ABSTRACTS DAY 2

Ben Davies

Amoral Responsibility

Should healthcare systems ever use patient responsibility as a criterion for allocating resources? This idea has come under significant, often reasonable criticism. However, this talk considers one family of objections which seem to me to rest on a mistake with much wider ramifications for ethics. The idea that responsibility-sensitive allocation policies engage in *moralising* trades on the assumption that the relevant sense of responsibility in play is traditional moral responsibility, such that holding people responsible involves *blaming* (or praising) their behaviour. While some advocates of responsibility-sensitive allocation may have this in mind, this is not the only sense of responsibility on the table. Distributive responsibility, a form of what I call 'amoral' responsibility, is a better candidate for the idea of responsibility relevant to resource allocation. I argue that distributive responsibility cannot be accused of 'moralising', and call for more attention to this (within academic philosophy) neglected idea.

Jesse Brindley

Culture as Valuation: Simmel's Philosophical Project

Historically, the work of Georg Simmel has been interpreted as unsystematic, or as thematically unified, at best. That interpretation is in part a product of historical- structural factors, such as antisemitism and the lack of a collected edition of his works, even in the original German. This interpretation is compounded by disciplinarily circumscribed approaches to his key texts, most notably those originating within sociology. A new understanding of Simmel's work is emerging, especially but not exclusively in the German-language literature, that seeks its philosophical structure and significance. This paper takes that, philosophical understanding as its starting point, and articulates Simmel's project in terms of cultural valuing, or more specifically in terms of Geist or Spirit in non-Hegelian terms.

Discernible across Simmel's writing is a theoretical project that describes 'strands' of *Geist* or spirit. Each strand broadly corresponds to a fundamental way of making sense of the 'world' and our place in it. The first 'strand' is that of the 'thing', in which minimal diGerentiation between ourselves and our experience exists. The 'world' simply 'is' as and when it enters appearance. The second 'strand' is that of the object, through which the distinction between ourselves and our experience develops, thereby positing the primacy of the category of the object. The third stand is 'that which stands opposite' in counterposition. Key to this strand is the interrelation of object and subject. Neither is exclusively primary; our world is co-constitutively structured by both categories. According to Simmel, Kant and Schopenhauer are among key thinkers who use this formulation of counterposition, which functions as a crucial corrective against excessively rationalistic and object-oriented thought.

Simmel operates within and beyond the latter strand of *Geist* to develop a complex notion of culture as valuation. Here, the focus shifts from the nature of subject-object, and their primacy, to the structure of the interrelationship between categories. This structure is not characterised by strict logical consistency or a monolithic logic. Rather, this structure is variegated, highly dependent on the forms which are interrelated, and by so being are also valued in specific ways. Simmel explores his approach throughout his work beginning with the *Philosophy of Money*, where he takes the phenomenon of monetary valuation to illustrate the breadth of this inter-relationality through 'objectification'. Objectification is constitutive of modern forms of sociality precisely because it selects certain aspects of quality. Yet, for Simmel, the demand to fully value the qualitative-ness of objects and social interaction, through money or otherwise, is inherently regressive. Simmel is not blind to the pathologies and subtle forms of domination made possible by money. Rather, from Simmel's perspective, we must develop ways of mobilising 'objectified' valuation that allows the autonomy of people, ways of life, and disciplinary knowledges to flourish. The study of the newly dominant mode of objectified valuation – money – provides insight into objectified valuation as a social process and, by extension, how its downsides may be remedied.

Kangyu Wang

An Internalist Approach to Hard Choices

11.30 Room 2

Incommensurability gives rise to hard choices. A and B are incommensurable when neither option is better than the other, yet they are not equal either (Parfit 1984; Griffin 1986; Raz 1986; Chang 2002, 2010; Sugden 2009). In a hard choice, the agent has no more normative reason to choose either option. Reason internalism (Williams 1981; Broome, 1993) says that normative reasons are based on desires. Granting all these, it follows that in hard choices one desires neither option more than the other yet does not desire them equally. It further follows that if to resolve a hard choice by deliberating requires one to come to have more reason for one option than the other, one must desire one option than the other after deliberating.

I develop an internalist model for this process, drawing on
 (1) a model of incommensurability developed by Hajek and Rabinowicz (2021),
 (2) a theory of multidimensionality developed by Hedden and Muñoz (2023),
 (3) analyses of the objects of desires of Savage (1954) and Jeffrey (1965), and
 (4) discussions on desire moderation by Sinhababu (2009) and Yip (2022).

A choice is hard when there are multiple permissible orderings among the options in terms of the strengths of the desires for those options, which results from the multidimensionality of the agent's desires involved in this choice and the agent's taking multiple ways to aggregate those multidimensional desires as simultaneously desirable. To resolve a hard choice, the agent has to moderate how much they desire each object of desire and/or moderate how much they desire to aggregate desires in each way.

Ruth Chang develops an alternative approach. Her theory of hard choice is combined with a hybrid theory of reason (2002, 2017, 2020, 2022a, 2022b). Chang says that when and only when external reasons presented by the world "run out", one can exercise one's normative

power to create a will-based (not desire-based) internal reason for oneself to resolve this problem and that her theory allows one's human agency to play an "active role" to play in determining what reasons one have. Chang's approach is problematic. I argue that the hybrid structure of Chang's theory of normative reason creates a kind of bootstrapping problem: in some cases, one can make what they primitively desire to do the thing that they normatively ought to do by failing to be motivated by the external reason which should have motivated them. Moreover, I argue that the "active role" Chang grants agents is not as active as it may *prima facie* look like: there is nothing one can actively do about whether one has an active role to play or whether to play an active role when such a role is available. For these reasons, my internalist theory is superior to Chang's.

Lava Schadde

TOWARDS DIFFERENT NOTIONS OF SEX

12.10 Room 1

Recent work on sex (Haslanger 2016; Asta 2018; Richardson 2022) has tried to account for how we might claim, following Butler (1991, 1993), that not just gender but also sex is socially constructed.Such work stands in a long tradition of thought concerned with the valuation of the body through gendered patriarchal mechanisms (a selection: Beauvoir 1949; Butler 1991, 1993; Tuana 1997; Moi 1999; Young 2002). Claiming that sex is constructed is often taken to be a first step towards explaining how not merely gender norms and standards that inflict harm upon people but also sex norms and standards (Bettcher 2016, Moi 1999, Young 2002). Further, it has been leveraged to explain the violence with which the gender binary is enforced, especially upon intersex and trans subjects (Bettcher 2014, 2016), and is taken to support the deconstruction of the sex/gender binary (Butler 1991, 1993) and the cis/trans binary, which have both been criticized as pernicious and oppressive (Awkward-Rich 2022; Bey 2021)

In this paper, I argue that 'sex' figures as a blanket term for different kinds of phenomena we should hold apart. Firstly, I challenge Ásta's (2018) application of their framework of conferralism to sex. I argue that while Ásta's account of conferralism about sex can account for sex assignment and sex roles as social properties conferred upon individuals by institutions or communal agents, it cannot account for a further notion of biological sex employed by different scientific discourses. I show then that sex is not always conferred. Secondly, I consider Haslanger's (2016) and Richardson's (2022) accounts of sex pluralism, in which they argue for disambiguating sex and claiming that what sex *means* is dependent on our context, scientific practices, and language use. I argue that while such accounts are better suited to help us differentiate notions of sex that are to differing degrees socially constructed, such frameworks fall short of explaining forms of oppression that trans people experience. Further, they are unable to explain the widespread use of sex terms in transgender communities, thereby lacking an explanation for a phenomenon of trans usages of gender *and* sex terms.

To take a step towards remedying this, I suggest distinguishing different sex-related terms, namely scientific notions of sex, ordinary notions of 'sex', 'sex assignment', 'sex roles', 'gender roles', and 'passing'. Separating different notions of sex allows us to better theorize

and understand the cause and perpetuation of gendered and sexed oppression by understanding when and how certain notions of sex are socially constructed (and when not), and how they play a role in the upholding of oppressive binaries, while not conceding to a blanket notion of socially constructed sex. I argue that allowing for such differing notions of sex (including 'scientific' notions) is important not just towards the ends of scientific and philosophical investigation but also for ensuring reproductive health, justice, and adequate sex-related care. I conclude by suggesting further topical and methodological avenues of research for thinking about sex, gender, and the body.

Jorge Bonet Goméz

DEONTOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS: A STUDY ON THE LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF NORMATIVITY IN HUSSERL'S LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS

12.10 Room 2 (online)

Deontic logic is the logic devoted to the study of deontic relations, their structures, and how normative systems can be made somehow coherent while avoiding contradictions. Deontic logic has been studied extensively from different perspectives and in relation to a wide variety of normative and ethical problems. Most of these logics are based on alethic operators which correlate with a semantics in terms of relations of accessibility to worlds. Certainly, the ought operator O seems to have some similarity with the necessity operator ($\square$). Nevertheless, there are alternative proposals that have tried to define norms in terms of other kinds of logical relations. Interestingly, Edmund Husserl in his Logical Investigations, contrary to the views of his masters Bolzano and Brentano, believed that normative predicates were dependent on logical relations between predicates and value-predicates (Husserl, 2012; Mulligan, 2006). Normativity would not be a separate and independent domain with its own laws, but a domain reducible to a logical schema of a certain kind. Specifically, this schema is to be found (in the chapter II of Prolegomena to Pure Logic) where it is described, but neither axiomatised nor formalised. In the 1970's George Kalinowsky made various studies in Deontic Logic and, indeed, he studied this passage from Husserl (1972). However, as he puts it in the text, he made a partial formalization of Husserl's notion, not giving a full account on how they could be formalized. In this essay I formalize such logical formulas which ground normativity. In order to do so, first I introduce the reader to Husserl's thought on the relation between Logic, normativity and axiology (2). Then I propose and discuss a first-order logic model, namely Husserl's Deontic Logic (HDL), according to which we could formalize Husserl's view on normativity (3). Having shown the problems of HDL I propose an alternative formalization of HDL, namely HDL' that will overcome some of the problems which we can encounter in HDL (4). After it, I refer to two problems that both HDL and HDL' may face: non-optionality and the impossibility of supererogation (5). I conclude giving some remarks on some remaining questions to be looked in Husserl's reduction of norms to logic (6).

Anca Pop

Healing Through or Against Illness

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Chris Salt

CAN CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING HUMAN FLOURISHING VINDICATE THE EXISTENCE OF UNIVERSAL MORAL VALUES?

13.50 Room 2

Bernard Williams argued that considerations regarding human flourishing can only provide what he calls the 'primitive cores' of values. For example, the desire to meet universal basic needs like food, water and shelter produces the primitive core of freedom, understood as the ability to act unimpeded. Full values, however, are elaborated within a given society. The full value of freedom, for instance, is elaborated through a social process in which claims to power are evaluated as reasonable or not, with only unreasonable claims to power constituting an infringement upon our freedom. For example, we do not typically view prohibitions on murder as constituting the same infringement upon our freedom as prohibitions concerning religious practice, despite both impeding our ability to act in some way, as we consider prohibitions on murder reasonable. Williams argues that due to their different historical contexts, however, different societies will elaborate values differently. Different societies will possess different values of freedom, for instance, because they will hold different views concerning what constitutes a reasonable claim to power. Whilst the 'primitive cores' of values are universal to human beings, full values are relative to the societies in which they are elaborated, with no external criteria to decide between them.

I suggest that the Neo-Aristotelian Philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre's discussion of independent practical reasoning as a universally human good, and the networks of giving and receiving this necessitates, reveals how considerations regarding human flourishing can take us beyond William's 'primitive cores' of values and towards full, universal values. In the case of freedom, his discussion provides a universal criterion to distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable claims to power, with reasonable claims to power being those conducive to the networks of giving and receiving required for us to develop and achieve excellence in our independent practical reasoning abilities. Evaluating which claims to power are conducive to these networks requires collective deliberation amongst a wide range of people. I will explore the necessity of Thomas Aquinas' virtue of *misericordia* for this process, offering what I believe to be a better justification for its invocation than MacIntyre's own.

Structure

I will begin by outlining Williams' challenge. I will then turn to MacIntyre's discussions of independent practical reasoning and the networks of giving and receiving this necessitates. Focussing on the values of freedom and justice, I will argue that such considerations can take us beyond the primitive cores of values highlighted by Williams and towards full, universal values. I will end with a discussion of the importance of *misericordia* for our collective deliberations about the common good.

Liam Livesley

MAKING SENSE OF DISABILITY PRIDE

14.30 Room 1

Elizabeth Barnes has prominently argued that accounts of disability must "make sense of" disability pride. She has also argued that her own account — Disability-As-Minority-Body — does this well, while hierarchical oppression-based accounts like my own — Disability-As-Oppression —fail to do this. In this paper, I draw out, from Barnes's ambiguous setup, what making sense of disability pride might involve. I distinguish a "Strong Pride Requirement" and a "Weak Pride Requirement". I then argue that Barnes's account turns out to fail to meet the Strong Pride Requirement, as, in fact, do most accounts. Absent good reasons to be invested in the Strong Pride Requirement, then, it looks to be *too* strong. I then argue, contra critics, that accounts like my own can meet the Weak Pride Requirement. However, the requirement is so weak that this is no particular achievement. I conclude, therefore, that the requirement to make sense of disability pride is not a useful discriminator when choosing between accounts of disability.

Drawing on Barnes's gloss on what disability pride is, I distinguish two ways we might cash out her requirement to make sense of disability pride. On the Strong Pride Requirement, accounts must allow that disability — as bodily difference — might be worth celebrating. On the Weak Pride Requirement, accounts must merely allow that *something* about disability might be worth celebrating.

I argue that Disability-As-Minority-Body cannot meet the Strong Pride Requirement. On Barnes's account, disability is not just bodily difference. Rather, it's to have a bodily state that the Disability Rights Movement classifies as being among the bodily states for which they seek to promote justice. So, at most the account can say something like "having a body that the Disability Rights Movement classifies in a particular way might be worth celebrating", which does not meet the Strong Pride Requirement. Indeed, any account that doesn't centre on disability as bodily difference will fail here, limiting us to the asocial, essentialising end of the spectrum of accounts of disability. Absent good reasons to uphold the Strong Pride Requirement, it looks to be too strong, then.

Barnes has argued that accounts like Disability-As-Oppression — on which to be disabled is to be socially subordinated in virtue of being perceived to have bodily features that are taken to merit that subordination — make disability something "wholly negative", leaving nothing open for celebration. If this is right, Disability-As-Oppression and similar accounts can't meet the Weak pride Requirement. I argue that Disability-As-Oppression does, at least, leave open that the existence of, and participation in, a distinct disability culture might be worth celebrating. That being said, it seems like most — if not all — accounts will be able to meet the Weak Pride Requirement via similar appeals to disability culture.

I conclude, then, that the requirement to make sense of disability pride — at least as construed from Barnes — is not a useful discriminator when choosing between accounts of disability. The Strong Pride Requirement closes off too many candidate accounts, while the Weak Pride Requirement closes off too few.

Patrick J. Winther-Larsen

Vulnerability and Untimely Blame: Blaming at the 'Wrong' Time

14.30 Room 2

In this talk, I'll explore whether certain contextual features can undermine the propriety of otherwise fitting instances of blame. In essence, I'll argue that blame can be expressed at the 'wrong' time, which I call 'untimely blame'. Specifically, I'll focus on cases where the blamer fails to consider the *vulnerability* of the wrongdoer (i.e., the target of blame). For instance, cases where they would be blamed after they've just received bad medical news or suffered a bereavement sometime following the relevant wrongdoing. These unfortunate circumstances may lead to a state of *temporary* vulnerability, which can increase their sensitivity to harm (in other words, they would find being blamed more harmful than they would otherwise). It seems fair to suggest that we should be sympathetic to their situation, and that blame should be postponed until they've recovered. In other cases, the target's vulnerability may be *permanent* due to terminal illness or severe accidents. In these cases, the window of opportunity in which the target can be blamed is significantly shortened. That is, if someone is expected to die within a short amount of time, then it won't be possible blame them at a later point in time. Unlike temporary cases, then, a better opportunity to blame the wrongdoer won't ever arise, which could have interesting implications for the 'timeliness' constraint I'm proposing. Perhaps it's appropriate to blame despite their vulnerability, or perhaps they should be blamed posthumously.

I'll address two objections to my account: the first has it that this type of untimely blame is reducible ultimately to disproportional blame. In short, one might object that, when the target is vulnerable, one's expression blame becomes disproportionate or too intense, rather than untimely, if the blamer doesn't *modify* the intensity of their blame in light of the target's vulnerability. Rather than postponing blame, one might object, maybe we should simply blame them in a softer manner than we would otherwise, to avoid causing them an undue amount of harm. In response, I would suggest that one can arguably wrong the *victim* by blaming the perpetrator in softer manner, thereby effectively downplaying the severity of the wrongdoing. Furthermore, the problem of disproportionate blame is traditionally taken to be that expressions of blame can be too severe or lenient relative to the severity of the relevant *wrongdoing*, and not the state of the wrongdoer. The second objection holds that the constraint I'm proposing is too *epistemically overdemanding*. Essentially, it might be too difficult to find out whether the target is vulnerable or not. It is, after all, often difficult to know what another person is going through, and they might be unwilling to reveal whether they're going through a hard time. (Moreover, it might be disrespectful to pry for details.) While I'm sympathetic to this counterargument, it seems to me fair to suggest that we have a responsibility to ensure that, when we confront others, we do so when we have reason to believe that they're in a state where they can handle it.

Felix Westeren

Future Autonomy and Trusteeship

Our generation is faced with a number of important future-affecting decisions. Some of the most important concern our response to climate change. How quickly we reduce our emissions, how well we can protect ecosystems from the effects of climate change and what things we choose to preserve into the future will have a very significant impact on the lives people are able to live in the future. Even relatively small policy changes can have large future effects. The contention of this paper is that, if we (as we should) care about the ability of future people to lead autonomous lives, then we need some method of judging our actions for their effects on future autonomy. I propose and defend one such principle, the *Trusteeship Principle.*

I also defend the idea that future people are owed, as a matter of justice, extensive autonomy rights that go beyond the satisfaction of their basic needs. Indeed, the *Principle* I defend depends on an expansive but, I think, defensible view of the autonomy-related interests and rights of future people. In particular, I defend the idea that future people have rights against us interfering with the *formation* and the *pursuit* of their conceptions of the good. We violate the former when we improperly influence the conceptions of the good of future people, and the latter when we do not leave them the options they need for the effective exercise of their autonomy.

I evaluate some candidate principles that could guide our future actions. I reject principles that rely entirely on preference satisfaction on the grounds that they permit us to determine the conceptions of the good of future people, wrongly interfering with their free formation. I also reject principles that demand excessive sacrifices of autonomy by the current generation in order to ensure the basic needs of a very large number of future generations are met.

To avoid this, the *Trusteeship Principle* incorporates a condition that protects the current generation from excessive sacrifices of autonomy. In deciding the level of excessive cost we must decide whether it is excessive to ask someone to forgo an autonomous life, even if the consequences of not doing so mean that we condemn others to that fate. This would ideally be done through some form of intergenerational deliberation.

I argue that since future people do not yet exist, we must hold their rights in trust on their behalf, and that this has important consequences for how we ought to approach decisions that will affect them. In deciding what costs for the current generation are excessive we must, as trustees, deliberate about the relative weights of our autonomy rights and the autonomy rights we hold in trust. The answers we arrive at will depend on very fundamental views about how we ought to relate to one another, and how seriously we take the roles we must assume.

Tommaso Soriani & Emanuele Tullio

A Value Retroactivity Puzzle for Perdurantism

15.30 Room 2 (online)

Perdurantism posits that continuant persons and moral agents are maximally extended four-dimensional aggregates (spacetime worms) of appropriately related instantaneous temporal parts (person-stages) (Sider, 2001). Yet, Johnston contests this concept, contending that non-maximally extended worms, which overlap substantial temporal segments of a person's lifetime and are referred to as *personites*, exhibit all the necessary mental and physical properties except maximality. This, in his view, makes them eligible for inclusion in moral calculus. The ethical challenge arises from personites suddenly coming into and going out of existence, resulting in their interests being frequently disregarded, leading to the *Personite Problem* (PP) for Perdurantism (Johnston, 2016, 2017).

Given this metaphysical framework, we delve into a particular puzzle for Perdurantism concerning *Value Retroactivity* (VR), which posits that well-being is susceptible to retroactive effects: the value of what occurs at T (whether it's an instant or an interval of time) can be influenced by what occurs at T* (with T* later than T) (Frugé, 2022a, 2022b). We argue that it is desirable for Perdurantists to accommodate VR, as it aligns naturally with other principles often associated with the standard perdurantist view, such as Eternalism (the belief that past, present, and future entities all exist) and Permanentism (the belief that everything always exists) (Ingram & Tallant, 2022). Moreover, VR provides a foundation for the prudential concern that person-stages of the same person have for one another (Miller & West, forthcoming).

Especially considering these latter elements, Perdurantists can easily incorporate the idea that VR also applies to individuals after their death. However, the complication arises when personites enter the picture: is it desirable for Perdurantists to maintain that VR is also applicable to personites, or not?

There are prima facie differences between persons and personites regarding vanishing and dying, which may justify their exclusion from VR. The majority of personites, whether *gappy* (not temporally continuous) or not, do not include the person-stage coinciding with the person's death, resulting in their *vanishing* by ceasing to be temporally located. Some questions we will address include: how does vanishing metaphysically differ from dying, specifically understood as undergoing irreversible loss of the capacity for consciousness (Holland, 2010)? Could dying confer *moral status*, and thus value, to individuals, such as those maximal worms corresponding to persons, over those who do not, such as vanishing personites?

In the end, our aim is to argue that endorsing VR is overall worthwhile for Perdurantists, even if it entails extending it to personites. We also aim to explore potential solutions to some of the challenges they may face in doing so.

Karri Heikkinen

Contractualist Population Ethics

16.10 Room 1

In this paper, I sketch a new contractualist theory of population ethics. I propose that when trying to decide which future population we should bring into existence, we should ask ourselves: if the different possible people that could come to exist depending on what we choose had to settle the issue among themselves, which option would they agree on?

I argue that we can approach this question in terms of what I call *existential claims*. Theseare moral claims that a possible person has for or against being brought into existence, the strength of which depends on how good or bad the life of that person would be. This framing is useful because the question of which existential claims should be satisfied is analogous to another question that Contractualists are very familiar with, namely the question of which competing moral claims should be satisfied in ordinary cases of interpersonal aggregation, like Scanlon's (1998) famous Transmitter Room example.

I argue that we can combine this framing with the most popular view in the interpersonal aggregation literature, known as *partial aggregation* (e.g. Kamm 1993, Voorhoeve 2014, Tadros 2019, Mann 2021), and use it to make progress in population ethics. I propose the following.

Aggregate Relevant Existential Claims (AREC): In a choice of population, we ought to choose the alternative that satisfies the greatest sum of strength-weighted, relevant existential claims, where an existential claim is relevant if and only if it is sufficiently strong relative to the strongest existential claim that it competes with.

After outlining the view, I show that AREC can deal with three pertinent problems in population ethics, namely the non-identity problem, the Repugnant Conclusion, and the Sadistic Conclusion (Parfit 1984). I also note that AREC makes the correct choice dependent on the specific set of options we have but argue that this need not worry us.

After establishing my proposal, I discuss two objections to the idea that our choice of population should be justifiable to merely possible people. First, Mulgan (2006) argues that opening the hypothetical contract at the heart of contractualism to merely possible people would lead to something like the Repugnant Conclusion. My response is that this objection assumes a rather Rawlsian (1971) view of mutually disinterested maximisers, and it can be avoided by adopting a more Scanlonian understanding of the parties of the contract. Second, we might worry that justifying our choices to merely possible people is incompatible with the so-called procreation asymmetry. I argue that, if one wishes to, there are multiple ways to avoid the conflict. For example, following Frick (2020), we can interpret AREC as describing conditional obligations.

Given that AREC secures a very intuitively attractive set of results, my conclusion is that it represents a promising attempt to make sense of what we owe to future people. More broadly, I believe AREC's success shows that the previously unpopular idea of justifying our choices to merely possible people is worth further development.

Pat Hayes

Role-Centred Virtue Aesthetics

16.10

In his 2018 article, Tom Robins defends a taxonomy of aesthetic virtues as belonging to either character traits or functions. Running parallel to discussions of reliabilism and responsibilism in virtue epistemology, his taxonomy is meant to provide a satisfactory definition of art and give further explanation of why we appreciate it. While his account succeeds in providing a parallel taxonomy, several issues arise in bringing reliabilism into virtue theories of aesthetics. In this paper, I draw attention to the shortfalls of a reliabilist account by examining cases of forgery and AI art. These examples are intended to highlight that the value of art cannot be reduced to a result of aesthetic faculty virtues and that it is not theoretically useful to think of aesthetic faculties as virtues proper. Motivated by these cases and building on Christine Swanton's discussion of moral virtues in particular roles in her 2021 book, I will defend an account of aesthetic role virtues that can overcome the shortcomings of a reliabilist account while maintaining Robins' intuitions about artistic valueand the theoretical need for aesthetic faculties and offering a more holistic account that includes partial virtues and virtues in development.