminist concerns is its focus on the social. According to this view, in trying to make sense of themselves and one another, agents depend on shared interpretative resources, which are developed collectively as part of a shared way of life. Because universality, transparency, and reciprocity are conducive to mutual understanding, ways of life will contain norms that we recognize as moral norms. On this view, moral progress consists in developing ways of life further so that they allow members of a community to understand themselves and each other better.

Although Velleman does not address this, his account of moral norms as collectively developed brings into view questions of unequal social power relations and how they can affect and distort shared interpretative resources. These questions have received some attention in the context of feminist epistemology. According to Miranda Fricker, an agent suffers a case of "hermeneutical injustice" when they are unable to adequately understand and communicate an important experience due to a gap in shared interpretative resources that is due to the systematic exclusion of the agent's social group from practices shaping these interpretative resources (Fricker 2007). Drawing on Gaile Pohlhaus's notion of "willful hermeneutical ignorance" (Pohlhaus 2012), Kristie Dotson has argued that members of social groups that are excluded from practices shaping the interpretative resources of a wider community often develop their own interpretative resources, which allow them to make adequate sense of their experience. When those in a privileged position exhibit willful hermeneutical ignorance in ignoring these interpretative resources and continuing to rely on resources that are structurally prejudiced this constitutes a case of what Dotson calls "contributory injustice" (Dotson 2012).

I show how these concepts from feminist epistemology can be relied upon in developing Velleman's conception of moral progress in terms of an increase in mutual intelligibility into a feminist conception of moral progress that can theorize ways in which unequal social power relations distort shared interpretative resources. The result is a conception of moral progress that offers a more nuanced account of what helps and hinders moral progress. The paper contributes to the emerging field of feminist metaethics, which explores questions routinely

discussed in metaethics from a new angle and at the same time shifts the focus to a different set of salient metaethical questions.

Acknowledging “Comfort Women” injustice: interactional and then structural

Seunghyun Song
University of Graz

In this paper, I will introduce a nauseating case of gender-based injustice known as the “Comfort Women” issue and argue for a particular type of corrective justice: acknowledgment. I will argue that for a genuine practice corrective justice, we should perform both interactional and structural acknowledgment, alongside reparation, compensation, and apology. I will draw from my analysis the importance of interactional corrective justice, which precedes structural corrective justice.

To this end, my paper proceeds as follows. In the first section, I introduce the “Comfort Women” injustice. It is a case of mass gender violence, where thousands of colonized women were used as sex slaves by the imperial Japanese army during the Second World War. An estimation of 80,000 to 200,000 women – mostly Korean – were dehumanized, raped, tortured, and murdered, moreover, the victim-survivors’ sufferings were silenced for decades after the original occurrence of injustice. In the second section, I will explain the silencing of victim-survivors as hermeneutical marginalization. I will argue that the silencing was an epistemic injustice, which was an additional injustice that succeeded the original injustice. I will argue that this additional injustice demands corrective justice. In the third section, I argue that the corrective justice demands acknowledgement – a particular correction that *recognizes* the injustice in order to strive towards reconciliation. I take acknowledgment as a *process of recognition*, where 1) an occurrence of injustice is admitted as something that should not have occurred, followed by 2) thorough recognition of what injustice entailed, translated into 3) concrete practice to subvert currently manifest structures that placed the victims in vulnerable positions. I argue acknowledgement should satisfy two modes: interactional and structural. On the one hand, the Japanese government should admit their legal responsibility for the “Comfort Women” injustice as an act of *interactional acknowledgment*. It is interactional, because it is a practice of acknowledgment from a specific moral actor, who bear legal liability and moral responsibility. On the other hand, all

moral actors should practice *structural acknowledgment*, which entails active subversion of intersecting structures of oppression such as gender, class, or postcoloniality. In my last section, I show how my case-based approach sheds a new light to the theory of corrective justice: the interactional corrective justice precedes structural corrective justice. Interactional acknowledgement establishes a mutual recognition of victim-perpetrator relationship, which were – from the onset – marginalized from critical normative consideration. After interactional acknowledgment reestablishes the wrongful relation, we can start to recognize the vulnerable corners of society wherein the victims reside.

Metaethical Baggage and Moral Cognition

Laura Soter

University of Michigan

Psychologists and philosophers alike have recently taken an interest in empirical moral cognition (EMC) and its relation to normative ethics. Greene, for example, uses “trolleyology” to argue that our implicit System 1 tends to distort our moral reasoning through emotional influence, and that our explicit System 2 is more reliable in unfamiliar moral cases. I argue that Greene implicitly – and unjustifiably – imports a realist metaethics into EMC. Justifying a realist metaethical background for EMC would require not only showing that realism is true, but also a further argument that “the folk” have reliable access to these independent moral truths and that empirical testing can reveal them. Such arguments are convincingly challenged by Street-style evolutionary debunking arguments. I thus suggest that EMC should instead take a socially embedded understanding of morality as its end, where our goal is to figure out what norms we as social creatures can collectively will together. We should, that is, be more critical about criticizing the normative value of EMC wholesale, and instead realize that its normative value will depend on the kind of metaethical framework we’re working in. Specifically, EMC can help us in naturalistic moral frameworks.

One such example is Railton’s naturalistic realism, which I take as a case study. Railton offers a convincing analysis of the moral roles of the explicit and implicit cognitive systems, where the affective (implicit) system is actually sophisticated and computationally powerful, driven by Bayesian updating and reinforcement learning. According to Railton, neither system can be shown a priori to be a better guide to moral reasoning, and we should take seriously input from both. This raises an epistemological puzzle: when the two systems conflict (e.g. in cases of implicit bias), which should we trust?

To address this, I suggest we look critically at the strengths (and weaknesses) of each system. Psychological research suggests the (normally developed) implicit system has both sophisticated statistical reasoning abilities and highly active interpersonal competencies. We should thus trust it more in situations where our affect is attuned to the suffering of others. But the implicit system is only as good as the input it gets, and is only helpful for guiding individual action. The explicit system allows for discontinuous changes in value, navigating obstacles that our implicit system can’t handle alone, and for public moral deliberation. Public moral reasoning is critical for engaging in moral discourse with a wide range of other people, figuring out what kinds of norms we can and should agree to live by, and then setting up social institutions that reflect and enforce those norms. Thus when we realize that our implicit system is operating on values we cannot consciously endorse, we can use explicit reasoning to engage in activities that will a) expand the scope of our moral concern so that it includes more people and b) help us with bias reduction or blocking – either ridding ourselves of our unjustified implicit biases, or setting up our environment in a way that blocks their influence on our actions.

Indigenous claims and compensatory justice: The moral irrelevance of group identity

Santiago Truccone Borgogno

University of Graz

Are the descendants of the perpetrators of some historic injustice responsible for compensating it in the present? One of the main difficulties for compensating historical injustices is associated with changes in circumstances. Jeremy Waldron pointed out this problem with his supersession thesis. This thesis asserts that injustice might be overtaken if, due to changes in circumstances, the situation that was unjust many years ago coincides with what justice requires nowadays. The previous challenge is significant when we consider indigenous claims with respect to the injustices committed against them since the Spanish colonization of the Americas and, in particular, during the military campaigns performed when the new Latin American States were built.

In this presentation, I focus on Mapuche people' claims in Argentina for the injustice committed against them during the *Conquest of the Desert* (1878-1885). That injustice generated a *correlativity* between the group who has perpetrated it and the group who has suffered it. However, many years have passed since the *Conquest of the Desert* and the circumstances in which we live today are different from those when the injustice took place. These changes most likely have had effects on the identity of the parties involved in the Conquest of the Desert. Thus, it might be claimed that the original *correlativity* between the perpetrators and those who have suffered the injustice has been broken. If this is so, then, the claims of the descendants of the victims of such injustice are not justified anymore.

In this presentation, I deny such a conclusion. I argue that what matters for the survival of groups is not numerical identity but only *something* that is contained in the numerical identity. Because what matters is something contained in the numerical identity, it is possible that the group that has survived is that *something* that has survived, regardless of the maintenance of the numerical identity. I suggest that what matters for asserting that the group whose rights have been violated has survived into the present is the existence of certain relevant connections between the currently existing indigenous community and the one who has suffered the injustice in the past. However, although the existence of such a connection implies that the group whose rights have been violated has not disappeared, it does not presuppose a *numerical* identity between the group or groups who are claiming in the present and the group or groups who have suffered an injustice in the past. Hence, as long as those connections are in place, the correlativity between the perpetrators and the victims of the injustice can be maintained.

If my argument is correct, from the fact that the group who is currently claiming for compensation is not the same group who has suffered the injustice in the past, it does not follow that the correlativity between the perpetrator and the victims of the injustice has been broken. Hence, as long as this condition remains the injustice has not been superseded.

How bad is badly off?

Charlotte Franziska Unruh
University of Southampton

Prohibitions against harming are ubiquitous in moral and legal discourse. However, it is controversial among moral philosophers what exactly it means to be harmed. The standard account in the literature is the counterfactual comparative account. It says that a person is harmed if and only if they are made worse off than they would have been in a baseline state. However, the reliance of the counterfactual comparative account on baselines is problematic, since there seem to be clear cases where someone is harmed without being made worse off. Such cases have motivated the non-comparative account of harm, which says that a person is harmed if and only if they are made badly off. The virtue of this account, or so it is thought, is that it does not require any comparisons with baselines.

In this paper, I argue that this apparent virtue of the non-comparative account does not withstand closer scrutiny. Unlike what its name suggests, the non-comparative account *does* rely on comparison baselines, in order to measure the severity of harm.

I start by arguing that accounts of harm need to provide not only a way to identify, but also a way to measure harm, in order to inform real-world decision making. However, all possible ways to measure harm involve comparisons. As pointed out above, the noncomparative account can *identify* harm without referring to a baseline: it suffices to point out that a person is in an intrinsically bad state. However, to *measure* harm, that is, to say just how badly off that person is, the non-comparative account needs to provide an account of what it means for a state to be intrinsically better or worse for a person.

Non-comparative baselines cannot appeal to a scale that depends on counterfactuals about possible states of those people who are harmed. They can also not simply define a non-comparative baseline as a state that is absolutely free from intrinsic badness. This is because every life contains some amount of bad things, and some amount of pain, grief, etc. is just a part of what it means to be human. I suggest that the most plausible way to understand what being 'unharméd' means on a non-comparative account is as occupying a default level of wellbeing. We can imagine this default level as a state in which a human being is neither particularly well nor badly off. The non-comparative account is challenged to specify this default.

However, this challenge is difficult to solve in cases where there is no clear default level, for example in cases involving future generations. It is unclear how non-comparative baselines could be specified in such cases. If my argument is correct, then it does not only present a challenge to defenders of the non-comparative account. More importantly, it shows that the non-comparative account faces significant difficulties in the very cases that motivated it in the first place.

KEYNOTE: My Body, My Self?

Heather Widdows

University of Birmingham

That our bodies have become our very selves in a visual and virtual culture is one of the main arguments of *Perfect Me*. This is so widely believed that we often don't recognise *either* that it is true (until it is pointed it out) *or* how surprising and transformative this is. To think that our selves are our bodies is new. We used to think of ourselves as our 'inner selves'. Self-improvement was not improving the body but improving the mind or the soul. Being better was knowing more, having a better character or being able to do more. Success is becoming appearance-success, and recognising the moral element in this is crucial to understanding what is going on. Body work has become virtuous. If we work hard enough – stick *religiously* to our diet, pump iron, run, buff, smooth and firm – we will be rewarded. And the rewards will be significant. We will be better people, and, in the logic of the beauty ideal, we will be rewarded with the 'goods of the good life'. Better relationships, better jobs, happiness, better lives.

In 'My Body, My Self?' I will explore the move to bodies as selves under an ethical ideal and consider what this means. In locating the self in the body we do not simply objectify. The body is not passive. It is subject and object. The self is located in the body, but not just in the actual flawed body – the objectified body. It is also in the transforming body, a body of potential and possibility, and the imagined body, the perfect me.