**Abstracts for Thursday**

**9:15 – KEYNOTE**  
Gerardo Viera (University of Sheffield) – *“From the Unity of Time to the Unity of Consciousness”*

Consciousness has a number of peculiar features that seem to defy explanation. One of these is the unity of consciousness. Sitting here at my desk, I see the pattern of colours on my computer screen, I feel the resistance of the keys as a type, I heard the music coming from my speakers, and I can taste and smell coffee. These experiences are not had in isolation from one another. There is a difficult to articulate sense in which these experiences are had in a unified manner – they come together to compose my overall experience. The aim of this talk is to demystify this unity of consciousness. I will show how the unity of consciousness can be explained in terms of our capacity for integrating temporal information across sensory modalities. This will not only allow us to better understand this form of unity but will allow us to explain the unity of consciousness using the normal tools of modern cognitive science.

**11:15 – Room A *(ONLINE?)***  
Doreen Sesiro *- Could a Transhuman be the Same Person as Distinct from other Persons Through Time? The Metaphysical Aspect of the Botho Perspective*

My paper will tackle, from the metaphysical aspect of the Botho perspective, the issue of whether or not transhumanism would affect personal identity in the context of enhanced persons, viz., whether enhancement has any impact on the identity of a person as distinct from that of other persons. According to the Botho perspective, immateriality and relationality are necessary and sufficient for a person’s continued existence. Immateriality in this broader context refers not only to consciousness from the perspective of transhumanism, but also to the notions of life force and spirituality, that according to the Botho perspective, are thought to house consciousness. From this viewpoint, loss of consciousness would not necessarily cause loss of personal identity. That is to say, even if an enhanced individual may not remember that s/he is the same person, s/he would be the same person as long as other human persons like his family and friends relate with him/her as the same person, and as long as s/he retains the same immaterial nature. I apply the metaphysical aspect of the Botho perspective to hypothetically enhanced human beings and I argue that an individual with a different body or no particular body could remain the same person in both the standard interpretation of transhumanism and the Botho perspective. I also show instances where the Botho perspective and transhumanism diverge and I demonstrates that the Botho perspective is philosophically plausible relative to the transhumanist perspective. Scholars in African philosophy have largely ignored the debate about personal identity in the context of transhumanism. This paper will therefore add new knowledge to the literature on African philosophy by introducing the implications of enhancements in an African context.

Keywords: African Metaphysics, Biotechnological Enhancement, Botho, Personal Identity, Transhumanism

**11:15 – Room B**   
Nick Clanchy - *Hermeneutical Injustices with a Universal Basic Income*

I outline a new, more materialist sort of strategy for tackling hermeneutical injustices that consists in doing away with interests people have in certain things about themselves being intelligible. I argue for pursuing this sort of strategy to tackle hermeneutical injustices arising in the context of the welfare state, and suggest doing so will most likely take the form of implementing a suitably generous scheme of universal basic income. I end by asking what this tells us about why hermeneutical injustices are politically important, and sketch an answer that draws on Michael Walzer’s *Spheres of Justice*.

**11:55 – Room A**   
Samuel Laves - *Taking Wittgenstein Seriously: A critique of moral intuitionism*

GE Moore is considered by many to be one of the founding figures of metaethics and it is  clear that his philosophy still has considerable influence over metaethicists working today.  One area of metaethics in particular that has clear intellectual heritage from Moore is moral  intuitionism, which will be the focus of this paper.1In particular, I will focus on Robert  Audi’s account because it is the most influential in contemporary metaethical discussions.  I will argue that Audi’s conception of the self-evidence of moral intuitions is is too close  to Moore’s self-evident knowledge claims that Wittgenstein criticizes in *On Certainty* (Wittgenstein 1969). Because of this similarity, Wittgenstein’s criticisms of Moore ought  to apply to Audi’s account as well. This leaves moral intuitionists with two choices: either  they must recognize that moral intuitionism’s conception of self-evidence is flawed and  thus must abandon intuitionism, or they must find a new way to conceive of moral  intuitions. I will conclude by arguing that recent research on the concept of moral certainty  presents intuitionists with a promising path for the latter option.

In *The Good and the Right* (Audi 2004) Audi develops a sophisticated account of  self-evidence that serves as a basis for his moral intuitionism for which he traces direct  lineage to Moore. He insists that for moral intuitionism to be a viable answer to moral  skepticism, moral intuitionists must posit that these self-evident propositions are a form of  *knowledge*. He differs from Moore in that he claims that this knowledge can be justified,  though non-inferentially. He says “There is some sense in which, although an intuition…  is not grounded in a proof or argument, it *can* be a conclusion formed through rational  inquiry or searching reflection” (Audi 2004, 45). This sort of reflection can constitute a  justification for moral intuitions even without premises (47). Wittgenstein’s critique of  Moore turns on precisely this point: that one can know something without being able to  prove it. For Wittgenstein, this is not a proper use of the word “know” (*OC* 151). I will  contend that Audi is mistaken because he starts from the wrong starting point. If we take  Wittgenstein’s critique of Moore seriously, we see that it is a mistake to assume that to  defeat the skeptic we must posit intuitions as a form of knowledge.

That said, I believe that this critique applies to other moral epistemologies that attempt to provide a  justification for our deeply held moral beliefs.

However, I will also present a way out for moral intuitionism. Recently, some  philosophers have argued that Wittgenstein’s reflections in *On Certainty* can be applied to  moral epistemology. Most prominently, Nigel Pleasants (2008, 2009) has developed an  account of moral certainty that, I will argue, can be used as a starting point for a moral  intuitionism. Instead of thinking of intuitions as self-evident knowledge, intuitions are best  described as moral certainties in that they are thought-free, non-propositional, and action

based. This will allow the moral intuitionist to answer the moral skeptic while avoiding the  conceptual error that Wittgenstein recognized in Moore’s writings.

Works Cited

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**11:55 – Room B**Camilo Ardila - *Pluriversal Politics and Political Reconciliation*

Pluriversal politics has received more attention in theoretical debates on the reverberations of European colonialism and imperialism (Blaser & de la Cadena, 2018; Escobar, 2020; FitzGerald, 2022; Kothari et al., 2019; Mignolo, 2018; Reiter, 2018; Savransky, 2021) The pluriverse, as the Zapatista dictum suggests, suggests “a world in which many worlds can fit.” This notion is not only associated with the critique of European modernity by revealing its colonial and imperial foundations but also with the encouragement of more horizontal dialogues between different traditions of socio-political thought. The assumption here is that, despite a modern and violent project of civilisation, there still exist alternative worlds like Indigenous, peasant and Afro-descendant communities with their own ontological, epistemological and socio-political proposals. These worlds may offer alternatives to the modern crises of capitalism, colonialism, heteropatriarchy and anthropocentrism once in conversation with European modernity.

In this paper, I explore the implications of this theoretical framework for political reconciliation. One may argue that political reconciliation consists in a world in which many worlds coexist together without one subsuming the others. This is what I call in this paper “pluriversal reconciliation”, i.e. a new beginning in the realm of politics for groups alienated from one another by a terrible past and deeply divided by their incompatible or even incommensurable frameworks. I argue that pluriversal politics offers a conception of political reconciliation that sheds light on some post-war, post-dictatorial and post-colonial questions. The emphasis of this conception of political reconciliation is on: (1) the socio-political, epistemic and ontological dimensions of political violence; (2) the recuperation of subaltern worlds as realistic, and perhaps less destructive, alternatives to the hegemonic order; (3) the preservation of the subaltern difference alive as repositories of alternative futures.

**13:30 - KEYNOTE**   
Michael Wheeler (University of Stirling) – *“Cognitive Models in Science and Beckett”*

The moniker ‘cognitive arts and humanities’ refers to an active interdisciplinary field of research, the aim of which is to bring the cognitive sciences and the arts and humanities into a mutually productive relationship. As a contribution towards this project, and following some brief scene-setting remarks for the uninitiated, I’ll explore the view that we should think of (at least some of) Samuel Beckett’s literary and dramatic works as engaged in cognitive modelling, in a way that is continuous with what goes on in cognitive science. This view has been defended recently by Marco Bernini in his book Beckett and the Cognitive Method: Mind, Models and Exploratory Narratives. Taking Bernini’s cognitive literary studies analysis as my point of departure, and focussing on the ontology of (i) characters and situations in fictional narratives, and (ii) models in science, I’ll use a mixture of philosophical reflection, literary analysis and sensitivity to scientific practice, to take a Bernini-style view as far as I can. I’ll argue that it shapes up well against some worries that might be derived from Gregory Currie’s paper ‘Models as Fictions, Fictions as Models’ (The Monist, 2016), but that, in the end, Beckett’s work (and by extension literature, drama and the arts more generally) is likely to reward a different although related cognitive arts and humanities approach, one that I’ll begin to sketch. According to this alternative view, one key value of artworks - including literary texts, including Beckett’s - is that they are ways of ‘externalizing’ our cognitive models. This process enables the sharing, stress-testing, and even the deliberate ‘breaking’, of those models, in experiments whose fundamental character is continuous with that of experiments found in science.

**15:30 – KEYNOTE**Patricia Kitcher (Columbia University) – *“The Right vs. the Good: Kant vs. Rawls”*

Rawls regarded the priority of the right over the good as the characteristic feature of his Kantian constructivism.  In this case, he also believed that his theory was not merely inspired by Kant, but in complete agreement with him.  I have four goals in the paper.  First, I try to refute this canonical reading of Kant on the relation between the right and the good.  Second, I fill out Kant’s picture of the rational nature that has intrinsic value.  Rational natures have the capacities required for the possibility of morality: They have the law of duty within, they are predisposed to respect themselves and others who have the law of duty within, and they belong to a community of other such rational natures.  Third, although I disagree with Rawls that Kant prioritized the right over the good, I agree with him on the centrality of the relation between the right and the good in an ethical theory to the nature of the theory.  My third goal is to use Rawls’s issue to illuminate the unusual status of Kant’s moral theory.  Rawls took Kant to prioritize the right over the good and so to be some type of moral constructivist; I take Kant to regard the right and the good as necessarily coeval and so to be a certain kind of moral realist.  Finally, I try to use my examination of the good, the intrinsically valuable in Kant to reject any temptation to regard his ethics as in dependent on his teleology.  On Kant’s theory, moral value exists in the world, even though “*man* (or any rational being in the world) *under moral laws*” is not nature’s “final purpose” (5. 449).