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Farbod Akhlaghi-Ghaffarokh
Non-Realist Cognitivism, Truth, Existence: A Response to Suikkanen, and Objection to Parfit

Jussi Suikkanen (2016) presents an argument against Derek Parfit’s Non-Realist Cognitivism (N-RC). According to N-RC, a range of non-naturalistic, cognitivist commitments in meta-normativity are true, and that no feature of reality, nor any additional normative features of reality, make normative claims true (that is, true normative claims have no ontological implications).

The plausibility of N-RC remains largely unexplored. Suikkanen has recently argued that Parfit’s N-RC faces a serious challenge: to provide a plausible account of how to understand normative truth. This challenge, Suikkanen argues, cannot be met. He maintains this is because a number of traditional accounts of truth are unavailable to Parfit, leaving N-RC forced to adopt a deeply unattractive form of primitivism about truth.

In this paper, I have two aims. First, I argue that Suikkanen’s argument for the claim that Parfit cannot endorse a form of deflationism about truth is unsound. Secondly, I argue that how Parfit can show the aforementioned argument unsound gives rise to a deeply problematic challenge for his view, which I maintain there is good reason to doubt Parfit can address - thereby casting strong doubt upon his view.

I proceed as follows.

In §1, I introduce Parfit’s N-RC, motivate concern with its plausibility, and explain why Parfit owes us an account of truth in his N-RC. I then argue that deflationism about truth is the most attractive account of truth for Parfit that Suikkanen discusses. Finally, I rehearse Suikkanen’s argument for the claim that Parfit cannot appeal to any form of deflationism about truth.

I argue, in §2, that Suikkanen’s argument is unsound. For a premise in this argument - that if Parfit endorsed both deflationism about truth and facthood, then N-RC becomes indistinguishable from Robust Meta-Normative Realism (RMR, that is, from realist views that accept that true normative claims have ontological implications) – is false.

Parfit can maintain a distinction between these views by arguing, pace Suikkanen, that what distinguishes these views is differing commitments about existence. RMR-ists claim that the existence of normative facts have ontological implications. But Parfit denies this. Instead, he endorses:

- (Senses of ‘Exist’): There are ontological and non-ontological senses of ‘exist’. (SoE)
- (Non-Ontological Normative Phenomena): Normative phenomena (i.e. normative facts, properties, and relations) exist in a non-ontological sense of ‘exist’. (N-ONP)

In §3, I turn to argue that, even if we grant Parfit SoE and N-ONP, and the success of the response to Suikkanen defended here, this response raises a strong challenge to his view:

- (The Challenge): Why does a distinction between ontological and non-ontological senses of ‘exist’, and the claim that normative phenomena – if they existed – would exist in a non-ontological sense of ‘exist’, entail or suggest that N-RC faces no ontological objections?

This question is crucial to the plausibility of N-MC. Absent an answer, it remains unclear that SoE and N-ONP allow Parfit to avoid the ontological objections that plague RMR. I proceed to present two ways in which Parfit can meet The Challenge, before arguing that both fail to provide a plausible answer to The Challenge.
Forgetting and Inconsistency: A Neuro-Philosophical Approach

This talk addresses the question: what is so bad about inconsistent testimony from witnesses? In criminal and civil legal contexts, inconsistent statements are used to both formally impeach a witness and to less formally damage witness credibility in the eyes of judges and jurors. Inconsistency is treated as far more damning than failing to remember, adding irrelevant details, or other testimonial flaws. In this project, we look at new models of memory functioning, in order to see if changes in the way we understand human memory should change how we treat inconsistency in the law. We first present a sample case of the use of inconsistency to impeach a witness in the American criminal system. Then, we survey neuroscientific research on the processes behind constructive memory. Finally, we present two views of the value of witness testimony, and argue that this work on the source of memory errors raises a challenge for our current legal practices on both views.

In the empirical section of the talk, our central claim is that the computation behind inconsistent memory reports is part of normal memory functioning. The production of these memories is itself part of that functioning, rather than a defective by-product. We define normal as follows: a computational operation φ is cognitively normal functioning when φ serves an adaptive or supporting function integrated with other large-scale adaptive operations in the organism’s daily life. While there is a long history of the study of memory errors, notably by Elizabeth Loftus, the question of whether inconsistency is cognitively normal is left unresolved by this research program. However, if anything, the tone of this early research treated inconsistencies as defective confabulation, and thus not cognitively normal.

More recent research suggests that active construction is indeed cognitively normal. One line of evidence is the connection between episodic future thinking and memory. This suggests deep and sustained connections between episodic memory and imaginative filling in of the details (De Brigard, Schachter, etc). Support for this view of inconsistency as arising predictably from the ordinary process of remembering is bolstered by research on sleep-linked (REM and tREM) gist extraction and confabulation of related items. This process, which seems to involve active effort, results in increased confabulations and other memory ‘errors’. In summary, the research on memory computation is very preliminary, but it seems that several stages of the memory process can lead to inconsistent reports, and in each case, this is a feature rather than a bug.

To apply these models to the question of the importance of inconsistent testimony, we need to first understand what we are looking for in good witness testimony. Borrowing a distinction from the epistemology of testimony, we divide the views on the value of this legal testimony into two families:

1. Reliance-based: Inconsistency is a marker (or part) of how reliable the person/testimony/etc is. Here, reliability could be understood in terms of future accuracy over some domain, or aggregate total accuracy using various measures. Essentially, reliance-based theories treat the value of being a good witness as not unlike the value of being a good thermometer.

2. Trust-based: Inconsistency is a marker (or a part) of how trustworthy the person is. Trustworthiness can be cached out in many ways, but essentially invokes qualities of the testifier as a person as opposed to as an indicator.

We argue that the evidence about the statistical significance of inconsistency is very hard to determine, which is a challenge for reliance-based views. Further, reliance-based views clash with our intuitions in thought experiments comparing the value of human testimony and merely statistical information. For trust-based views, the cognitive normality of inconsistency is a stumbling block. If some cognitive feature is normal (in a normative sense), it can’t at the same time reflect negatively on the person’s character or relationship to the court.

We conclude with a discussion of the risks associated with wrongfully including or impeaching testimony based on (in)consistency.
**Simon Barker**  
**Bucking the Trend - the puzzle of individual dissent**

In this paper, I argue that individual dissent amongst a collective of peers can be permissible so long as the dissenter’s position is strongly warranted and she makes strategically rational choices in further inquiry that are likely to ‘flush out’ that warrant.

Epistemologists remain divided upon the appropriate response to finding oneself in disagreement with an individual epistemic peer, yet it is widely accepted that one should *accede* when the disagreement is with a sufficiently large number of one’s peers (see Christensen 2011, Kelly 2010, Lackey 2013, Pettit 2006). Call this assumption *collective authority*. At the same time, it has been argued that a collective of inquirers will tend to perform better epistemically, in terms of both reliability and rationality, if there are dissenting individuals amongst the collective (see Mill 1859, De Cruz and De Smedt 2013, Elgin 2010, Matheson 2015) Call this view *epistemic liberalism*. Taken together, collective authority and epistemic liberalism allow that there can be situations in which an individual dissenter is obliged to *accede* to the collective, but where it would better serve the collective if the dissenter were to remain *steadfast*. I call this the ‘Puzzle of Individual Dissent’ (for a related problem see Matheson 2014).

There are three responses to this puzzle: accept that individual and collective rationality can produce conflicting recommendations; reject epistemic liberalism; reject collective authority. I suggest that we should reject collective authority, the difficulty is to do so in such a way that does not license any and all dissent.

To do so, I first offer a characterisation of the normative significance of disagreement. Faulkner (2016) distinguishes between the *strength* and *transparency* of warrant. Strength is the degree of support warrant gives, transparency a matter of access to and appreciation of the facts that determine warrant. I suggest that the higher-order evidence provided by disagreement does not reduce the strength of warrant, but impairs its transparency. In other words, disagreement functions as what I call an ‘obscuring defeater’. Crucially, though, it can be permissible to hold strongly warranted beliefs when that warrant is not transparent, for instance, when deferring to expert testimony, or recalling beliefs from memory. Whether a dissenter is permitted to remain steadfast, then, will depend upon how strongly warranted her position is, and whether continued confidence in that warrant can be appropriately underwritten once it has been obscured by the collective opinion.

With this framework in place, I consider two explanations of how the dissenter can underwrite her steadfastness: by *deferring* responsibility to the collective on the basis of its capacity to ‘flush out’ warrant when it allows space for dissent and disagreement; and by *taking* responsibility to conduct further inquiry via strategic choices that she expects to introduce new information to the collective likely to ‘flush out’ warrant. I argue that the latter explanation is better, but that fleshing it out will require a fuller picture of the intellectual virtues of inquiry.
Naturalistic fallacy is traditionally traced back to Hume and its main claim is that one cannot derive moral claims from purely non-moral/descriptive claims. This means that is-statements and ought-statements are different in nature and it brings about a dichotomy of facts and values. Leaving aside the discussions of the naturalistic fallacy itself, however, there are very diverse receptions of Hume in the literature on how to reconcile this view with Hume’s philosophy in general. In this paper, I provide a classification on this wide range of responses after making a thorough analysis of the literature. Besides providing a classification, I argue, not unlike many Hume scholars, that the isolation of facts and values cannot be a position Hume supported in the first place. I believe that as an emotivist and a naturalist, his aim was to rather set a target which he intended to overcome in the *Treatise of Human Nature*. A reconciliation is only possible by accepting that Hume’s aim is to solve the gap between is-statements and ought-statements. Firstly, I provide an introduction on the is-ought passage in Hume. Secondly, I offer a classification and represent the different receptions of the naturalistic fallacy in Humean philosophy in general. Hume is interpreted in two ways in this matter: There are those that believe the is-ought inference does not constitute a gap and those that believe the is-ought inference does constitute a gap. After providing a representation of these different views, I agree with Sayre-McCord that facts and values cannot be isolated from each other and to claim otherwise is a position that cannot be reconciled with Hume’s philosophy. Furthermore, I argue that Hume’s ethics tends to carry on with thick concepts that are open to empirical analysis such as *courage*, *generosity*, etc. rather than thin concepts like *right*, *permissible*, *good*, and so on and this tendency is an indication that Hume does not recognize the fact-value distinction he is immensely known for.
Sally-Anne Beverley  
Exploring Gender Identity in Queer Spaces

This paper will argue that bisexual spaces are queer spaces which are focused less on binary gender so offer supportive environments for transgender people. The paper uses original data from interviews with transgender people in bisexual only spaces discussing the negotiation of their gender in those spaces. This stems from bisexual attraction not being determined by, or limited to, gender preference. This means that gender identity and gender performance are less restricted or policed in bisexual spaces. The paper will also argue that similarities between the overlapping transgender and bisexual communities reinforce this supportive environment. These similarities are in deconstructing gender binaries and in shared experience of exclusion from lesbian and gay spaces. These communities also share an experience of being constructed as dangerous by others including second-wave radical lesbian feminists. This will demonstrated through the work of Sheila Jeffrey’s (1999, 2014), a radical lesbian feminist who has written work which is critical of both transgender and bisexual people. The paper will focus on voices of transgender bisexual people throughout and privilege their perspectives which are often absent from academic discourse. It will conclude by looking at examples of bisexual and transgender communities creating queer spaces together, advocating for more queer spaces that are less focused on gender.
James Brown
Solving the Negation Problem: The New Expressivist Manoeuvre

Expressivism explains the meaning of evaluative language in terms of the nondescriptive states of mind we express by using such language. A major difficulty for expressivism is to explain the logic of externally negated evaluative sentences. The problem is best shown through example. Consider:

WRONG Murder is wrong.

Let’s say that WRONG expresses the disapproval attitude towards murdering. Next, consider:

WRONG-NOT Not murdering is wrong.

Let’s say that WRONG-NOT expresses the disapproval attitude towards not murdering. An account of the meaning of these claims needs to explain why they are logically inconsistent. Like ordinary inconsistent descriptive beliefs, we have here a single attitude type directed towards inconsistent contents. The expressivist can therefore hope to explain inconsistency engendered by internal negation in terms of inconsistent contents in the usual way. Finally, consider:

NOT-WRONG Murdering is not wrong.

What attitude does NOT-WRONG express? Expressivists might maintain that it expresses the tolerance attitude towards murdering. This attitude cannot be defined out of disapproval and negation, as this would give us only an absence of an attitude. So tolerance must be a logically distinct attitude type to disapproval.

Now the problem. WRONG and NOT-WRONG appear to be logically inconsistent. The expressivist explains this inconsistency in terms of the properties of the attitudes of disapproval and tolerance. But what explains why these properties engender inconsistency? Logically distinct attitudes do not generally give rise to inconsistency. And why is this logical inconsistency, rather than some other kind of incompatibility? The expressivist might simply stipulate that the relevant evaluative attitudes have these inconsistency-engendering properties. But these are the very properties we set out to explain. Hence, expressivism fails to adequately explain external negation for evaluative sentences (see, among others, Hale 1993, van Roojen 1996, Unwin 1999, 2001, Dreier 2006, Schroeder 2008).

Drawing on recent work in the philosophy of language, this paper argues that expressivists might solve the negation problem by developing an expressivist-friendly account of normative content. The idea is to develop a suitably nondescriptive conception of normative content that can play the content-role for evaluative attitudes and that engenders inconsistency in a satisfactory way without succumbing to descriptivism about value. This will allow the expressivist to understand both internal and external negation as expressing a single attitude type towards inconsistent contents. More generally, the proposed view aims to allow the expressivist to construe evaluative judgments as beliefs with normative propositional contents, while still being distinct in kind from descriptive beliefs.

The proposal is examined in the context of Allan Gibbard's (1990) norm-expressivism. I argue that systems of norms can be constructed out of possibilia in a similar manner to descriptive content in the form of possible worlds propositions. This allows the expressivist to capture normative inconsistency in the same manner as descriptive inconsistency, while nonetheless understanding normative and descriptive content as distinct in kind. In contrast to Gibbard's own psychologistic construal of normative content, I argue that this provides the expressivist with the resources to solve the negation problem.

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James Chamberlain
The Case for Moral Emotions

Hume argued that all positive moral judgements are constituted by occurrences of a specifically moral emotion which he called ‘approbation’ (*Treatise* 3.1.2.3), and all negative moral judgements by disapprobation. To judge something as wrong is directly analogous to judging something as frightening, for example. Today, many philosophers accept that moral judgements somehow require emotions, but the notion of specifically moral emotions has fallen from favour. I argue that there is, at least, a case to be made for their existence.

I take it that emotional appraisals and behaviours are produced by mental systems which are ‘modular’, in a loosely Fodorian sense. Many current theorists take this line (Charland 1995; Griffiths 1997; Prinz 2004). By this account, emotions constitute psychological systems which are to some extent separate from our higher cognitive functions, such as beliefs and desires. I argue that, understood in this way, emotions have several features which are sufficiently similar to the processes which cause moral judgements for us to take moral judgements to be emotional reactions.

I suggest that the processes which produce moral judgements, as well as those which produce emotional reactions, are typically *mandatory, cognitively impenetrable, opaque* to consciousness and *domain specific*. The outputs of such processes are *shallow*, by which I mean that they are not conceptually complex judgements. These are five of the defining features of psychological modules. A further similarity between emotional reactions and moral judgements is that they are in many cases intrinsically motivating. This suggests, not only that moral judgements are produced by modular processes, but that they are produced by emotional processes.

There are strong counter-arguments to overcome. Moral judgements seem very different from emotions like fear. First, it seems that, while all objects of fear are in some way taken to be dangerous, the objects of moral judgements do not seem unified in this way. Prinz (2007) argues for a set of emotions which cause moral judgements, partly because he thinks the only unifying property of morally assessed objects is our attitude towards them. Second, it seems that all judgements of fearsomeness are accompanied by a phenomenological feeling of fear, whereas moral judgements may involve several or no feelings.

I suggest two Humean counter-arguments. First, all moral judgements share the same *distal* cause, despite having very different proximate causes. Similarly, an emotion like fear has many proximate causes – fire, spiders etc. – but a unified distal cause; there is an unconscious psychological relation between these objects and harm. We may not be aware of the distal causes of emotions, but they can be empirically determined. Moral judgements have a shared distal cause. All approved actions are of a kind associated with causing the happiness of those around us, as all disapproved actions are associated with causing unhappiness.

Second, some emotions are, in Hume’s terminology, ‘calm’; they involve no obvious phenomenological feeling (*Treatise* 2.3.3.8). I argue that emotional reactions which are caused by abstract ideas are typically calm in this way, and that moral judgements are typically caused by abstract ideas.
It is commonly accepted that pain possesses a general biological value for an organisms. This has been particularly demonstrated in the investigation of Congenital Pain Analgesia, a disorder with an extreme high rate of early mortality as the concerned patients are not able to experience any physical pain. As such, the idea of pain as ‘a gift that nobody wants’ became popular (Brand, Yancey, 1993). However, defining the exact value of pain that is missing in pathological cases is still up for debate and philosophical models differ significantly with regard to this issue. Defenders of a representational account assume that pain’s value lies in the detection of a certain physiological state, such as tissue damage (Bain, 2007). Defenders of an imperative account assume that pain’s value is identical to its motivational force (Klein, 2015). Defenders of a hybrid view claim that pain tracks a body state and commands the subject to act (Martinez, 2011). Which of these accounts shall be considered as appropriate?

In my presentation, I intend to offer an empirically informed approach to this question. Thereby, I will introduce a conceptual distinction between pain as a process including various neural and endocrine mechanisms and pain sensation as the phenomenal experience of a subject. Although I assume that they are highly connected, I will refer to the empirical results of different disciplines to adequately account for both of them. On the one hand, I will reveal that a variety of mechanisms is involved in pain processing while all of them contribute to its adaptive benefit. This becomes salient particularly in neuroscientific investigations showing that the involved mechanisms subserve sensory and affective encoding, the production of a general arousal and an aversive drive, autonomous changes, reflexive and expressive responses, memorizing effects, shifts in attention as well as the production of an integrative conscious experience. Thus, the value of the pain system must be described as multidimensional. On the other hand, I will focus on the phenomenal experience and show on the basis of psychological investigations that it occurs as a consequent of processing different kinds of sensory input based on a subject’s past experience, expectations, emotional and physiological conditions. Thus, the sensation of pain is best understood as the subject’s awareness of itself as being a threatened embodied being in the world. In sum, I will conclude that none of the present available accounts does justice to these insights from empirical science as they are too restricted on a specific aspect of pain, respectively pain sensations and do not capture the complexity of their value.

References
Matthew Cull
How to Criticize Family Resemblance Theories of Gender

One attempt to understand gender which accounts for the diversity within genders has been to adopt a family resemblance model of gender kinds. Such a position has been endorsed by thinkers such as Cressida Heyes, Jacob C. Hale, and John Corvino. Such thinkers have, however, come under criticism from Talia Mae Bettcher, who thinks that whilst family resemblance theories of gender were supposedly introduced partly as a way of accounting for trans women’s claims to womanhood, such theories ultimately fail to do justice to those claims. First I shall clear up some conceptual confusion, showing that two quite different models in the literature are both called ‘family resemblances’. I will then argue that whilst Bettcher’s criticisms rightly rule out certain family resemblance models of gender, her criticisms miss the target when it comes to Hale and Corvino, and that in fact Heyes’ family resemblance picture of the kind woman does adequately do justice to trans women’s claims. I then shall provide what I take to be more biting arguments against Heyes’ position. Noting the added complexity needed to account for more than one gender using such analyses, I argue that they all face problems of double counting, and that novel genders such as demiboy and demigirl, along with certain forms of genderfluidity pose additional and insuperable problems for the family resemblance theorist. I then show that this final problem points to an interesting tension between the claims of different trans people.
Joseph Cunningham
Is Believing for a Normative Reason a Composite Condition?

In their *Believing for Normative Reasons: Prime, Not Composite*, Errol Lord and Kurt Sylvan focus on a surprisingly neglected question in contemporary epistemology: what is it for an agent to believe that \( p \) in response to a normative reason for them to believe that \( p \)? They argue by appeal to counterexample against what they call the Composite View, which, to a first approximation, says that we should conceive of believing in response to a normative reason as factoring into believing in the light of an apparent normative reason where, in addition, the apparent reason is genuine.

The first aim of this paper is to demonstrate that Lord and Sylvan do not succeed in refuting the Composite View root-and-branch, for a modified version of the Composite View which preserves its core motivation survives their attack. I argue that the Composite View is intended to capture the thought that we should think of believing in response to normative reasons as factoring into believing for apparent reasons plus further conditions, that Lord and Sylvan’s argument fails to undermine this more general idea, and that therefore the proponent of the Composite View can happily modify their theory to preserve the general idea whilst side-stepping the issues Lord and Sylvan raise.

The second aim of the paper is to provide a fresh argument against the Composite View which succeeds in undermining its core motivation. I argue that refuting the core motivation requires us to conceive of the rational-basing relation that holds between one’s belief that \( p \) and one’s belief that \( q \) in the success case of rationally held belief as a kind of relation that can obtain *only if* the agent is in the success case: the in-the-light-of relation which holds in the success case is essentially successful in character (much as the relation constitutively involved in having a veridical experience is conceived by the Naive Realist in the Philosophy of Perception). Against this background, I then try to locate a case of which it is plausible to say that (i) it is not a success case of rationally held belief and (ii) this can only be explained by appeal the idea that the essentially successful kind of in-the-light-of relation is not instantiated in the case. I argue that Hornsby’s well-known case of Edmund the Pond-skater doesn’t fit the bill; it only requires the proponent of the Composite View to modify their theory further, by adding the condition that the agent knows their reason to their analysis as an additional component. The kind of case I settle on involves an agent who satisfies all the conditions laid down even by the fully modified version of the Composite View but, because they lack the general ability to reason from their knowledge of their reason to the conclusion that \( p \), they do not count as holding their belief that \( p \) in the light of their normative reason.
What is the relation between language and national identity? One way of addressing this question is to situate the answer on a spectrum where, on the one extreme, language and national identity are so closely interwoven that the former is an inseparable component of the latter (linguistic nationalism). On this view, language functions as a vehicle for the cultural particularities it embodies. On the other extreme of the spectrum, language makes no significant contribution to a people’s cultural or national identity, such that any cultural shifts induced by the replacement of one language by another are negligible (linguistic cosmopolitanism).

This paper specifies the main features of language which contribute towards a people’s cultural and national identity. I begin by adopting a working characterisation of the terms ‘people’ and ‘nation’ proposed by the mid-20th century Welsh philosopher and language rights campaigner J.R. Jones. Jones’ characterisation of these terms will be used not as an exhaustive definition, but rather as what I shall argue is a highly fruitful way of looking at the matter in hand, emphasising a number of highly relevant insights. Then, I will discuss what, specifically, it is about language that has compelled many to argue that it is an inseparable component of a people’s national identity. This will involve looking at problems of incommensurability in translation and hermeneutics, and invoking Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘forms of life’ in order to elucidate some of the ways in which native languages mirror their users’ culture-specific particularities. I argue that these considerations imply that the culture-specific factors in question can be compressed into a native language through repeated historical use, thereby functioning as a mechanism for anchoring certain aspects of a people’s national identity.

I also make use of two features of Herder’s account of the relation between language and conceptual understanding which are consistent with Wittgenstein’s account, but can also be seen as useful additions to it in this context. These features are (1) certain types of mental imagery, and (2) musical form. Herder argued that both these features play a relevant role in conceptual understanding, and I explore how differences in these features across different languages can also be seen as relevant contributing factors towards the impact of language on cultural and national identity. I conclude that the considerations adduced collectively suggest that language does make an indispensable contribution towards its users’ cultural or national identity, though the exact extent to which its relevance is weighted varies across peoples and nations according to two further factors. The first is the degree of influence that other culturally-relevant features such as beliefs, institutions and practices have in comparison to it; the second is the richness of its conceptual repertoire, and the degree to which that repertoire reflects its users’ cultural past.
Arguments from faultless disagreement are a topic of current interest in metaethics. These arguments move from the premise that faultless moral disagreement is possible to the conclusion that moral realism is false. In particular, the idea is that the possibility of faultless moral disagreement is incompatible with the objectivity of morality.

On one way of precisifying these claims, disagreement is faultless just in case it does not involve a cognitive shortcoming (Wright, 1992). In other words, just in case both parties are fully rational and neither has any defect in their evidence. Furthermore, to say that an actual disagreement over p is possibly faultless is to say that there is at least one possible world where both parties have reasoned perfectly and neither has any defect in their evidence, and where they nevertheless disagree about p.

The aim of this paper is narrow: to rebut one objection to arguments like this. Namely, David Enoch's (2009) argument to the effect that they beg the question.

This objection has two parts. In the first part, Enoch argues that the evidence for moral objectivism defeats the evidence for the possibility of faultless moral disagreement. His argument turns on an analogy with mathematics. The evidence for the possibility of faultless moral disagreement, he supposes, comes from actual moral disagreements which appear to be faultless in the sense that it is not obvious that either party suffers from a cognitive shortcoming. We sometimes encounter mathematical disagreements like this. For example, we sometimes see two people get different answers to an arithmetical calculation, where neither is notoriously bad at arithmetic, or overly tired, or drunk, etc. In such cases, Enoch thinks, we should just assume that despite appearances, at least one party has made a mistake. For we have an antecedently justified commitment to mathematical objectivism, which rules out the possibility that neither party has. This claim, moreover, is supposed to follow from a quite general line of reasoning, so that ‘the analogous metaethical views would license the analogous attitude in the moral case’ (ibid.).

For Enoch, and this is the second stage of his argument, this means that the evidence for the possibility of faultless will be probative (in the sense of undefeated) only if no prior commitment to moral objectivism is justified. Therefore, the argument begs the question in the sense of failing as an independent objection. An argument begs the question in this sense if it depends, for its force, on the negation of the original justification for the view under attack. (Enoch, 2017, correspondence, May 12).

I provide two responses to this objection. The first response attacks the analogy between mathematics and ethics. First, even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that a prior commitment to moral objectivism is justified, we should not grant that that commitment (insofar as it is justified) is anywhere near as strong as the analogous commitment in the mathematical case. Part of the reason why this is true (and this is the second disanalogy) is that the evidence for the possibility of faultless mathematical disagreement is very weak, the evidence for the possibility of faultless moral disagreement is much stronger. It’s far from clear, therefore, that any justified commitment to moral objectivism defeats the evidence for the possibility of faultless moral disagreement.

The second response, however, grants this claim. Even if it is true, the argument does not beg the question in Enoch’s sense. For the evidence for the possibility of faultless disagreement comes from moral epistemic considerations about the rationality of individuals who disagree about moral matters in certain circumstances. And these considerations are not typically taken to be part of the prior motivation for moral objectivism. Admittedly, there is a weak sense in which the probity of that evidence requires that the relevant prior justificatory considerations will turn out to be misleading. But this means that the argument is question-begging only in the sense that all valid arguments are (and this is not the sense that Enoch has in mind).

References
Can Kant’s Idea of Self-Legislation be Understood in a Way Which Avoids Anscombe’s Superior Power Objection?

In her influential paper *Modern Moral Philosophy* (1958/2005) Elizabeth Anscombe argued that Immanuel Kant’s idea of legislating for oneself - the idea that the individual human being gives her or himself the moral law - is absurd (ibid, p.186). ‘The concept of legislation’, Anscombe objected, ‘requires superior power in the legislator’ (ibid, p.171). Anscombe presumably conceived of legislating for oneself as a self-reflexive action akin to washing one’s hair or brushing one’s teeth; for on this conception self-legislation turns out absurd - I cannot have superior power over myself. However, though points in Kant’s texts give us reason to understand legislating for oneself as a self-reflexive action (e.g. 6:438), can we not understand Kant’s idea in a way which avoids Anscombe’s charge of absurdity?

In this paper, I use Kant’s works to suggest two other ways of understanding legislating for oneself, both of which avoid Anscombe’s objection. I term these the ‘reason-as-legislator account’, and the ‘metaphorical account’. The reason-as-legislator account attempts to avoid Anscombe’s objection through suggesting that we understand the faculty of reason (a mental faculty which Kant claims gives us moral concepts) to have superior power as legislator over an individual’s will. By contrast, the metaphorical account attempts to avoid Anscombe’s objection through suggesting that we understand all talk of self-legislation to be metaphorical.

I begin the presentation by introducing the idea of legislating for oneself and Anscombe’s objection to it. I then proceed to provide an account of moral obligation. Moral obligation - the idea that we are obligated to pursue virtuous actions and refrain from vicious ones - is central to Kant’s ethics and required for both the alternative accounts of self-legislation I shall suggest. Kant’s idea of moral obligation has been explored by Allen Wood (1999) and Robert Stern (2012), and I draw upon their work as well as work by David Wiggins (1987) in providing my explanation. Subsequently, I illustrate the reason-as-legislator and the metaphorical accounts of self-legislation, arguing that both avoid Anscombe’s charge of absurdity.
Devin Fitzpatrick  
Melancholic Metaethics: Phenomenology of Depression and Moral Motivation

I argue that the Humean psychology which defines normative or moral motivation in terms of either belief or desire is inadequate for understanding both 1) certain experiences of depression and 2) the general implications such experiences have for moral motivation and value as such. By a conventional understanding of Humean psychology, depression is an absence of motivation because it is an absence of desire, as in Michael Smith’s example of a depressive who knows rationally what she ought to do but cannot muster the desire to act accordingly. I acknowledge that this may be the case for some states of melancholy or clinical depression, including bipolar depression. But in the case of experiences of unmooring or acedia that in clinical discourse is associated with major depression, I do not think a belief/desire paradigm allows us to understand what phenomenologically occurs: the transformation of previously adequate reasons or motives into inadequate reasons or motives. That is, the significance of both beliefs and desires is lost, becoming as though a distant memory. I am hungry, but why was it that I thought it was important to eat? I believed that my health mattered, but do I still maintain the assumptions upon which that belief relied? Every reason or motive that was previously “good enough” seems exposed as having always been insufficient, up to and including reasons to continue living, and whether that motive took the form of a belief or a desire is irrelevant. I aim to show that such an experience is not a special case for motivation but is rather paradigmatic: values, that which ought to motivate, are neither essentially beliefs nor desires but are rather that which when lost demotivates both.

I begin with a phenomenology of depression, drawing on Matthew Radcliffe’s recent Experiences of Depression: A Study in Phenomenology and Ann Cvetkovich’s Depression: A Public Feeling, to help explain and situate the phenomenon I am describing in both clinical and personal terms. I then proceed to introduce this experience into the framework of contemporary metaethics, relying on Smith’s The Moral Problem and subsequent work, and show how the contest between Humean and Kantian views of motivation in terms of either desire or belief leaves no room for the intelligibility of such an experience. The consequences of this disruption of the belief/desire paradigm for motivation are I think broad, implying challenges to strict separations between reason and passion or fact and value as well. But I will focus on the question of how this account of motivation in general becomes a matter of moral motivation in particular. I will argue that there is a moral hazard that is specific to the depressive loss of motivation: the failure to care about one’s most essential commitments and those to whom one is most committed, thereby potentially undoing others or oneself. Thus, in addition to the metaethical implications, I will consider the normative ethical challenge of how the depressed person and their depressed or non-depressed loved ones should cope with this possibility.
This paper articulates a novel account of values as reflectively endorsed conventions. The account is framed as a response to Hilary Putnam’s so-called “pragmatist challenge” to philosophers of science to “rethink” what he calls “the last dogma of empiricism”: the treasured fact/value dichotomy [1]. Putnam’s view, of course, is that the said dichotomy collapses, and that we must therefore treat our value judgments as objective lest we fall into subjectivism about the claims of science. I aim to meet and overcome Putnam’s challenge from within a broadly pragmatist view, while retaining a commitment to robust, i.e. roughly Quinean, naturalism. To this end, I present my account as a development of Quine’s basic picture which cleaves to the dogma in question, while nevertheless managing to give Putnam (nearly) everything he wants in a theory of value, admitting, in particular, the deep interpenetration of facts and values, while staving-off subjectivism about the claims of science.

I start by noting that Putnam’s attack on the fact/value dichotomy is directly modeled on Quine’s earlier argument against another treasured dichotomy: that between analytic and synthetic statements. As Putnam tells it, Quine’s argument succeeded by drawing attention to the deep and inextricable “entanglement” of these two kinds of statements: those whose truth is a matter of linguistic convention, and those whose truth is determined by empirical observation. In effect, Putnam notes, “Quine argued that scientific statements cannot be neatly separated into “conventions” and “facts”” (8). Putnam’s own strategy then, is to make the same kind of move with respect to the purported dichotomy between facts and values. Namely, to show the entanglement of value judgments and statements of fact, and then “to argue that this dichotomy collapses in a way that is entirely analogous with the collapse of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy” (8 my emphasis).

Despite his explicit appeal to Quine’s general form of argument, however, Putnam also argues that Quine is as guilty as anyone of “evading” the topic of values, and their role in scientific practice in particular. And while I grant that Quine himself did not devote nearly [2] enough time to developing a theory of value, I also believe that it is possible to deploy the conceptual resources available to Quine in order to do so, and this is precisely what I try to do. I argue that values just are conventions (in the broadest sense of patterned bits of behavior, including of course, linguistic behavior), albeit ones of a certain specific kind. In particular, I claim that a value is simply a reflectively endorsed convention, by which I mean, a convention of which one is aware, and which one continues actively to embrace over known alternatives. After clarifying this view somewhat, I conclude by showing how it enables us to concede Putnam’s point about the deep entanglement of fact and value (since it is ultimately the same point Quine had made), while denying the view that avoiding subjectivism about the claims of science requires treating our value judgments as objective.

Notes
**Andrés García**  
**The Finality and Instrumentality of Value in a Way**

*Final value* is the type of value that accrues to ends, understood as objects that are good or bad for their own sakes. *Instrumental value* is the type of value that accrues to means, understood as objects that are good or bad for the sake of their effects. The distinction between final and instrumental value is one of the most prominent in the field of axiology. The following talk aims to show that it is also one of the most fundamental because it cuts across large areas of the evaluative domain. If this is correct, there may be many types of value which can come in either final or instrumental form. For the sake of brevity, the talk aims to illustrate this point by focusing on two distinct value concepts, gathered here under the banner of *value in a way*. The first concept we will be considering is that of *kind-value*, which denotes the type of value that accrues to objects that are good or bad as kinds of things. When an object is judged to be a good toaster, this is typically what we have in mind. The second concept we will be considering is the concept of *personal value*, which denotes the type of value that accrues to objects that are good or bad for someone. When we judge prescription glasses to be good for people with bad and correctible eyesight, this is typically what we have in mind.

The talk is divided into two main parts. Section 1 offers intuitive support for the fundamentality view in the form of substantive examples. The purpose of these is to show that value in a way can be of the final or instrumental variety. Section 2 is meant to strengthen the intuitive support, mostly by making observations about the structure and behaviour of fitting attitudes. The argument here proceeds from the observation that we can conceivably value objects either as kinds of things or for someone, but in such a way that we also value them for their own sakes or for the sake of their effects. Not only that, but the examples given in Section 1 could be taken to show that doing so can sometimes be fitting. This places a burden of proof on potential sceptics, since they will now have to insist that regardless of how it is conceivable or even fitting to value objects, it is still not possible for them to have value in these ways. For the sake of clarity and precision, this argument is made with the aid of the fitting-attitudes analysis, which reduces value to fitting responses.
This paper focuses on democratic theory and the ethics of voting. Recent political events and the rise of populism in the Western world have shaken the belief in the justice of democratic elections. In light of this, some theorists have claimed that epistocracy might represent a viable alternative to democratic decision-making.

The term epistocracy, roughly speaking, identifies a political system that implies an unequal and competence-based distribution of enfranchisement among citizens.

The idea of epistocracy is often criticized because it violates the equal respect owed to citizens’ moral status. Respect for political views, democrats argue, should not be conditional upon their epistemic depth. In this paper, I claim that egalitarian arguments based on the notion of respect fail to reject epistocracy.

First, I defend the claim that the very notion of good membership in a political community normatively implies a responsible use of one’s power and hence of the voting power as well. Therefore, even a democratic framework accommodates the idea that citizens should possess a reasonable level of epistemic awareness when voting and that abiding to this norm represents a civic responsibility.

If this is true, then the notion of epistemic responsibility in the act of voting provides a strong argumentative weapon for epistocrats and poses a dilemma for respect-based arguments for democracy.

On one hand, if it is recognized that equal respect for citizens’ views can be constrained on the basis of considerations about epistemic and civic responsibility, then the argument would be compatible with a moderate epistocracy, where the exercise of voting power is dependent on a qualification test.

On the other hand, if equal respect for citizens’ views holds greater value than epistemic and civic responsibility, then the argument entails an implausible unconstrained notion of respect. This would imply a conception of public reason that is indulgent towards irrational political views and would heavily expose the argument to the instrumental critique of democracy.

Therefore, democratic arguments against epistocracy based on the notion of equal respect are either implausible or self-defeating.
In this paper I will analyze different proposals on how to understand the ‘can’ in ‘ought implies can’ (OIC). While most subscribe to OIC under its slogan formulation, there is less agreement once one starts to analyze what we exactly mean by ‘can’.

In the paper I provide and compare six different interpretations of ‘can’. What they have in common is that none of the alternative read ‘can’ as mere nomologically possible. The notion of ‘can’ in OIC is more restrictive. I argue that a method is to compare the alternatives is by looking at the underlying motivation for OIC. While there might be several motivations for OIC my focus is on the idea that it is necessarily so that morality is fair and that one of the motivations behind OIC is to preserve the fairness of morality. This allows us to utilize our moral intuitions about the fairness of specific moral requirements when comparing the different readings of OIC. If an alternative allows for unfair moral requirements, then we should look for an alternative reading, more in line with the motivations underlying the principle in the first place.

Take the example of the Joan who is about to shoot a free throw. She nets about .98 of her free throws. The best ethicists in the world have come to the conclusion that if she can make the free throw, she ought to do it. The only thing left is whether she can do it in the restrictive sense necessary for OIC. Assume that despite trying her best to make the shot, she fails. Would it be fair to say that she failed to do something that she ought to have done? Intuitively, the answer is no. It would have been an unfair moral requirement. From this, I propose the trivial sounding test: If an agent tries their best to do something and yet fails, then it was not the case that she could do it in the sense prescribed by OIC, and thereby it was not the case that she ought to have done it. The standard readings of ‘can’, such as Peter Vranas’ version where an agent can do something if she has the prerequisite skills and the opportunity to do it, or Frances Howard-Snyder’s view where an agent can something if it is very likely the she will succeed in doing it, both fail the test in the case of Joan.

Instead of the standard approaches I believe that the more plausible candidates are the following: (1) “If an agent were to try her best to do something then she would do it”, (2) “if an agent were to try her best to do it, then it is necessarily so that she would do it”. I show how both of these readings, while not without their own problems, pass the proposed test, handles classic counter-examples to OIC, and allows us to solve other issues in normativity.
Reza Hasidi  
**Reflexive Grounding of Normativity: Humean Doubts and Kantian Formalism**

Why are rational agents obligated to follow rules of a specific kind? I call this the question of the ground of normativity. Questions of this kind could be interpreted reflexively (for example, asking for moral reasons to ground the normativity of moral rules) or non-reflexively (for example, asking for non-moral reasons to ground the normativity of moral rules). While it is easy to make sense of non-reflexive grounding questions, there is a deep philosophical chasm between the followers of Kant and Hume concerning the status of reflexive grounding questions. For Kantians, normative theorizing (at least in domains of ethics and epistemology) starts with reflection on the reflexive grounding questions. By contrast, according to Humeans, these questions are unintelligible. Thus, by doubting the intelligibility of these questions, Humeans shake the Kantian normative theory at its very foundations. In this paper, I offer a Kantian response to this Humean challenge. I argue that Kantians can meet the Humean challenge if they take seriously Kant's own insight about the distinction between “formal” and “material” rules—this involves presenting a novel reading of Kant's dictum that the Categorical Imperative must be a formal rule of practical reason.

Here is how I view the dialectic: on Kant's account, the chief task of offering a “groundwork” for a system of norms is to explain the possibility of obligations that are (normatively) necessary and (strictly) universal. [1] I argue that according to Kant, we can have necessary and universal obligations to the rules of a set just in case the normativity of the set in question can be traced back to a reflexively grounded set of rules. Further, it is rather uncontroversial that in Kant's view, there are universal and necessary epistemic and moral obligations. Thus, Kant's account of epistemic and moral obligations is tenable only if the general idea of reflexive grounding of sets of rules makes sense.

Humeans typically agree with the conditional claim that if our obligation to any set of rules were meant to be universal and necessary, then we would have to be able to trace their normativity back to a reflexively grounding set. But since we cannot ground the normativity of any set of rules reflexively, they argue, we cannot be bound by any universal and necessary obligations either. We must thus accept that all our obligations are always normatively contingent and not strictly universal.

In the second half of the paper, I argue that Kant's distinction between “formal” and “material” rules can come to the rescue. The crux of the paper is to show that purely formal rules, in the narrowly Kantian sense, are intrinsically normative. I argue that, as a result, a consistent set of rules which contains a purely formal rule is reflexively grounded by that very rule. Of course, this is not yet to show that the set of epistemic or moral rules do contain any purely formal rules. In this paper, I am not arguing that epistemic or moral rules are in fact reflexively grounded. Rather, my aim is to establish that the set of epistemic or moral rules would be reflexively grounding if it contained any purely formal rules. We can thus make headways in the debate between Humeanism and Kantianism about grounding normativity by showing that even if the Kantian project fails, it will not be because the very idea of reflexive grounding does not make sense.

**Notes**

Rachel Handley
Quasi-Realism and the Problem of Relativity
In my paper, I argue that the problem of relativity threatens to rear its head against the quasi-realist yet again. I develop a revised relativist objection to quasi-realism and I give a potential solution to it with the ultimate aim of defending the quasi-realist. I argue that contra Blackburn the challenge of relativity for the quasi-realist does not lie in undermining confidence in first order moral judgements. Rather, the problem of relativity lies in the quasi-realist’s account of attitudes and as such Blackburn’s solution to the relativity problem misfires. The quasi-realist cannot solve the problem of relativity by appealing to differences in our first order moral judgements. If the quasi-realist wishes to achieve her commitments of both echoing realist sounding moral discourse and of making sense of our realist sounding discourse using expressivism, she must answer the relativity challenge on the level of attitudes.

One way of putting the relativist objection in terms of attitudes goes like this (Blackburn, 1999) (Kirchin, 2000): Since moral disagreement is a disagreement in attitudes there’s no way to tell which attitude is better. If we can’t say which attitude is better, then quasi-realism is relativistic because your judgement that x is wrong is just as good as mine. If quasi-realism is relativistic then it fails in its commitment to echo our realist sounding moral discourse. Why? Because if we concede that clashing judgements are all on an equal footing (your judgement is just as good as mine) then we lose the distinctively realist flavour of our moral discourse.

I begin my paper by setting up the original problem briefly stated above before considering Blackburn’s (1999) solution to it. I then argue that the relativity problem above can challenge the quasi-realist’s account of on a metaethical level. I argue that if we accept that there is a difference at the first order level between two speakers in moral disagreement, and if the quasi-realist doesn’t explain the difference on her account of attitudes, then there is an explanatory gap present in the quasi-realist’s explanation and justification of moral discourse. I argue against both Kirchin and Blackburn to show that Blackburn’s first order solution fails. Should my challenge go through the quasi-realist would both fail in her commitments to echo our realist sounding moral discourse and in her claim that expressivism can explain and justify said discourse.

Crucially, for the quasi-realist, moral discourse is explained and justified by an expressivist account of attitudes not vice versa. In Spreading the Word (1984) Blackburn writes, “it [quasi-realist expressivism] seeks to explain, and justify, the realistic-seeming nature of our talk of evaluation” (180). I argue that if this is Blackburn’s aim then to achieve this aim there needs to be a quasi-realist explanation of the difference in judgement between two people in moral disagreement with one another. If the quasi-realist seeks to explain and justify our first order judgements via her account of attitudes, then when the relativist asks (to borrow an example from Blackburn) what the difference is between two people disagreeing about women being educated, this difference cannot be explained by appealing to first order explanations. Why? Because the direction of fit is that the second order account explains the first. The quasi-realist account of attitudes make sense of our moral discourse. If the relativist challenge can be applied to the quasi-realist account of attitudes then a problem with that account can’t be explained by the very thing it is meant to explain and justify (i.e one can’t appeal to Blackburn’s first order solution to the original problem).

I conclude by offering a potential solution for the quasi-realist. I argue my revised relativist objection assumes too strict a distinction between the metaethical and the ethical. I argue that the quasi-realist can show how she can explain and justify moral judgements via an account of attitudes, and that the quasi-realist can do this by rejecting the direction of fit obligation. I argue against the relativist by arguing that the quasi-realist does have resources available in her metaethical story to explain and justify moral judgement. I argue that the advantage of quasi-realism is that she doesn’t have to add anything onto her account to make this response. If we take Blackburn’s first order response to the classic challenge and give it a metaethical explanation this should suffice to deal with my version of
the relativity objection. To do this I discuss Blackburn’s response once more, this time showing how if we view accepting or rejecting new information as having a metaethical story (I approve of x, I disapprove of x) i.e. quasi-realists can give a story of how the first order affects the second order in a way that abolishes the direction of fit claim.
Alexander Heape
Scanlon on Blame and the Moral Relationship

Moral wrongs are blameworthy. According to Contractualists, an action is morally wrong just in case it is disallowed by principles that no one could reasonably reject. But, unlike proponents of other moral views, Contractualists cannot explain why moral wrongs are blameworthy by claiming that they are ‘bad’ or ‘irrational’ in any teleological sense. It may be best for everyone, or rational for oneself, to do what some other person could reasonably object to. Contractualists must provide some other explanation.

In recent work, T.M. Scanlon has argued that an action is blameworthy just in case it impairs a relationship with another person. Call this the blameworthiness thesis (BT). To explain the nature of moral blameworthiness, Scanlon further pro-poses that there is a distinctively moral relationship that we share with all rational agents. Call this the moral relationship thesis (MRT). According to Scanlon, BT and MRT together explain why moral wrongdoings are subject to blame, dissent, and objection. However, given BT, for any person to be blameworthy for a moral wrongdoing, he must have some relation with the injured party. Given the plausible claim that anyone can be blameworthy for committing a moral wrongdoing against anyone, Scanlon must explain how any two persons are party to a moral relationship. To do so, he rejects the view that a relationship is necessarily constituted by the attitudes of those who are party to it. Call this the attitudinal constraint (AC).

Rejecting AC presents Scanlon’s view with a number of problems. First, it seems to conate the notion of an interpersonal relation with that of an interpersonal relationship. Second, it seems to locate the justification for our practices of moral blame in moral principles rather than facts about substantive relationships. Ird, there is no obvious reason to reject AC, other than the fact that doing so is required for Scanlon’s view to give the right predictions. I argue that Scanlon’s view can avoid these problems by accepting AC. It can do so by appealing to a modified version of BT. On this view, A’s action is blameworthy just in case it impairs a possible relationship with some other person B that there is sufficient reason for A and B to have. Call this the modified blameworthiness thesis (MBT).

I argue that MBT gives more accurate predictions about which actions are blameworthy, and is easily accommodated by Scanlon’s own account of ‘impairment’.

Since we ought to accept MBT, there is no reason to reject AC. If blameworthiness does not depend on the impairment of a relationship one actually has, the fact that one does not have the attitudes that constitute it does not imply that one is not blameworthy. is gives proponents of Scanlon’s view the resources to develop a much more plausible account of MRT. To do so, they need to explain which attitudes might constitute the moral relationship. I conclude by suggesting what I consider a particularly interesting option.
James Hutton
(How) Can the Emotions Function as Sensitivity to Value?

How, if at all, can emotions function as a sensitivity to evaluative properties? If we want to maintain that they can, then there are various problems we need to solve. One is the Implementation Problem: can we explain how emotions track evaluative properties, without lamely invoking an unexplained faculty of intuition?

The problem can be put more clearly, by distinguishing between three levels of description: the function; the algorithm that performs the function; and the biological processes that implement that algorithm. What kind of algorithm could perform this epistemic function of tracking values? And how could the emotions implement that algorithm?

To fill in the algorithm-level, I draw an analogy with cases from the psychology of “expert intuition”: the capacities of expert chess players, fire firefighters and neonatal nurses. These experts’ “intuitive capacities” are constituted by subpersonal processes which exploit stable statistical correlations between cues and the ‘intuited’ facts. I argue that similar processes would suffice in the case of value, exploiting the supervenience of values on non-normative properties. I argue that the inputs and outputs of our emotion-systems make them capable of implementing such an algorithm.

A question remains as to how our emotion-systems could become attuned to the relationship between cues and values. Understood as a causal question, we can answer with an explanation, involving upbringing and cultural evolution. The explanation leaves a residual sceptical worry, but this isn’t as serious as it first appears.
Recent discussions on equality have been broadly divided between two views, disagreeing about how to conceive of the nature of equality. Distributive egalitarians argue that equality is a distributive value that requires an equal distribution of certain goods such as resources, welfare, and opportunities. In contrast, relational egalitarians argue that equality is an ideal of interpersonal relationships, enjoining us to relate to one another as equals.

In this paper, centering on the significance of ‘identity’ as ‘conception of self’, I argue that we have reasons to choose relational egalitarianism over distributive egalitarianism. Besides reconstructing the tension between identity-recognition and the distributive framework into an analytic argument, I make an original illustration of the distinctive strength of the relational framework that has remained schematic, largely unexplored in the literature.

The paper consists of two parts. First, I develop an argument against distributive egalitarianism that it fails to respect the disadvantaged because it disregards the significance of their identities. I propose a thought experiment where a lesbian makes a claim against the government to secure her equal status as a citizen. Assuming that a surgery can change sexual orientation, the government proposes a free surgery as a response. The proposal seems objectionable in a way that anti-discrimination campaigns are not. The objectionableness seems to lie in the fact that the surgery changes not the prejudicial society but the claimant’s identity. Now, the argument is that distributive egalitarians cannot detect this normative asymmetry between identity-changing and non-identity-changing actions. Both actions would make the claimant’s amount of goods equal to that of a heterosexual citizen, whether the goods be resource, welfare, or opportunity. Thus there is no reason for distributive theorists to reject identity-changing actions. This insensitivity to identities expresses disrespect for those disadvantaged on account of identities.

In the latter part, I flesh out relational egalitarianism so as to demonstrate its built-in sensitivity to identities. Drawing upon Samuel Scheffler’s approach in “The Practice of Equality”(2015), I start from the nonpolitical case of personal relationships and then proceed to consider its political extension to a society of equals. I illuminate features of egalitarian personal relationships that underwrite identity-recognition. First, the fact that it is always particular individuals as who they are that we have relations with gives us reasons to acknowledge what the other thinks makes who she is. Second, relating as equals entails that neither possesses more authority than the other in determining the conception of each as the participant, i.e., as whom each participates in the relationship.

Then an objection is considered that the discrepancy between personal and civic-political relationships invalidates the extension to the political case. I reply that the discrepancy does not entirely defeat the fundamental requirement of identity-recognition but changes the scope of recognition-deserving identities and the mode in which we embody our recognition. Accordingly, the requirement of identity-recognition in civic-political relationships takes a narrower scope and negative mode compared to personal relationships. Relational egalitarianism nonetheless secures sensitivity to identities concerning core cases of deep discrimination against social identities.
What is the place of shame in the life of virtue? The feeling of shame not only involves the idea that you are exposed to the onlooking eyes of an audience, but that you are also held up to the audience’s ideals or standards and found wanting. The main issue with shame, as Tomasello puts it, is “whether others are watching an act and whether this effects their reputational assessment of me”. To be so dependent on the opinions of others, independently of one’s endorsement, smacks of servility. It’s symptomatic of a concern with how you appear over how you are, a manifestation of heteronomy over autonomy. So understood, susceptibility to shame is a sign of weakness, and has no place in the virtuous life.

Some who grant that this sensitivity to how one is viewed by others is a defect nevertheless seek to reconcile this with the thought that shame plays an important ethical role. In doing so, they reject the idea that shame is heteronomous - shame is not concerned primarily with the views of others, but with one’s own self-evaluation. According to Gabriele Taylor, ‘A person feeling shame judges herself adversely...Thinking of herself as being seen in a certain way has revealed her to herself as inferior to what she believed, assumed or hoped to be’. Shame is autonomous, as is its role in moral psychology. It is held to be an ‘emotion of self-protection’. One’s sense of self is determined by one’s values, and when you fail in light of these values you feel shame; but the fact you still feel shame shows you have retained a sense of who you are and what you value; you still have some hold on the person you once were, and therefore can regain your old position. But if you feel no shame, then you will have abandoned totally the values you lived by, and will have discarded with it the person you once were.

My aim in this paper is to question this understanding of shame’s place in ethical life. I present two objections to Taylor’s model. In short, I present two objections to Taylor’s model. The first derives from an examination of some examples from Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter. This is intended to show that even when we accept the adverse evaluation which forms a part of the experience of shame, the fact that we are devalued in our community’s eyes plays is nevertheless an important element in these instances of shame which Taylor’s model can’t accommodate. In the second I consider an example from Ellison’s Invisible Man, which I take to depict examples of shame in light of standards with which one disagrees. My reading of each of these examples suggests that if shame is to have a role in our ethical life, it will be one which takes seriously its heteronomy, but which also does justice to the ambivalence we feel in being so dependent on the opinions of others.
What should moral expressivists say about the legitimacy (or not) of relying on moral testimony? This is an underexplored question and yet one which, given the expressivist project of ‘saving the appearances’ of moral discourse, expressivists should take a stand on. In this paper I argue that expressivists should be against such reliance.

The question of whether moral testimony is a legitimate source of forming one’s moral views is primarily set up as an intramural debate between cognitivists: optimists think there is no issue with relying on moral testimony, whereas pessimists think that there is something problematic with such reliance (Hopkins 2007). One might think that the initial stance would be optimism, after all cognitivists hold that moral claims express moral beliefs that represent moral facts, and if there are moral facts then it seems there should be no problem in learning what these facts are by means of moral testimony, just as we might learn the scientific facts by means of scientific testimony. However, this is not the case, as it is often taken as a datum that in ordinary practice we think there is something amiss with relying on moral testimony when forming our moral views (McGrath 2009, Fletcher 2016). Thus a puzzle arises for cognitivists of both stripes: pessimists need to vindicate the datum, whilst optimists need to explain it away.

It might seem natural to think that no such puzzle arises for non-cognitivists. As traditional non-cognitivism holds that utterances with moral content are meaningful not in virtue of representing moral facts, but rather in virtue of the non-cognitive mental states they express, it should come as no surprise that there seems something amiss with relying on moral testimony. For, on this picture, there are no moral facts for us to learn about. Of course, there may still be an influencing function to moral talk for non-cognitivists, but there is no analogy with testimony concerning (say) scientific facts, as there are no moral facts. Thus the datum is vindicated.

However, many proponents of sophisticated versions of non-cognitivism – call them expressivists – may not want to say this. They may want to say that there are correct moral views, i.e., moral knowledge (Blackburn 1998), and they may even want to say that we can gain such knowledge by means of testimony (Barker 2014). Such expressivists then have a similar task to cognitivists to either vindicate, or explain away, the datum.

In this paper I argue that expressivists should be pessimists about certain central cases of relying on moral testimony. This is not because we cannot come to the correct moral views by way of moral testimony, but because we cannot come to have moral understanding by way of testimony (cf. Nickels 2001, Hills 2009). Building on existing work (Lenman 2007, Grimm 2016), I explicate an expressivist friendly notion of moral understanding. I explain why such understanding is important, and why, although we can gain moral knowledge by way of testimony, we should still avoid doing so.

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James Lewis

The Openness of Thinking of You

There is significant ambiguity over what philosophers are referring to when they talk about the ‘second person relation’. Broadly, that is the relation that a person takes to another when they think of that other as you. But the ambiguity arises because there are competing candidate answers to the question of what it is, exactly, that distinguishes the second-person relation. Here are some of the most prominent of those:

i) **Accountability.** Being in some way accountable to the other (Darwall);

ii) **Trust.** Being able to trust, rather than merely rely on, the other;

iii) **Valuing.** Being able to take up certain interpersonal valuing attitudes to the other, such as affection and sympathy;

iv) **Openness.** Thinking of the other not as an object that could be fully understood, but as in some way undetermined (Buber).

In this paper, I will address the fourth candidate answer: the idea of second-personal openness. I have two goals. Firstly, to defend the idea that having a special kind of openness to others is indeed an important feature of our interpersonal lives, and one that deserves serious consideration as the distinctive quality of second person relations. And secondly, to take a step to diminish the ambiguity of what we ought to have in mind when thinking of the second person relation. I will pursue both goals by arguing that second-personal openness is best understood as a certain kind of open-ended valuing attitude. Thus, the ambiguity is diminished because the above list is made shorter, as its third and fourth items can be combined.

Once this philosophical context has been presented, and my aims stated, my argument will proceed in four parts. First, I will elaborate on the idea of second-personal openness. This will involve animating Martin Buber’s idea that, “if I face a human being as my Thou […] he is not a thing among things, and does not consist of things.”

Second, I will briefly consider and reject a strong reading of Buber’s idea according to which being open to the other means *not conceptualising* the person before you at all, and so not categorising them as a physically extended object, a living creature, a human, a conscious agent, and so on.

Third, I will introduce the idea that when one values another, it is possible to value the person themselves, rather than the particular valuable attributes that they may bear. This thought – common in the philosophical literatures about love and respect – is that as well as it being possible to value particular traits, our interpersonal lives commonly demonstrate the possibility of valuing a person in themselves, non-qualitatively.

Fourthly and finally, I will suggest that the idea of second-personal openness best be understood as placing value in the other in themselves, but remaining open to the way that the other determines their own valuable properties. As such, one’s value in the other is justified only retroactively by reference to those valuable properties that the other determines for themselves.
Josh Matthews
On the Normative Role of Logic

Whilst Logic gives a clear picture of consistency and truth preservation, it is not clear what its significance is for rationality and reasoning. An account of such a connection could be considered a characterisation of a normative role of logic. Here I examine some possible characterisations, and defending the one I deem most successful.

Consider a very simple epistemic norm of logic:

\[ N1: \text{Where } A \models B, \text{ if you believe } A \text{ you ought to believe } B \]

This sort of norm is clearly unsatisfactory, for reasons pointed out by Harman (1986). For one, it is too demanding. This means you always ought to believe the logical consequences of your current beliefs. But it’s not even possible to recognise all the consequences, so we can’t consider someone irrational for failing to believe them all. Secondly, this would lead to being obligated to clutter our minds with irrelevancies. From our belief A, it follows that A v A, and A v A v A... and with the norm \( N \) we would be obligated to believe them all.

For these sorts of reasons MacFarlane (2004) suggests a different norm:

\[ N2: \text{Where } A \models B, \text{ you ought to see to it that if you believe } A \text{ then you don’t disbelieve } B \]

This wouldn’t make the logical norms demanding or cluttering; you aren’t irrational for failing to believe logical consequences of your beliefs, but only if you disbelieve them. However, it is far too weak. According to \( N2 \), an agent who accepts A but refuses to make a judgement on A v A, an obvious logical consequence, couldn’t be considered irrational. MacFarlane suggests that whilst the norm cannot oblige the agent to accept the disjunction, we can say that logic gives her a (defeasible) reason to accept it.

I submit that this is far from satisfying; the agent is clearly making a mistake when she refuses to accept A v A, she is being irrational. And it is not because she fails to believe something for which there is a pro-tanto reason to believe. We need a norm strong enough to account for the irrationality here, that doesn’t become too demanding or cluttering.

I defend an account similar to that of Hartry Field (2009):

\[ N3: \text{Where it is obvious } A \equiv B, \text{ you ought to see to it that if you believe } A \text{ then you believe } B \]

This captures the irrationality, but isn’t demanding or cluttering. MacFarlane might object to it because of what can be called a priority issue; it seems backwards to think logic only norms our belief when we have logical knowledge. This means we are free to believe what we like if we aren’t aware of entailment. Whilst someone could make this complaint about \( N3 \), I suggest that it’s right we don’t consider someone irrational for failing to reason in accordance with inferences they don’t accept or aren’t aware of. Thus, I conclude \( N3 \) is the most promising characterisation of the normative role of logic.
In recent years there has been an increase in the number of people subscribing to the ‘philosophy’ of ‘wellness’, ‘superfood’ and ‘clean-eating’, the tenets of which are largely more fruit and veg, less processed food. In a social climate where there is a large amount of anxiety about health the purveyors of this new way of eating have grown in number, going from strength to strength in both eminence and profit. At the time of writing 15 of the Top 20 Best Selling Cookbooks on Amazon promoted this ‘philosophy’ in one form or another. However, in this paper I will argue that this movement leads to the creation of a gendered climate in which certain foods and ways of eating have come to be seen as more or less valuable and permissible for (mostly) women due to their supposed health benefits, despite the claims of this movement having been largely discredited by science.

Using Lewis’ notion of scorekeeping in a language game, I will first analyse the language used by the main proponents of this movement to argue that through a combination of pseudoscience and the application of certain key morally tainted words, such as ‘natural’, ‘clean’ and ‘good’, to certain foods, they create a binary system in which other foods and ways of eating are tainted as unnatural, unclean and bad, and are therefore deemed less valuable and more impermissible.

I will then argue that the authority required to make these exercitive speech acts is granted for two related reasons. Firstly I will suggest that standards regarding authority over food and health related claims are lowered due to high levels of anxiety regarding obesity and other health concerns promoted by the media. I will then argue that the proponents of ‘clean-eating’ and its comrades are able to take particular advantage of these health claims due to their adherence to the norms of feminine appearance. Implicit in their nutritional advice is the claim, ‘eat like this, and you can look like me’. It is not then merely certain foods or ways of eating that are promoted as more or less valuable, but ways of looking as well.

Finally, I will argue that the decreased value and permissibility that the ‘clean-eating’ language game assigns to certain foods and ways of eating plausibly extends beyond the realm of those directly choosing to participate in the game. Moreover, those foods and ways of eating which are deemed less valuable and permissible can be seen as tracking groups which already face discrimination, social stigma and oppression in society, whilst health professionals have noted an upswing in the prevalence of eating disorders which is conceivably linked to the moralising language employed.
Jonathan Mitchell  
Nietzschean Emotional Authenticity as Openness to Value

Emotional authenticity is increasingly recognized as an important topic for emotion theory, motivated by concerns such as the following: what does it mean to be ‘true’ to one’s emotions; are there ever rational constraints on what one should feel; is emotional authenticity more than having one’s emotions in line with one’s evaluative judgements, or other aspects of one’s psychology (see De Sousa 2002, Salmela 2005). In this paper, I examine Nietzsche’s distinctive contribution to make to these debates, insofar as he offers a characterization of emotional authenticity in terms of openness to value in the following way. Throughout his works he makes a distinction between pre-reflective affective-evaluative experiences – emotions as feelings towards value – and ‘long-lasting’ or life-structuring values, which might include affective dispositions, and have developed out of recurrent features of one’s affective psychology. Nietzsche often claims that relatively open and unprejudiced affective experiences can reveal the evaluative standing of something in a way that is radically at odds with our entrenched, he thinks usually morally inflected, ‘life-structuring’ values. For example, he claims than an ‘original evaluation’, as opposed to an ‘adopted’ habitual one, would involve assessing a ‘thing according to the extent to which it pleases or displeases us alone and no one else’, that is, how we ‘originally’ affectively respond to it, which, according to Nietzsche is ‘excessively rare’ (Nietzsche, Daybreak 104). Affective-evaluations, which were ‘original’ in this sense, provide the central idea behind a conception of Nietzschean emotional authenticity.

Section 1 of this paper outlines in more detail the distinction between pre-reflective affective-evaluative experiences and ‘life-structuring’ values, also explaining why Nietzsche thinks that in some cases our pre-reflective emotional experiences of value are more ‘transparent’ than our reflective judgements of value (see Marcel and Lambie 2002, cf. Brady 2013). Section 2 would then examine whether, so defined, Nietzschean emotional authenticity is a project anyone can engage in, or whether it requires – as he suggests – being affectively ‘well-constituted’ to begin with. Section 3 would then pose a problem from the view of emotional authenticity as follows: are substantive values ruled out by this conception, or is it a purely formal criterion, in the sense of one’s values being emotionally authenticated in the right way? I suggest that Nietzsche’s conception of emotional authenticity can rule out at least one substantive category of emotions and their connected evaluative perspectives, namely those that involve self-deception.

Bibliography

Robbie Morgan
What Makes an Attack Sexual?

Content warning: sexual violence.

The question of whether an attack is sexual has significant implications for value judgements concerning the attack. The terms ‘rape’ and ‘sexual assault’ indicate that we recognise violations that are in some way sexual, and that the sexual nature of these violations is an important aspect of their wrongness. In the UK, sexual attacks carry significantly higher penalties than non-sexual assault. Insofar as many theorists and legislators define ‘rape’ as ‘non-consensual sex’ and ‘sexual assault’ as ‘non-consensual sexual touching’, an account of what it is for an attack to be sexual is required to make sense of these concepts.

I argue that it is difficult to make sense of what it is for an attack to be sexual, rejecting three attempts to explain what it is for an attack to be sexual. I then provide my own account.

First, I consider the ‘common-sense’ view that an attack is sexual if it takes a certain physical form. Most obviously, ‘rape’ is sexual because it takes the form of nonconsensual sexual contact (eg. penile-vaginal penetration). However, this account fails to explain what it is that makes an attack sexual, and cannot specify the scope of the concept ‘rape’ or adjudicate disagreement about its scope.

Secondly, I consider Alan Wertheimer’s (2003) suggestion that an attack is sexual if and only if it involves the sexual organs of the assailant or victim. This is inadequate because it entails counter-intuitive claims about which acts are sexual and therefore constitute sexual assault. For example, this account would suggest that a kick to the genitals constitutes sexual assault.

Thirdly, I reject the view that an attack is sexual just in virtue of the assailant having a sexual mental state (of the kind stipulated by Alan Goldman (1977) or Igor Primoratz (1999)). This account cannot accommodate sexual assault that is not sexually motivated.

Having rejected some attempts to make sense of what it is for an attack to be sexual, I propose my own view.

I propose that an attack is sexual insofar as it sexualises the victim. I suggest that the victim is sexualised insofar as the attack treats the victim as having the potential to be used by another person in the pursuit of sexual pleasure. An attack can sexualise the victim in virtue of its physical nature or in virtue of the assailant’s mental states.

I reserve the term ‘sexual assault’ for the former case. For example, non-consensual penile-vaginal intercourse is sexual assault because the physical form of the act sexualises the victim. Drawing on Anne Barnhill’s (2013) account of default expressive significance, I argue that certain forms of physical contact sexualise the victim even in the absence of the assailant having any sexual motive.

When an attack does not take a recognisably sexual physical form, but the assailant experiences sexual mental states, I call this ‘sexually-motivated battery’. The victim is straightforwardly treated as a sexual object because the non-consensual imposition serves the assailant’s sexual purposes.
The concept of duty, even though drawn from “the common use of our practical reason”, is not “a concept of experience” (GMS AA IV, 406) and accordingly one could give no “worse advice to morality than by wanting to derive it from examples” (GMS AA IV, 408), thus Kant argues in the *Groundwork*. On the contrary, in §52 of the *Doctrine of Virtue* Kant seems to ascribe considerable significance to good examples with regard to moral education, when he claims that „for a still undeveloped human being, imitation is the first determination of his will to accept maxims that he afterwards makes for himself“ (MS, AA VI, 479). Thereby the example does not only seem to function as an illustration of the good, it is not merely an instance of a good action. In fact, it seems to function as a normative ideal or as Kant specifies: „An example is a particular case of a practical rule, insofar as this rule represents an action as practicable or impracticable, whereas an instance is only a particular (concretum), represented in accordance with concepts as contained under a universal (abstractum) [...]“ (ibid., n). But what does that precisely mean? At first sight it remains at least unclear which kind of actions can be considered as being of exemplary conduct. Therefore my aim is twofold: first I shall clarify Kants remarks in §52 and second I shall consider whether the apparent tension with regard to the remarks in the *Groundwork* can be solved. I will argue, that clarifying Kant’s remarks includes two aspects, a methodological one and one regarding content. Thus, the question whether an action can be considered as an example is on the one hand dependent on how and to what purpose it is introduced. And on the other hand, regarding its content, it seems likely to assume that meritorious actions can be considered as good examples. Hence good examples are outstanding cases of a fulfillment of a duty, that (can be introduced to) inspire emulation. The apparent tension thus can be solved, as morality itself is not derived from examples, but rather the examples by exemplifying morality may improve ones understanding of what it means to act accordingly as well as motivate one to emulate and thus cultivate morality. Given this interpretation is fitting one should actually question Kant’s limitation of the effect of good examples to “the undeveloped human being” or at least pose the question when someone can be considered as sufficiently developed to have no need for such inspiration.
In this presentation, I examine the relationship between valuing something and having certain beliefs with distinctly evaluative content. Intuitively, valuing and evaluatively believing are not identical since there are many things in the world that we see as having value without valuing them ourselves, such as hobbies we don’t engage in, vocations we don’t pursue, and people we don’t befriend. While theorists of valuing have acknowledged that there is some evaluative component to valuing (viz., the valuer must see the thing she values as having value in some sense), the exact nature of her evaluation has received insufficient scrutiny so far. I think this scrutiny can be enhanced, first, by appreciating that valuing exhibits a richer logical structure than has so far been explicated: not only does someone S value something x, but S values x in a distinct way w. Roughly, the way w in which S values x corresponds to an underlying, non-valuing relationship she sees herself as having with x, which grounds her valuing and gives it the distinct character that it has. Examples of such non-valuing relations include instrumental relations, familial relations, collegial relations, and critical relations (that is, as a critic relates to a work of art). In my talk, I will argue that, when S values x in some way w, S sees herself as standing in a corresponding, non-valuing relationship with x, such as a collegial relationship or a participant-activity relationship. This is a necessary postulate to explain why, when S values x in way w, she exhibits what I call discriminating, systemic responsiveness to certain considerations involving her and x. I will offer such an explanation and give some arguments why other possible explanations (in terms of higher-order non-cognitive attitudes, say) look implausible. Time permitting, I will then argue that S must, additionally, positively evaluate the non-valuing relationship she has with x. This is necessary to distinguish valuing x in way w from disvaluing it in that same way.
This paper argues for the view that knowledge is the epistemic goal of cognition (that is, of cognitive acts producing and managing beliefs). As such, it has two aims.

The first aim is to critically assess the received view, defended among others by William Alston, Richard Foley, and Marian David; that is, the view that the goal of cognition is, roughly, getting to the truth while avoiding error. In fact, this paper raises a number of worries for the received view. For starters, the received view is multiply ambiguous, and, once its ambiguities are disentangled, each of its versions is at odds with intuition. To ease the disentanglement of the ambiguities of the received view, this paper addresses the following four questions. First, is the goal of cognition to believe all and only true propositions or to amass sufficiently many beliefs with a favorable truth-falsity ratio? If the latter version of the goal is right, second, how favorable should the truth-falsity ratio of the body of our beliefs be for us to amass a body of beliefs with a sufficiently favorable truth-falsity ratio? Third, how large should the number of beliefs that we ought to amass be for it to be a sufficiently large body of beliefs? Fourth, when should we attempt to amass the beliefs we ought to amass? Moreover, this paper shows that, while restricting the beliefs that we ought to amass to beliefs about issues that are of interest or importance to us can solve some of the worries raised, this intuitively appealing idea implicitly relies upon principles that are at least very contentious.

The second aim of this paper is to give answer to the following question: ‘Which is the function of belief?’; for an answer to this question allows to tell when belief appropriately serves its function, and, then, in turn, which is the goal of cognition. The theses advanced here are, first, that the function of beliefs is to serve as premises for practical reasoning, and, second, that a belief is an appropriate premise for one’s practical reasoning if and only if it is knowledgeable. The argument for the first thesis draws from the most widely endorsed view of functions in contemporary literature, which identifies functions with etiological functions. This paper also develops an original argument for the second thesis. Its core idea is that, given that beliefs serve as premises for practical reasoning, one’s actions systematically and reliably maximize practical benefit only if one’s relevant beliefs are accurate. For this reason, a belief is an appropriate premise for one’s practical reasoning only when it is true. Mere true belief is, however, less stable than knowledge, or typically promotes the formation of false beliefs, and the reliance on belief-forming methods that are likely to generate false beliefs. Then, it is preferable to rely only on knowledgeable beliefs in practical reasoning. Therefore, knowledge must be the goal of cognition.

Lastly, this thesis is defended against versions of the worries raised for the received view. Interestingly, it follows that the right reading of this view is a distributive reading; that is, the goal of cognition is not to maximize knowledge and minimize ignorance. There is no single goal of cognition; but, instead, as many goals as there are propositions: for each proposition, one must believe it if and only if one knows it.
Daniel Putnam
What is a Social Basis of Self-Respect?

Rawls famously said that the social bases of self-respect are “perhaps the most important primary good.” But in spite of the ubiquity of this refrain, he and subsequent commentators have had surprisingly little to say about what it actually means to be a social basis of self-respect. In particular, they’ve had surprisingly little to say about what the basis of relation consists in: the relation between institutions in the basic structure and people’s self-respect in virtue of which the former are properly deemed a basis of the latter. Moreover, what one can glean from Rawls’s remarks about the basis of relation is not ultimately very plausible. Rawls seems to employ a causal conception of the basis of relation, under which an institution is a basis of self-respect insofar as it can reasonably be expected to make a positive or negative contribution to people’s levels of self-respect. I argue that this understanding of what it means to be a social basis of self-respect not only runs into counterexamples; more fundamentally, it misrepresents people as essentially passive in relation to their own degree of self-respect, thereby misconstruing the connection between self-respect and agency. I diagnose the root of the problem as distributivism: Rawls’s assumption that the social bases of self-respect can be understood on the model of other distributive goods like opportunities and resources. A more promising view of what it means to be a social basis of self-respect can be found by appealing to relational theories of equality. On the view that I develop, whether an institution is a social basis of self-respect is not determined by the causal contribution that institution makes to people’s self-respect. Rather, it is determined by the content of the considerations that participants in that institution as such recognize as justifying reasons. In particular, if the considerations that count as reasons from the perspective of participants in the basic structure are inconsistent or incoherent with the self-respect of some citizens, then the basic structure embodies an inequality in the social bases of self-respect. On this interpretation, what makes an inequality in the social bases of self-respect fundamentally problematic is that it puts some citizens in a position where they cannot both internalize the norms of the basic structure and consistently retain a robust sense of self-respect. In effect, they are alienated from society’s institutions. I illustrate this view by analyzing the case study of mental health disparities between LGBT people and the general population, which I interpret as evidence of internalizing homophobic justifications endorsed by state officials. What emerges is not only a clearer and more plausible account of what it means to be a social basis of self-respect than is available within the confines of the distributive paradigm. I would submit that this account also does a better job explaining why the social bases of self-respect are, indeed, so important.
In this talk I challenge the common perception that communication via Internet should be considered as equivalent to communication in the immediate world. Employing Juergen Habermas’s communicative action theory, I show that whilst, in principle, Internet mediated communication is compatible with face-to-face discourse, the two differ in respect to the function of shaping the lifeworld. Understanding how online communication exploits the power that is erroneously ascribed to it, I suggest, can help us to better understand how un-validated values and norms become incorporated in the lifeworld.

Following Habermas, we can understand the lifeworld as the set of shared norms, values, and understandings that determine social reality. By engaging in rational discourse about possible developments to social reality – which norms to follow and values to pursue – it is possible for individuals to contribute to the process of shaping the lifeworld. This is a crucial function of communication and an opportunity that should be taken when available. However, the understanding of discourse as a face-to-face phenomenon appears to have been altered with the development of new means of communication. In particular, some types of communication via Internet, e.g. Tweets, are taken to be contributions to public discourse, and so, to have a role in shaping the lifeworld. In this talk, I challenge the assumption that this is the case, and suggest that there are significant differences between face-to-face communication and Internet communication in just this respect.

Firstly, I make use of John B. Thompson’s distinction between immediate communication, mediated communication, and quasi-mediated interaction to highlight the differences in forms of Internet communication. Drawing on this classification helps us to recognise that established pre-internet communication forms have found a new venue upon the Internet. At the same time, Thompson’s distinction helps us to recognise a unique new form of communication that has arisen in social media usage and which appears to function in the same manner as face-to-face communication despite the mediating role of technology. I label this Internet mediated communication.

Secondly, I draw upon Habermas’s theory of communicative action to identify the criteria that determine the way in which intelligible communications contribute to the shaping of the lifeworld. By applying this framework to Internet mediated communication, I show that Internet mediated communication does not properly instantiate the intersubjective relationship by which a communicative act can be challenged and validated. Consequently, Internet mediated communication cannot be seen to contribute to the shaping of the lifeworld in the same manner as does face-to-face communication.

I conclude with some thoughts upon the significance of this distinction. In the absence of the validation process that underlies rational face-to-face communication, I suggest, it becomes possible for ideas, themes, and concepts that would be otherwise not be validated to go unchallenged and eventually seep into the lifeworld. Correspondingly, by operating outside of the common values of the shared lifeworld, Internet mediated communication allows the possibility for misuse of the social reality forming power that comes with rational communication in general.
Colin Rideout  
**Intersubjective Intertwining: Reversibility and the Disruption in Human Relations**  
In his famous chiasm chapter, Merleau-Ponty demonstrates the inextricable intertwining of perception, or (a development of this concept) the visible, and reflection, or the invisible. As paradigmatic of this, he briefly discusses the interpersonal experiences of shaking another’s hand and, more importantly, the encounter of two individuals in the erotic encounter. In both cases one can be either the touching, i.e., active, or touched i.e., passive, never both: much like the relation I have when touching one hand with the other. In the secondary literature, this phenomenon has often been described as a relation of “reversibility”, as one can make one hand touching or touched at will. Yet, this notion reduces the touching and touched to a qualitatively identical status, thereby emptying the dialectic of its inherent potential for inequality. This is particularly the case in the heterosexual erotic encounter under the dominant paradigm of patriarchal domination over the female body. Under such a reading, the female as touched, never touching, is seen as morally irrelevant, due to the identity of both states, and so Merleau-Ponty has been criticized by feminists such as Luce Irigaray. Yet, Merleau-Ponty’s chiasm makes clear that the transition from touched to touching is only achieved after what may be called a disruption, a brief moment in time when the touched subject recognizes herself as touching and vice-versa. This disruption, noticed implicitly in the single subject, is exacerbated in the interpersonal relation, be it a handshake or the erotic encounter. The perceptual shift of one touched to one touching requires a moment of recognition from the other party, which itself implies an acknowledgement of one’s moral duty to the other as an equal agent, not a lesser object. While Merleau-Ponty himself does not develop this thought (perhaps due to the unfinished nature of The Visible and the Invisible), I believe it can be extrapolated from what he does say without significant conceptual violence. To do so, I will begin by further explaining Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the chiasm, followed by an exposition of how the chiasmically structured sexual encounter appears. I will consistently emphasize the importance of the disruption, which highlights the non-identical status of the transitioning states. Next, I will explain how the disruption reveals the aforementioned ethical responsibility at the perceptual, rather than purely reflective, level. I will conclude by defending Merleau-Ponty from two feminist critics who accuse him of creating an intersubjective relation of domination rather than dialogue, and of ignoring the gendered body.
Talents play a central role in the way that we live and organise our lives. For those who are talented, their talent allows them to more efficiently and uniquely develop a particular set of skills, and doing so can often shape their personal development, determining the choices that they make and the conception of the good life that they endorse. It is a widely accepted assumption that identifying and developing one’s talents is valuable, for oneself or for others. This is because talents are considered to directly contribute to personal flourishing, as well as contributing indirectly to the flourishing of others.

Some moral theories explicitly advocate that the personal and social benefits that come with talent development justify the claim that we have a moral obligation to develop our talents. Kant, for example, claims that talent development is necessary for the nurturing of one’s perfection and moral agency, whilst Moral Perfectionists claim that talent development is itself a constitutive part of one’s human flourishing. Consequentialism, by contrast, claims that we are morally required to develop our talents if doing so results in the best consequences, according to the relevant consequentialist calculations.

In this paper I argue that irrespective of a particular moral theory’s commitments, if that theory claims there is a moral obligation to develop one’s talents, then it is potentially subject to a particular form of the demandingness objection. In its more general form, this objection states that if a moral obligation requires one to unreasonably sacrifice one’s non-moral commitments, then it is implausibly demanding. I propose that the demandingness objection that is relevant to talent development should be understood in terms of what I call the ‘endorsement constraint’. As such, the obligation to develop one’s talent is only reasonably demanding insofar as an agent endorses the normative commitments that are necessary for bringing about the development of her talent. If one does have an obligation to develop one’s talent, it will thus be conditional on one’s endorsement of that development; lack of endorsement rules that the moral obligation to develop one’s talents is too demanding.
I set out John Greco’s early account of the nature and value of knowledge. This account has been influential in the literature on the value of knowledge and appears to over a promising solution not only to the value of knowledge problem found in the Meno but also the value problems articulated by Duncan Pritchard. On Greco’s value of knowledge account, knowledge is distinctively valuable with respect to that which falls short of knowledge. On Greco’s account, this is because of knowledge’s status as an achievement (a success from ability) and achievements being finally valuable. Firstly I argue that true belief is also plausibly finally valuable in so far as it gives us a cognitive grasp on reality. Furthermore, I make the case that virtuous belief is also an achievement. I argue that the nature of knowledge is such that knowledge is finally valuable in a way that virtuous belief is not precisely because knowledge is not simply a success from ability. Knowledge is such that a virtuous contribution from an agent isn’t sufficient for knowledge. Neither is a virtuous contribution that ultimately results in a true belief sufficient for knowledge. Gettier cases tell us this much. I make the positive case that knowledge requires a relevant positive responsiveness from the world to an agent’s epistemic virtuousness. The value of knowledge falls out of the nature of the knowledge. The value of knowledge lies in the positive responsiveness of the world to an agent’s epistemic virtuousness. I argue that in this respect knowledge falls into a broader category of goods that also share this value. There is nothing intrinsically epistemic about this value. A consequence of my account is that what makes knowledge special is not some epistemic value per se, rather knowledge is an epistemic good with a non-epistemic value that makes it special.
The notion of commitment is rather neglected in general philosophy even though it finds use in various fields such as economic theory, legal theory, ethical theory, moral theory, and action theory. Commitments are commonly construed as something somewhat binding, e.g., marriage, relationships, contracts, promises or preferences. somewhat more ambitious is the idea of commitments we can find in Bernard Williams’ notion of ground projects and Harry Frankfurt’s idea of second-order volitions. Both, Williams and Frankfurt speak of necessities that will reveal the nature of our commitments. This account renders the agent purely passive.

All these descriptions offer a rather mysteriously binding understanding of commitments. We cannot really put an idea on what it is that binds us. Michael Bratman wants to demystify commitments by showing that their influence of future conduct is part of their natural role they play as resulting out of intentions. This account highlights the importance of an active agent but lacks the power to adequately address the often felt passivity towards oneself.

Ruth Chang understands commitments as the result of hard choices. She is arguing for “soft binding” commitments, the possibility of abandoning commitments at will. This is a tough pill to swallow if we are convinced that personal commitments are supposed to be able to influence future conduct – even despite current tendencies that go against that commitment. Chang does not take seriously a commitment’s binding power.

Opposed to the “lowest common denominator” that the term commitment provides us with in the various fields – “something binding” – I want to suggest that personal commitments should be understood as qualified desires. Personal commitments are located between activity and passivity. While it is true that I need to actively bind myself it is not true that I can rid myself of that commitment will. Personal commitments have the diachronic capacity to direct a person’s actions the way it wants them to be directed.

It seems that we sometimes act rationally irrational when we do not act against our personal commitments. What this really shows though is that acting under the terms of our personal commitments is indeed rational. Personal commitments are of normative importance and are an integral part of ourselves; they represent a distinct category of practical reason. Personal commitments, then, are characterized by at least three features: 1.) the identification with a desire where the person is active, 2.) the resulting commitment possesses a certain robustness, and 3.) the commitment “generates” follow-up reasons. We find ourselves passive with respect to these follow-up reasons.

The aim of this talk, then, is ultimately threefold: First, I want to show under what meaning the term “commitment” has so far been understood, second, I want to argue against one up-and-coming account of commitment that comes somewhat close to mine: Ruth Chang’s understanding of commitments in her hybrid account of reasons, and, third, I want to argue for an account of personal commitments in terms of qualified desires.
Recently, Alastair Norcross has developed a “scalar” version of consequentialism (SC), according to which there are only “scalar”, axiological facts (i.e., facts about the comparative value of states of affairs and our reasons for action), and no “deontic”, binary facts (i.e., facts about whether certain actions are right or wrong, and whether we are obliged to perform them). However, Brian McElwee has objected that deontic concepts seem to play an important role in our moral lives, and that if they cannot figure in SC, that would count against it. And arguably, there are indeed important benefits to adopting a moral code that distinguishes between right and wrong, that is, to (generally) treating individuals differently depending on whether they do the right thing. In particular, such a distinction can provide us with useful shortcuts as to how we should (generally) feel about and react to agents who behave in particular anti-social ways, can provide us with a sense of security because we know what we will be held responsible for and can motivate us to act more altruistically (in virtue of its felt connection with strong moral emotions and its simplicity, universality and sense of urgency). I will argue, however, that although deontic concepts indeed cannot play a role at the fundamental level, they can – and probably should – play a non-fundamental or derivative role. Although it is, for SC, not necessary to distinguish between right and wrong, if it helps us make better choices, we have reason to keep on doing so. If SC can indeed accommodate deontic notions in this way, this not only dispels with one prominent objection, but also provides us with an explanation of why we should draw the line between right and wrong in a certain way (i.e., because it promotes value).
Understanding the nature of pleasurable and painful experiences is worthwhile. Not just for its own sake – although it’s undoubtedly intrinsically fascinating – it can be an important step in understanding and solving puzzles about agency, emotions and the human mind more generally. This paper defends a motivational understanding of pleasure and pain[1] - one that’s faced a lot of attack in recent literature and has been described as ‘decisively’ rejected. The thesis is this: what makes a mental state pleasant for a subject is for the subject to intrinsically desire for that mental state to continue, and the converse applies to painful or unpleasant experiences.

One of the most appealing arguments in favour of the motivational account is that it is the only way to account for the wide variety of different pleasurable and painful experiences that exist. Pleasures of some kinds can feel almost completely different from pleasures of other kinds, and the motivational account explains that by appealing not to a specific aspect of the phenomenology, but by appealing to something that all examples of sensory pleasure do have in common: a certain kind of desire. Of course, this means that the motivational account is vulnerable if there are counter-examples: either cases in which pleasurable experiences don’t come with the relevant desires [2], or cases where the relevant desires aren’t accompanying a pleasurable experience [3]. This paper answers these counter-examples and demonstrates what key mistakes they make. For the former kind of objection I have a two-fold response: the counter-examples given are all either not genuine cases of sensory pain/pleasure or the cause of the pain/pleasure is inadequately described. For the latter objections I argue that although all pleasant experiences are desires, not all desires need be pleasant experiences – only those of a certain kind.

Although it’s not possible to catalogue every example of pleasure or intrinsic desire, the methodical way that I approach these counter-examples should be persuasive on a much wider level. In doing so I intend to make an important contribution to understanding the nature of pleasurable and painful experiences.

Notes
[3] Hurka is an example of someone who makes this criticism, and then he also attributes it to Sidgwick in Hurka, T. (2014) British Ethical Theorists from Sidgwick to Ewing Oxford: OUP
Rebecca Wallbank
Reconsidering Artistic Value

One debate that currently holds prominence in the literature concerns whether moral value can be relevant to our assessment of an artwork’s value qua art. In relation to this debate, frequent questions that are commonly asked include: ‘Can a moral defect lessen artistic value?’; ‘Can a moral virtue in turn enhance artistic value?’; ‘If such interaction takes place, does it do so systematically?’, and; ‘Can a moral defect, in fact, enhance artistic value. Of those who answer in the affirmative, many motivate their claim through an appeal to the notion of a work’s ‘internal aims’; they argue that moral value can affect the achievement of what is internal to the work qua art, hereby affecting it’s artistic value. Yet I suggest that the debate seems to have developed such that it no longer simply concerns the relevance of moral value for artistic value, but it also concerns the extent to which moral value can be relevant for artistic value. More precisely, an apt question to ask is as follows: what role does moral value play in the assessment of artistic value? Indeed this gains pertinence in light of the claim made by Eileen John that moral value has dominance over other considerations – particularly the achievement of a work’s internal aims – when assessing the value of an artwork. So in this paper I would like to start to reconsider the ways in which an artwork’s value is to be determined; it remains to be seen what kind of role the achievement of a work’s internal aims can appropriately play in the evaluation of an artwork; it remains to be seen why we should care about ‘internal aims’ at all; whether moral value has dominance over other considerations, and; whether it is coherent to even describe one of these considerations as having dominance at all. Pertinently, it should also be questioned whether the answers to the above questions change in relation to the consideration of to other art forms, and more pertinently still, it relatedly it needs to be clarified what it means to suggest that moral value can be artistically relevant. The debate has, so far, been narrowly focused in its conception of what can count as a moral defect or virtue for a work of art, and it has also been narrowly focused in the kinds of artforms that are considered. By exposing these concerns and expanding the discussion here, in this paper I push the debate forward to reassess artistic evaluation and the roles different values might play in shaping it.
Richard Williams
Incentive-laden democratic decisions and the common good

Populism claims that majority votes make the common good knowable. However, Riker uses advances Arrow’s impossibility theorem to argue that majority votes cannot make the common good knowable. Cohen advances an ‘epistemic’ brand of populism in order to avoid Riker’s argument. Cohen demands that each individual voter forms a reliable belief about the common good, and that they should vote on the basis of this belief. He argues that, under these conditions, majority votes count as reliable evidence for what public policies further the common good. I will argue that Riker’s argument equally applies to Cohen’s epistemic brand of populism. Buchanan and Tullock argue that majority votes have a distinctive kind of incentive structure built into them. Cohen’s epistemic populism is incompatible with this incentive structure. I will use Buchanan and Tullock’s model to advance Riker’s argument that individual voters are incentivised to vote strategically. An individual is generally motivated by utility maximisation whether this coincides with the common good or not. So, we should only accept that majority votes create public policies which a majority coalition expects to best further their own individual interests under this distinctive incentive structure. This has both ontological and epistemic consequences. An ontological consequence of this incentive structure is that a majority coalition is more likely to create a ‘rent-seeking’ public policy than to create a public policy which furthers the common good. An epistemic consequence is that it is very difficult to know when a majority coalition has in fact successfully created a public policy which furthers the common good. Cohen tries to use a ‘bottom-tier’ of background institutions in order to change the incentive structure within the ‘top-tier’ of democratic deliberation. He argues that background institutions must reliably produce responsible voters who are motivated by the common good, and that voters must know that background institutions do this. However, I will argue that the incentive structure within the ‘top-tier’ of democratic deliberation is more likely to change the ‘bottom-tier’ of background institutions instead. Background institutions are also generally motivated by utility maximisation whether this produces responsible voters or not. So, we should only accept that background institutions produce voters which the institution expects to further their own institutional interests under this distinctive incentive structure. This also has both ontological and epistemic consequences. An ontological consequence of this incentive structure is that background institutions are likely to also ‘rent-seek’ than to create responsible voters. An epistemic consequence is that it is very difficult to know when a background institution has in fact successfully produced responsible voters. Consequently, Cohen has not yet successfully defended populism from Riker’s attack. Once the incentive structure built into democratic deliberation is brought to light, it ironically becomes very difficult to see how majority votes can make the common good knowable.